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      People with Suspected COVID-19 Symptoms Were More Likely Depressed and Had Lower Health-Related Quality of Life: The Potential Benefit of Health Literacy

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          Abstract

          The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) epidemic affects people’s health and health-related quality of life (HRQoL), especially in those who have suspected COVID-19 symptoms (S-COVID-19-S). We examined the effect of modifications of health literacy (HL) on depression and HRQoL. A cross-sectional study was conducted from 14 February to 2 March 2020. 3947 participants were recruited from outpatient departments of nine hospitals and health centers across Vietnam. The interviews were conducted using printed questionnaires including participants’ characteristics, clinical parameters, health behaviors, HL, depression, and HRQoL. People with S-COVID-19-S had a higher depression likelihood (OR, 2.88; p < 0.001), lower HRQoL-score (B, −7.92; p < 0.001). In comparison to people without S-COVID-19-S and low HL, those with S-COVID-19-S and low HL had 9.70 times higher depression likelihood ( p < 0.001), 20.62 lower HRQoL-score ( p < 0.001), for the people without S-COVID-19-S, 1 score increment of HL resulted in 5% lower depression likelihood ( p < 0.001) and 0.45 higher HRQoL-score ( p < 0.001), while for those people with S-COVID-19-S, 1 score increment of HL resulted in a 4% lower depression likelihood ( p = 0.004) and 0.43 higher HRQoL-score ( p < 0.001). People with S-COVID-19-S had a higher depression likelihood and lower HRQoL than those without. HL shows a protective effect on depression and HRQoL during the epidemic.

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          A novel coronavirus outbreak of global health concern

