Folk-Psychological Interpretation of Human vs. Humanoid Robot Behavior: Exploring the Intentional Stance toward Robots

Background When our PC goes on strike again we tend to curse it as if it were a human being. Why and under which circumstances do we attribute human-like properties to machines? Although humans increasingly interact directly with machines it remains unclear whether humans implicitly attribute intentions to them and, if so, whether such interactions resemble human-human interactions on a neural level. In social cognitive neuroscience the ability to attribute intentions and desires to others is being referred to as having a Theory of Mind (ToM). With the present study we investigated whether an increase of human-likeness of interaction partners modulates the participants' ToM associated cortical activity. Methodology/Principal Findings By means of functional magnetic resonance imaging (subjects n = 20) we investigated cortical activity modulation during highly interactive human-robot game. Increasing degrees of human-likeness for the game partner were introduced by means of a computer partner, a functional robot, an anthropomorphic robot and a human partner. The classical iterated prisoner's dilemma game was applied as experimental task which allowed for an implicit detection of ToM associated cortical activity. During the experiment participants always played against a random sequence unknowingly to them. Irrespective of the surmised interaction partners' responses participants indicated having experienced more fun and competition in the interaction with increasing human-like features of their partners. Parametric modulation of the functional imaging data revealed a highly significant linear increase of cortical activity in the medial frontal cortex as well as in the right temporo-parietal junction in correspondence with the increase of human-likeness of the interaction partner (computer

Functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to assess the cortical areas active during the observation of mouth actions performed by humans and by individuals belonging to other species (monkey and dog). Two types of actions were presented: biting and oral communicative actions (speech reading, lip-smacking, barking). As a control, static images of the same actions were shown. Observation of biting, regardless of the species of the individual performing the action, determined two activation foci (one rostral and one caudal) in the inferior parietal lobule and an activation of the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent ventral premotor cortex. The left rostral parietal focus (possibly BA 40) and the left premotor focus were very similar in all three conditions, while the right side foci were stronger during the observation of actions made by conspecifics. The observation of speech reading activated the left pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus, the observation of lip-smacking activated a small focus in the pars opercularis bilaterally, and the observation of barking did not produce any activation in the frontal lobe. Observation of all types of mouth actions induced activation of extrastriate occipital areas. These results suggest that actions made by other individuals may be recognized through different mechanisms. Actions belonging to the motor repertoire of the observer (e.g., biting and speech reading) are mapped on the observer's motor system. Actions that do not belong to this repertoire (e.g., barking) are essentially recognized based on their visual properties. We propose that when the motor representation of the observed action is activated, the observer gains knowledge of the observed action in a "personal" perspective, while this perspective is lacking when there is no motor activation.