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      An action plan for pan-European defence against new SARS-CoV-2 variants

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          Abstract

          COVID-19 cases are very high across Europe. Current measures are not reducing virus spread sufficiently, and new SARS-CoV-2 variants are emerging. The B.1.1.7 and B1.351 variants, first identified in the UK and South Africa, respectively, have spread to many European countries.1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Although the biological properties of these variants are yet to be characterised, epidemiological data suggest they have a higher transmissibility than the original variant.6, 7 These viral properties could increase the effective reproduction number R in the population. In the case of B.1.1.7, estimates suggest R could increase from 1 to about 1.4 with no change in population behavior.3, 4 If true, many countries that have succeeded in reducing R to 1 or less will be confronted with a novel wave of viral spread despite the current measures.8, 9 Once a more contagious variant has established itself, stabilising the number of new infections will become increasingly difficult. Despite the availability of effective vaccines, production to meet demand and roll-out of vaccination programmes will take months. Countries will have to manage high case numbers and their adverse impact for several months to come. With slowly increasing population immunity and evolutionary selection pressure on the virus, the emergence of new SARS-CoV-2 variants will continue, potentially leading to more contagious variants, and perhaps even variants for which existing vaccines are less effective. Such variants could quickly exacerbate the crisis, long before enough people are vaccinated. While awaiting experimental data to understand the new variants, pan-European decisions have to be made, and actions have to be taken immediately to contain the spread of new variants. If measures are not taken to prevent the spread of novel variants with selective advantages, case numbers and hospital admissions will increase. A surge in cases could lead to the breakdown of health-care systems. In many countries, hospitals can no longer deliver care of the usual quality to all patients. Many intensive care units are already beyond capacity, and non-urgent procedures have been postponed for weeks or months. Delayed diagnosis and compromised care delivery for people with other diseases poses additional health risks, not just to patients with COVID-19, but for the whole population. Health-care professionals and other frontline workers have already been working under extreme conditions for most of the past year, and this has had a severe impact on their physical and mental health. If variants like B.1.1.7 lead to a new surge in cases, this could overwhelm health-care professionals and bring health-care systems to the breaking point. Ensuring that the burden on health care professionals is alleviated while safeguarding system sustainability is of critical importance. Adequate support for these crucial forces might require additional funds. Containment and mitigation become more challenging with the rise of a more infectious variant. Assuming that the B.1.1.7 variant does increase R from 1 to 1.4, then allowing it to spread without a change in population behaviour will mean case numbers double every week. Major efforts will be necessary to bring R back down to 1 or less and to regain control. Acting before B.1.1.7 has spread widely means that those same major efforts could strongly reduce the number of new cases and slow down the establishment of B.1.1.7. Europe needs to act now to delay and prevent any further spread of SARS-CoV-2,8, 9 particularly B.1.1.7, even in the absence of final experimental data. A clear plan for immediate pan-European action and rapid establishment of public health measures needs to be formulated since new variants with increased infectivity are likely to continue to arise. We suggest possible core measures in the panel . The guiding principle is to reduce case numbers as quickly as possible as this has strong advantages for health, society and economy. The joint action of all European countries will make each national and local effort more effective and impactful and safeguard public health across Europe. 8 Panel Core measures to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2 in Europe Achieve and maintain low case numbers with a clear prevention strategy • Define clear targets and rekindle motivation: clearly define the targets that need to be met for measures to be lifted and explain the rationale behind them; convincingly convey that the fight against the pandemic needs a collective effort that is in the interest of every citizen; and ensure adequate social and economic support for those in need. • Act early: implement mitigation measures before case numbers spike. • Reduce the number of physical contacts: meet as few different people as possible; implement and improve home-office and online schooling; small, stable social bubbles, and stable groups at home and at work should be preferred over alternating contacts. • Prevent contagion by individual measures such as physical distancing, hygiene, face masks, ventilation, and use of filters, avoiding closed and crowded spaces and staying at home when experiencing symptoms; provide FFP2 masks to those in need and to all who cannot work from home. Monitor the spreading of the virus and of individual variants • Test, trace, isolate, support: enforce mandatory isolation of people with confirmed infections and encourage preventive quarantine of suspected cases; support affected individuals and families. • Screen and test preventively: offer tests at schools and workplaces at no cost to detect outbreaks early and protect people; increase testing capacity to meet demand; use waste-water surveillance to detect local surges. • Increase genetic sequencing and PCR-based detection of the B.1.1.7 variant, as well as other variants of SARS-CoV-2. Stop the virus at borders and protect the vulnerable • Reduce travel within and across national borders, and require tests and quarantine for cross-border travelers; tests should be required 24h before travel and 7–10 days after travel; quarantine anyone arriving from countries with high local COVID-19 transmission or suspicious variants. • Improve the protection of, and support for, the elderly and vulnerable groups; foster European exchange about successful strategies and measures to speed up the progress. Increase the efficacy and pace of vaccination • Speed up vaccination: improve vaccine supply, delivery, and allocation by mutual learning and international cooperation; coordinate efforts to scale up the production of vaccines. • Monitor infections among vaccinated people to detect potential reinfection with new variants or deficient vaccination management as soon as possible. • Answer urgent questions through international cooperation; research ways to improve vaccination regimes to optimise logistics, or increase willingness to be vaccinated using data from multiple countries. Further details are available in the appendix. The longer restrictions last, and the less effective they become, the more depleted people's psychological, social, and economic resources become. Where novel variants require even stricter and longer measures than existing measures, it is of utmost importance to ensure that people with particularly heavy burdens receive financial and social support, that social burdens are justly distributed, and that mental health services meet the increasing demand to cope with bereavement, isolation, loss of income, fear, alcohol and drug misuse, insomnia, and anxiety as a result of the pandemic and lockdown strategies. Contextual factors, and factors affecting risk behaviour such as risk perception, must also be considered. The core principles of action are to avoid importing new variants, to prevent their spread, and to improve molecular surveillance. The earlier and more effectively countries act, the earlier the restrictions can be relaxed. All types of measures ought to be coordinated and synchronised across Europe. Every additional reduction of contagion (ie, of R) counts, as it reduces the necessary duration of strict measures more than proportionally.