          In December, 2019, Wuhan, Hubei province, China, became the centre of an outbreak of pneumonia of unknown cause, which raised intense attention not only within China but internationally. Chinese health authorities did an immediate investigation to characterise and control the disease, including isolation of people suspected to have the disease, close monitoring of contacts, epidemiological and clinical data collection from patients, and development of diagnostic and treatment procedures. By Jan 7, 2020, Chinese scientists had isolated a novel coronavirus (CoV) from patients in Wuhan. The genetic sequence of the 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) enabled the rapid development of point-of-care real-time RT-PCR diagnostic tests specific for 2019-nCoV (based on full genome sequence data on the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data [GISAID] platform). Cases of 2019-nCoV are no longer limited to Wuhan. Nine exported cases of 2019-nCoV infection have been reported in Thailand, Japan, Korea, the USA, Vietnam, and Singapore to date, and further dissemination through air travel is likely.1, 2, 3, 4, 5 As of Jan 23, 2020, confirmed cases were consecutively reported in 32 provinces, municipalities, and special administrative regions in China, including Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. 3 These cases detected outside Wuhan, together with the detection of infection in at least one household cluster—reported by Jasper Fuk-Woo Chan and colleagues 6 in The Lancet—and the recently documented infections in health-care workers caring for patients with 2019-nCoV indicate human-to-human transmission and thus the risk of much wider spread of the disease. As of Jan 23, 2020, a total of 835 cases with laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection have been detected in China, of whom 25 have died and 93% remain in hospital (figure ). 3 Figure Timeline of early stages of 2019-nCoV outbreak 2019-nCoV=2019 novel coronavirus. In The Lancet, Chaolin Huang and colleagues 7 report clinical features of the first 41 patients admitted to the designated hospital in Wuhan who were confirmed to be infected with 2019-nCoV by Jan 2, 2020. The study findings provide first-hand data about severity of the emerging 2019-nCoV infection. Symptoms resulting from 2019-nCoV infection at the prodromal phase, including fever, dry cough, and malaise, are non-specific. Unlike human coronavirus infections, upper respiratory symptoms are notably infrequent. Intestinal presentations observed with SARS also appear to be uncommon, although two of six cases reported by Chan and colleagues had diarrhoea. 6 Common laboratory findings on admission to hospital include lymphopenia and bilateral ground-glass opacity or consolidation in chest CT scans. These clinical presentations confounded early detection of infected cases, especially against a background of ongoing influenza and circulation of other respiratory viruses. Exposure history to the Huanan Seafood Wholesale market served as an important clue at the early stage, yet its value has decreased as more secondary and tertiary cases have appeared. Of the 41 patients in this cohort, 22 (55%) developed severe dyspnoea and 13 (32%) required admission to an intensive care unit, and six died. 7 Hence, the case-fatality proportion in this cohort is approximately 14·6%, and the overall case fatality proportion appears to be closer to 3% (table ). However, both of these estimates should be treated with great caution because not all patients have concluded their illness (ie, recovered or died) and the true number of infections and full disease spectrum are unknown. Importantly, in emerging viral infection outbreaks the case-fatality ratio is often overestimated in the early stages because case detection is highly biased towards the more severe cases. As further data on the spectrum of mild or asymptomatic infection becomes available, one case of which was documented by Chan and colleagues, 6 the case-fatality ratio is likely to decrease. Nevertheless, the 1918 influenza pandemic is estimated to have had a case-fatality ratio of less than 5% 13 but had an enormous impact due to widespread transmission, so there is no room for complacency. Table Characteristics of patients who have been infected with 2019-nCoV, MERS-CoV, and SARS-CoV7, 8, 10, 11, 12 2019-nCoV * MERS-CoV SARS-CoV Demographic Date December, 2019 June, 2012 November, 2002 Location of first detection Wuhan, China Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Guangdong, China Age, years (range) 49 (21–76) 56 (14–94) 39·9 (1–91) Male:female sex ratio 2·7:1 3·3:1 1:1·25 Confirmed cases 835† 2494 8096 Mortality 25† (2·9%) 858 (37%) 744 (10%) Health-care workers 16‡ 9·8% 23·1% Symptoms Fever 40 (98%) 98% 99–100% Dry cough 31 (76%) 47% 29–75% Dyspnoea 22 (55%) 72% 40–42% Diarrhoea 1 (3%) 26% 20–25% Sore throat 0 21% 13–25% Ventilatory support 9·8% 80% 14–20% Data are n, age (range), or n (%) unless otherwise stated. 2019-nCoV=2019 novel coronavirus. MERS-CoV=Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus. SARS-CoV=severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus. * Demographics and symptoms for 2019-nCoV infection are based on data from the first 41 patients reported by Chaolin Huang and colleagues (admitted before Jan 2, 2020). 8 Case numbers and mortalities are updated up to Jan 21, 2020) as disclosed by the Chinese Health Commission. † Data as of Jan 23, 2020. ‡ Data as of Jan 21, 2020. 