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      SITUATING FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

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      Episteme

      Cambridge University Press (CUP)

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          ABSTRACT

          Feminist epistemologies hold that differences in the social locations of inquirers make for epistemic differences, for instance, in the sorts of things that inquirers are justified in believing. In this paper we situate this core idea in feminist epistemologies with respect to debates about social constructivism. We address three questions. First, are feminist epistemologies committed to a form of social constructivism about knowledge? Second, to what extent are they incompatible with traditional epistemological thinking? Third, do the answers to these questions raise serious problems for feminist epistemologies? We argue that some versions of two of the main strands in feminist epistemology – feminist standpoint theory and feminist empiricism – are committed to a form of social constructivism, which requires certain departures from traditional epistemological thinking. But we argue that these departures are less problematic than one might think. Thus, (some) feminist epistemologies provide a plausible way of understanding how (some) knowledge might be socially constructed.

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          Most cited references 27

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          Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought

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            Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism

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              Saving the Phenomena

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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Episteme
                Episteme
                Cambridge University Press (CUP)
                1742-3600
                1750-0117
                March 2020
                April 10 2018
                March 2020
                : 17
                : 1
                : 28-47
                Article
                10.1017/epi.2018.11
                © 2020

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