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          Most cited references9

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          Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 Lineage B.1.1.7 in England: Insights from linking epidemiological and genetic data

          The SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7, now designated Variant of Concern 202012/01 (VOC) by Public Health England, originated in the UK in late Summer to early Autumn 2020. We examine epidemiological evidence for this VOC having a transmission advantage from several perspectives. First, whole genome sequence data collected from community-based diagnostic testing provides an indication of changing prevalence of different genetic variants through time. Phylodynamic modelling additionally indicates that genetic diversity of this lineage has changed in a manner consistent with exponential growth. Second, we find that changes in VOC frequency inferred from genetic data correspond closely to changes inferred by S-gene target failures (SGTF) in community-based diagnostic PCR testing. Third, we examine growth trends in SGTF and non-SGTF case numbers at local area level across England, and show that the VOC has higher transmissibility than non-VOC lineages, even if the VOC has a different latent period or generation time. Available SGTF data indicate a shift in the age composition of reported cases, with a larger share of under 20 year olds among reported VOC than non-VOC cases. Fourth, we assess the association of VOC frequency with independent estimates of the overall SARS-CoV-2 reproduction number through time. Finally, we fit a semi-mechanistic model directly to local VOC and non-VOC case incidence to estimate the reproduction numbers over time for each. There is a consensus among all analyses that the VOC has a substantial transmission advantage, with the estimated difference in reproduction numbers between VOC and non-VOC ranging between 0.4 and 0.7, and the ratio of reproduction numbers varying between 1.4 and 1.8. We note that these estimates of transmission advantage apply to a period where high levels of social distancing were in place in England; extrapolation to other transmission contexts therefore requires caution.
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            Scientific consensus on the COVID-19 pandemic: we need to act now

            Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has infected more than 35 million people globally, with more than 1 million deaths recorded by WHO as of Oct 12, 2020. As a second wave of COVID-19 affects Europe, and with winter approaching, we need clear communication about the risks posed by COVID-19 and effective strategies to combat them. Here, we share our view of the current evidence-based consensus on COVID-19. SARS-CoV-2 spreads through contact (via larger droplets and aerosols), and longer-range transmission via aerosols, especially in conditions where ventilation is poor. Its high infectivity, 1 combined with the susceptibility of unexposed populations to a new virus, creates conditions for rapid community spread. The infection fatality rate of COVID-19 is several-fold higher than that of seasonal influenza, 2 and infection can lead to persisting illness, including in young, previously healthy people (ie, long COVID). 3 It is unclear how long protective immunity lasts, 4 and, like other seasonal coronaviruses, SARS-CoV-2 is capable of re-infecting people who have already had the disease, but the frequency of re-infection is unknown. 5 Transmission of the virus can be mitigated through physical distancing, use of face coverings, hand and respiratory hygiene, and by avoiding crowds and poorly ventilated spaces. Rapid testing, contact tracing, and isolation are also critical to controlling transmission. WHO has been advocating for these measures since early in the pandemic. In the initial phase of the pandemic, many countries instituted lockdowns (general population restrictions, including orders to stay at home and work from home) to slow the rapid spread of the virus. This was essential to reduce mortality,6, 7 prevent health-care services from being overwhelmed, and buy time to set up pandemic response systems to suppress transmission following lockdown. Although lockdowns have been disruptive, substantially affecting mental and physical health, and harming the economy, these effects have often been worse in countries that were not able to use the time during and after lockdown to establish effective pandemic control systems. In the absence of adequate provisions to manage the pandemic and its societal impacts, these countries have faced continuing restrictions. This has understandably led to widespread demoralisation and diminishing trust. The arrival of a second wave and the realisation of the challenges ahead has led to renewed interest in a so-called herd immunity approach, which suggests allowing a large uncontrolled outbreak in the low-risk population while protecting the vulnerable. Proponents suggest this would lead to the development of infection-acquired population immunity in the low-risk population, which will eventually protect the vulnerable. This is a dangerous fallacy unsupported by scientific evidence. Any pandemic management strategy relying upon immunity from natural infections for COVID-19 is flawed. Uncontrolled transmission in younger people risks significant morbidity 3 and mortality across the whole population. In addition to the human cost, this would impact the workforce as a whole and overwhelm the ability of health-care systems to provide acute and routine care. Furthermore, there is no evidence for lasting protective immunity to SARS-CoV-2 following natural infection, 4 and the endemic transmission that would be the consequence of waning immunity would present a risk to vulnerable populations for the indefinite future. Such a strategy would not end the COVID-19 pandemic but result in recurrent epidemics, as was the case with numerous infectious diseases before the advent of vaccination. It would also place an unacceptable burden on the economy and health-care workers, many of whom have died from COVID-19 or experienced trauma as a result of having to practise disaster medicine. Additionally, we still do not understand who might suffer from long COVID. 3 Defining who is vulnerable is complex, but even if we consider those at risk of severe illness, the proportion of vulnerable people constitute as much as 30% of the population in some regions. 8 Prolonged isolation of large swathes of the population is practically impossible and highly unethical. Empirical evidence from many countries shows that it is not feasible to restrict uncontrolled outbreaks to particular sections of society. Such an approach also risks further exacerbating the socioeconomic inequities and structural discriminations already laid bare by the pandemic. Special efforts to protect the most vulnerable are essential but must go hand-in-hand with multi-pronged population-level strategies. Once again, we face rapidly accelerating increase in COVID-19 cases across much of Europe, the USA, and many other countries across the world. It is critical to act decisively and urgently. Effective measures that suppress and control transmission need to be implemented widely, and they must be supported by financial and social programmes that encourage community responses and address the inequities that have been amplified by the pandemic. Continuing restrictions will probably be required in the short term, to reduce transmission and fix ineffective pandemic response systems, in order to prevent future lockdowns. The purpose of these restrictions is to effectively suppress SARS-CoV-2 infections to low levels that allow rapid detection of localised outbreaks and rapid response through efficient and comprehensive find, test, trace, isolate, and support systems so life can return to near-normal without the need for generalised restrictions. Protecting our economies is inextricably tied to controlling COVID-19. We must protect our workforce and avoid long-term uncertainty. Japan, Vietnam, and New Zealand, to name a few countries, have shown that robust public health responses can control transmission, allowing life to return to near-normal, and there are many such success stories. The evidence is very clear: controlling community spread of COVID-19 is the best way to protect our societies and economies until safe and effective vaccines and therapeutics arrive within the coming months. We cannot afford distractions that undermine an effective response; it is essential that we act urgently based on the evidence. To support this call for action, sign the John Snow Memorandum.
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              • Record: found
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              Estimated transmissibility and severity of novel SARS-CoV-2 Variant of Concern 202012/01 in England