9 As an RNA virus, 2019-nCoV still has the inherent feature of a high mutation rate, although like other coronaviruses the mutation rate might be somewhat lower than other RNA viruses because of its genome-encoded exonuclease. This aspect provides the possibility for this newly introduced zoonotic viral pathogen to adapt to become more efficiently transmitted from person to person and possibly become more virulent. Two previous coronavirus outbreaks had been reported in the 21st century. The clinical features of 2019-nCoV, in comparison with SARS-CoV and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)-CoV, are summarised in the table. The ongoing 2019-nCoV outbreak has undoubtedly caused the memories of the SARS-CoV outbreak starting 17 years ago to resurface in many people. In November, 2002, clusters of pneumonia of unknown cause were reported in Guangdong province, China, now known as the SARS-CoV outbreak. The number of cases of SARS increased substantially in the next year in China and later spread globally, 14 infecting at least 8096 people and causing 774 deaths. 12 The international spread of SARS-CoV in 2003 was attributed to its strong transmission ability under specific circumstances and the insufficient preparedness and implementation of infection control practices. Chinese public health and scientific capabilities have been greatly transformed since 2003. An efficient system is ready for monitoring and responding to infectious disease outbreaks and the 2019-nCoV pneumonia has been quickly added to the Notifiable Communicable Disease List and given the highest priority by Chinese health authorities. The increasing number of cases and widening geographical spread of the disease raise grave concerns about the future trajectory of the outbreak, especially with the Chinese Lunar New Year quickly approaching. Under normal circumstances, an estimated 3 billion trips would be made in the Spring Festival travel rush this year, with 15 million trips happening in Wuhan. The virus might further spread to other places during this festival period and cause epidemics, especially if it has acquired the ability to efficiently transmit from person to person. Consequently, the 2019-nCoV outbreak has led to implementation of extraordinary public health measures to reduce further spread of the virus within China and elsewhere. Although WHO has not recommended any international travelling restrictions so far, 15 the local government in Wuhan announced on Jan 23, 2020, the suspension of public transportation, with closure of airports, railway stations, and highways in the city, to prevent further disease transmission. 16 Further efforts in travel restriction might follow. Active surveillance for new cases and close monitoring of their contacts are being implemented. To improve detection efficiency, front-line clinics, apart from local centres for disease control and prevention, should be armed with validated point-of-care diagnostic kits. Rapid information disclosure is a top priority for disease control and prevention. A daily press release system has been established in China to ensure effective and efficient disclosure of epidemic information. Education campaigns should be launched to promote precautions for travellers, including frequent hand-washing, cough etiquette, and use of personal protection equipment (eg, masks) when visiting public places. Also, the general public should be motivated to report fever and other risk factors for coronavirus infection, including travel history to affected area and close contacts with confirmed or suspected cases. Considering that substantial numbers of patients with SARS and MERS were infected in health-care settings, precautions need to be taken to prevent nosocomial spread of the virus. Unfortunately, 16 health-care workers, some of whom were working in the same ward, have been confirmed to be infected with 2019-nCoV to date, although the routes of transmission and the possible role of so-called super-spreaders remain to be clarified. 9 Epidemiological studies need to be done to assess risk factors for infection in health-care personnel and quantify potential subclinical or asymptomatic infections. Notably, the transmission of SARS-CoV was eventually halted by public health measures including elimination of nosocomial infections. We need to be wary of the current outbreak turning into a sustained epidemic or even a pandemic. The availability of the virus' genetic sequence and initial data on the epidemiology and clinical consequences of the 2019-nCoV infections are only the first steps to understanding the threat posed by this pathogen. Many important questions remain unanswered, including its origin, extent, and duration of transmission in humans, ability to infect other animal hosts, and the spectrum and pathogenesis of human infections. Characterising viral isolates from successive generations of human infections will be key to updating diagnostics and assessing viral evolution. Beyond supportive care, 17 no specific coronavirus antivirals or vaccines of proven efficacy in humans exist, although clinical trials of both are ongoing for MERS-CoV and one controlled trial of ritonavir-boosted lopinavir monotherapy has been launched for 2019-nCoV (ChiCTR2000029308). Future animal model and clinical studies should focus on assessing the effectiveness and safety of promising antiviral drugs, monoclonal and polyclonal neutralising antibody products, and therapeutics directed against immunopathologic host responses. We have to be aware of the challenge and concerns brought by 2019-nCoV to our community. Every effort should be given to understand and control the disease, and the time to act is now. This online publication has been corrected. The corrected version first appeared at thelancet.com on January 29, 2020
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            Nowcasting and forecasting the potential domestic and international spread of the 2019-nCoV outbreak originating in Wuhan, China: a modelling study

