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      Como as ONGs ambientais influenciam a política ambiental brasileira?

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          Abstract

          Examinamos como as ONGs ambientais, mesmo com recursos escassos (votos e contribuições financeiras), conseguem influenciar de forma efetiva a política ambiental no Brasil. A inovação do trabalho consiste em utilizar a abordagem de agência comum e suas aplicações em economia política para modelar a ação ambientalista no Brasil. O principal resultado teórico é que as ONGs ambientais afetam a política ambiental através da informação, revelando aos eleitores informações a respeito da ação do governo. Os principais resultados empíricos são a mensuração do impacto dos produtores rurais, das ONGs ambientais e da mídia sobre a política ambiental no Brasil.

          Translated abstract

          The objective of this paper is to examine how environmental NGOs even with scarce resources (votes and financial contributions), succeed in influencing effectively the government's actions in Brazil. The innovation is to use the common agency theory and its applications to model the environmental action in Brazil. The main theoretical result is that environmental NGO's affect the environmental policy through information, revealing to voters information about government actions. The main empirical results are the measurement of rural farmers, environmental NGO's and media impacts on Brazilian environmental policy.

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          Most cited references35

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          An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

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            Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design

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              The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problems

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                Author and article information

                Journal
                rbe
                Revista Brasileira de Economia
                Rev. Bras. Econ.
                Fundação Getúlio Vargas (Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil )
                0034-7140
                1806-9134
                March 2012
                : 66
                : 1
                : 79-98
                Affiliations
                [01] orgnameUniversidade de Brasília orgdiv1Departamento de Economia bmueller@ 123456unb.br
                Article
                S0034-71402012000100004 S0034-7140(12)06600100004
                10.1590/S0034-71402012000100004
                804df713-f2e8-4b67-95e6-954485e37436

                This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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                Page count
                Figures: 0, Tables: 0, Equations: 0, References: 35, Pages: 20
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                SciELO Brazil


                Meio Ambiente,Múltiplas Tarefas,Múltiplos Principais,Agência Comum,Política Ambiental,ONGs Ambientais

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