              A novel SARS-CoV-2 variant, VOC 202012/01, emerged in southeast England in November 2020 and appears to be rapidly spreading towards fixation. We fitted a two-strain mathematical model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission to observed COVID-19 hospital admissions, hospital and ICU bed occupancy, and deaths; SARS-CoV-2 PCR prevalence and seroprevalence; and the relative frequency of VOC 202012/01 in the three most heavily affected NHS England regions (South East, East of England, and London). We estimate that VOC 202012/01 is 56% more transmissible (95% credible interval across three regions 50-74%) than preexisting variants of SARS-CoV-2. We were unable to find clear evidence that VOC 202012/01 results in greater or lesser severity of disease than preexisting variants. Nevertheless, the increase in transmissibility is likely to lead to a large increase in incidence, with COVID-19 hospitalisations and deaths projected to reach higher levels in 2021 than were observed in 2020, even if regional tiered restrictions implemented before 19 December are maintained. Our estimates suggest that control measures of a similar stringency to the national lockdown implemented in England in November 2020 are unlikely to reduce the effective reproduction number R t to less than 1, unless primary schools, secondary schools, and universities are also closed. We project that large resurgences of the virus are likely to occur following easing of control measures. It may be necessary to greatly accelerate vaccine roll-out to have an appreciable impact in suppressing the resulting disease burden.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Lancet
                Lancet
                Lancet (London, England)
                Elsevier Ltd.
                0140-6736
                1474-547X
                21 January 2021
                21 January 2021
                Affiliations
                [a ]Max-Planck-Institute for Dynamics and Self-Organization, 37077 Göttingen, Germany
                [b ]University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
                [c ]Technische Universität Braunschweig, Helmholtz Zentrum für Infektionsforschung, Braunschweig, Germany
                [d ]University Hospital, Goethe-University Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany
                [e ]Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria
                [f ]London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
                [g ]University Hospital Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
                [h ]University of Trento, Trento, Italy
                [i ]London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London, UK
                [j ]Karolinska Institute, Stockholm, Sweden
                [k ]University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL, USA
                [l ]Minerva Foundation Institute for Medical Research, Helsinki, Finland
                [m ]Medical University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
                [n ]Complexity Science Hub Vienna, Vienna, Austria
                [o ]Ludwig-Maximilian-Universität München, Munich, Germany
                [p ]ifo Institute, Leibniz Institute for Economic Research, University of Munich, Munich, Germany
                [q ]University of Maribor, Maribor, Slovenia
                [r ]Alma Mater Europaea, Maribor, Slovenia
                [s ]University of Crete, Crete, Greece
                [t ]Department of Political Science, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
                [u ]Faculty of Mathematics, Informatics and Mechanics, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
                Article
                S0140-6736(21)00150-1
                10.1016/S0140-6736(21)00150-1
                7825950
                33485462
                7c333853-3932-4cad-b7a3-25f37964b3da
                © 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

                Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website. Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active.

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