            Summary Background Since Dec 31, 2019, the Chinese city of Wuhan has reported an outbreak of atypical pneumonia caused by the 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV). Cases have been exported to other Chinese cities, as well as internationally, threatening to trigger a global outbreak. Here, we provide an estimate of the size of the epidemic in Wuhan on the basis of the number of cases exported from Wuhan to cities outside mainland China and forecast the extent of the domestic and global public health risks of epidemics, accounting for social and non-pharmaceutical prevention interventions. Methods We used data from Dec 31, 2019, to Jan 28, 2020, on the number of cases exported from Wuhan internationally (known days of symptom onset from Dec 25, 2019, to Jan 19, 2020) to infer the number of infections in Wuhan from Dec 1, 2019, to Jan 25, 2020. Cases exported domestically were then estimated. We forecasted the national and global spread of 2019-nCoV, accounting for the effect of the metropolitan-wide quarantine of Wuhan and surrounding cities, which began Jan 23–24, 2020. We used data on monthly flight bookings from the Official Aviation Guide and data on human mobility across more than 300 prefecture-level cities in mainland China from the Tencent database. Data on confirmed cases were obtained from the reports published by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Serial interval estimates were based on previous studies of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV). A susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered metapopulation model was used to simulate the epidemics across all major cities in China. The basic reproductive number was estimated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods and presented using the resulting posterior mean and 95% credibile interval (CrI). Findings In our baseline scenario, we estimated that the basic reproductive number for 2019-nCoV was 2·68 (95% CrI 2·47–2·86) and that 75 815 individuals (95% CrI 37 304–130 330) have been infected in Wuhan as of Jan 25, 2020. The epidemic doubling time was 6·4 days (95% CrI 5·8–7·1). We estimated that in the baseline scenario, Chongqing, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen had imported 461 (95% CrI 227–805), 113 (57–193), 98 (49–168), 111 (56–191), and 80 (40–139) infections from Wuhan, respectively. If the transmissibility of 2019-nCoV were similar everywhere domestically and over time, we inferred that epidemics are already growing exponentially in multiple major cities of China with a lag time behind the Wuhan outbreak of about 1–2 weeks. Interpretation Given that 2019-nCoV is no longer contained within Wuhan, other major Chinese cities are probably sustaining localised outbreaks. Large cities overseas with close transport links to China could also become outbreak epicentres, unless substantial public health interventions at both the population and personal levels are implemented immediately. Independent self-sustaining outbreaks in major cities globally could become inevitable because of substantial exportation of presymptomatic cases and in the absence of large-scale public health interventions. Preparedness plans and mitigation interventions should be readied for quick deployment globally. Funding Health and Medical Research Fund (Hong Kong, China).
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              2019-nCoV epidemic: address mental health care to empower society

