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      La acción moral. Contraste entre las explicaciones motivacionales dadas por la filosofía y la psicología

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          La pregunta de por qué actuamos moralmente ha sido respondida de diferentes maneras tanto por la filosofía como por la psicología. La filosofía presenta explicaciones que pueden agruparse en tres tipos de posiciones: a) internalista o racionalista, derivada de Kant; b) externalista o emotivista, derivada de Hume; c) racionalista y externalista, o combinación de posiciones. La psicología, por su parte, ofrece explicaciones que pueden corresponder a las de la filosofía, pero con una primacía del tipo c). Un análisis crítico del fundamento de las distintas posiciones, así como de la evidencia empírica disponible en lo moral y en otros campos de la psicología, permite rechazar las dos primeras explicaciones a favor de la tercera.

          Translated abstract

          The question about why we act morally, has been answered by philosophy as well as by psychology. Philosophy offers explanations that could be grouped in three types of positions: a) internalism or rationalism, derived from Kant; b) externalism or emotivism, derived from Hume; c) combination of positions. These positions are also present in psychology, although c) predominates.A critical analysis of the suppositions underlying the different positions, as well as the empirical evidence in morality and related fields of psychology, allows us to reject the first two positions in favor of the third.

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                Author and article information

                Role: ND
                Revista de Estudios Sociales
                Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de los Andes (Bogotá )
                August 2004
                : 0
                : 18
                : 27-35


                Product Information: SciELO Colombia


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