              A novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) has been identified as originating in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China. It has widely and rapidly spread in China and several other countries, causing an outbreak of acute infectious pneumonia. According to the official website of the National Health Commission, 1 as of Feb 4, 2020, 24 324 people have been confirmed to have a 2019-nCoV infection and 490 deaths have resulted from 2019-nCoV in 31 provinces in mainland China. 1 16 678 confirmed cases were in Hubei province. 2 Nearly 160 cases of 2019-nCoV have been detected and confirmed in southeast Asia (Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines, and Cambodia), east Asia (Japan and Korea), south Asia (India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka), western Asia (United Arab Emirates), Europe (Germany, France, Italy, UK, Russia, Finland, Spain, and Sweden), North America (USA and Canada), and Australia. 3 Approximately 13% of people with confirmed 2019-nCoV infection are reported to have severe respiratory symptoms, 2% have died, and 4% have been cured. 1 Human-to-human transmission is occurring, and WHO has recommended limiting human-to-human transmission by reducing secondary infections among close contacts and health-care workers, preventing transmission amplification events, and preventing further international spread.3, 4 The outbreak of 2019-nCoV in China has caused public panic and mental health stress. The increasing number of patients and suspected cases, and the increasing number of outbreak-affected provinces and countries have elicited public worry about becoming infected. The unpredictable future of this epidemic has been exacerbated by myths and misinformation, often driven by erroneous news reports and the public's misunderstanding of health messages, thus causing worry in the population. Further travel bans and some executive orders to quarantine travellers during the Spring Festival holiday might have generated public anxiety while trying to contain the outbreak. The medical health-care workers who are caring for individuals who are either severely ill, feel scared, or experiencing bereavement are themselves exposed to trauma. Health-care workers are also at risk of getting infected, and they carry a large burden in the clinical treatment and public prevention efforts in Chinese hospitals and community settings. The challenges and stress they experience could trigger common mental disorders, including anxiety and depressive disorders, and posttraumatic stress disorder, 5 which in turn could result in hazards that exceed the consequences of the 2019-nCoV epidemic itself. To efficiently cope with the 2019-nCoV outbreak, the Chinese Government has implemented rapid and comprehensive public health emergency interventions. To date, all of the 31 provincial-level regions in mainland China with confirmed 2019-nCoV cases have activated so-called level 1 public health emergency responses (ie, the highest level of emergency public health alerts and responses within the national public health management system). 6 The provincial governments are responsible for organising, coordinating, and handling all emergency public health treatments, disclosing information, and gathering emergency materials and facilities under the guidance of the State Council. For health-care sectors, in addition to public health interventions, dealing with public psychological barriers and performing psychological crisis intervention is included in the level 1 response. The National Health Commission has released guidelines for local authorities to promote psychological crisis intervention for patients, medical personnel, and people under medical observation during the 2019-nCoV outbreak. 7 Peking University is preparing a mental health handbook for the public that describes how to deal with stress and other psychological problems occurring due to the outbreak of 2019-nCoV. 8 The Chinese Government strives to improve the public's awareness of prevention and intervention strategies by providing daily updates about surveillance and active cases on websites and social media. Increasingly, psychologists and psychiatrists use the internet and social media (eg, WeChat, Weibo, etc) to share strategies for dealing with psychological stress. For example, experts from Peking University Sixth Hospital made six suggestions for the public to cope with mental stress. 9 These included assessing the accuracy of information disclosed, enhancing social support systems (eg, families and friends), eliminating stigma associated with the epidemic, maintaining a normal life under safe conditions, and using the psychosocial service system, particularly telephone-based and internet-based counselling for health-care staff, patients, family members, and the public. Numerous psychiatric hospitals, psychological counselling centres, and psychology departments within universities have launched specialised hotlines to provide psychological counselling services for people in need. 7 We believe that including mental health care in the national public health emergency system will empower China and the world during the campaign to contain and eradicate 2019-nCoV.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                J Clin Med
                J Clin Med
                jcm
                Journal of Clinical Medicine
                MDPI
                2077-0383
                31 March 2020
                April 2020
                : 9
                : 4
                : 965
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Director Office, Thai Nguyen National Hospital, Thai Nguyen City 241-24, Vietnam; nguyenconghoang@ 123456tnmc.edu.vn (H.C.N.); dhthaivn@ 123456gmail.com (T.H.D.)
                [2 ]President Office, Thai Nguyen University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Thai Nguyen City 241-17, Vietnam
                [3 ]International Master/Ph.D. Program in Medicine, Taipei Medical University, Taipei 110-31, Taiwan; drminh.ttytlc@ 123456gmail.com (M.H.N.); phamminhthu.ytcc@ 123456gmail.com (T.T.M.P.)
                [4 ]Department of Infectious Diseases, Military Medical University, Hanoi 121-08, Vietnam; nhubinh.do@ 123456vmmu.edu.vn (B.N.D.); tientv@ 123456vmmu.edu.vn (T.V.T.)
                [5 ]Division of Military Science, Military Medical Hospital 103, Hanoi 121-08, Vietnam
                [6 ]Department of Anesthesiology, Thu Duc District Hospital, Ho Chi Minh City 713-11, Vietnam; quoccuong.mph@ 123456gmail.com (C.Q.T.); huuquyenhm@ 123456gmail.com (Q.H.N.); hoangminhthanhbvct@ 123456gmail.com (T.M.H.)
                [7 ]Director Office, Thu Duc District Health Center, Ho Chi Minh City 713-10, Vietnam
                [8 ]Health Management Training Institute, Hue University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Thua Thien Hue 491-20, Vietnam; ntpthao.hmti@ 123456huemed-univ.edu.vn
                [9 ]School of Health Policy, Planning and Financing, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest 1093, Hungary
                [10 ]Faculty of Public Health, Hai Phong University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Hai Phong 042-12, Vietnam; pmkhue@ 123456hpmu.edu.vn (K.M.P.); nttham@ 123456hpmu.edu.vn (T.T.N.)
                [11 ]President Office, Hai Phong University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Hai Phong 042-12, Vietnam
                [12 ]Department of Pulmonary & Cardiovascular Diseases, Hai Phong University of Medicine and Pharmacy Hospital, Hai Phong 042-12, Vietnam; pvlinh@ 123456hpmu.edu.vn
                [13 ]Director Office, Hai Phong University of Medicine and Pharmacy Hospital, Hai Phong 042-12, Vietnam
                [14 ]Director Office, Hospital District 2; Ho Chi Minh City 711-13, Vietnam; tvkhanh.q2@ 123456tphcm.gov.vn
                [15 ]Nursing Office, Tan Phu District Hospital; Ho Chi Minh City 720-16, Vietnam; duongtrang7273@ 123456gmail.com
                [16 ]Director Office, Military Medical Hospital 103, Hanoi 121-08, Vietnam
                [17 ]Department of Internal Medicine, Thai Nguyen University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Thai Nguyen City 241-17, Vietnam
                [18 ]Department of Health Education, Faculty of Social Sciences, Behavior and Health Education, Hanoi University of Public Health, Hanoi 119-10, Vietnam; ntk1@ 123456huph.edu.vn
                [19 ]School of Nutrition and Health Sciences, Taipei Medical University, Taipei 110-31, Taiwan; sherry@ 123456tmu.edu.tw (S.-H.Y.); chenjui@ 123456tmu.edu.tw (J.C.-J.C.)
                [20 ]Research Center of Geriatric Nutrition, Taipei Medical University, Taipei 110-31, Taiwan
                [21 ]Nutrition Research Center, Taipei Medical University Hospital, Taipei 110-31, Taiwan
                [22 ]Master Program in Global Health and Development, College of Public Health, Taipei Medical University, Taipei 110-31, Taiwan
                Author notes
                [* ]Correspondence: tvduong@ 123456tmu.edu.tw ; Tel.: +886-2-2736-1661 (ext. 6545)
                Author information
                https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1377-3921
                https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1320-964X
                https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2974-3484
                https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3707-1166
                https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2287-0723
                Article
                jcm-09-00965
                10.3390/jcm9040965
                7231234
                32244415
                83e1bafc-5b09-4d71-bd1b-51e9caef1c2a
                © 2020 by the authors.

                Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

                History
                : 12 March 2020
                : 27 March 2020
                Categories
                Article

                coronavirus,covid-19,epidemic,suspected covid-19 symptoms,comorbidity,healthy eating,physical activity,health literacy,depression,health-related quality of life

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