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      Emergence and Evolution of Cooperation Under Resource Pressure


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          We study the influence that resource availability has on cooperation in the context of hunter-gatherer societies. This paper proposes a model based on archaeological and ethnographic research on resource stress episodes, which exposes three different cooperative regimes according to the relationship between resource availability in the environment and population size. The most interesting regime represents moderate survival stress in which individuals coordinate in an evolutionary way to increase the probabilities of survival and reduce the risk of failing to meet the minimum needs for survival. Populations self-organise in an indirect reciprocity system in which the norm that emerges is to share the part of the resource that is not strictly necessary for survival, thereby collectively lowering the chances of starving. Our findings shed further light on the emergence and evolution of cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies.

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          Coevolutionary games--a mini review.

          Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges faced by cooperators when competing with defectors. Evolutionary game theory provides a competent theoretical framework for addressing the subtleties of cooperation in such situations, which are known as social dilemmas. Recent advances point towards the fact that the evolution of strategies alone may be insufficient to fully exploit the benefits offered by cooperative behavior. Indeed, while spatial structure and heterogeneity, for example, have been recognized as potent promoters of cooperation, coevolutionary rules can extend the potentials of such entities further, and even more importantly, lead to the understanding of their emergence. The introduction of coevolutionary rules to evolutionary games implies, that besides the evolution of strategies, another property may simultaneously be subject to evolution as well. Coevolutionary rules may affect the interaction network, the reproduction capability of players, their reputation, mobility or age. Here we review recent works on evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as give a didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with the subject. In addition, we briefly outline directions for future research that we feel are promising, thereby particularly focusing on dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules on the evolution of cooperation, which are still widely open to research and thus hold promise of exciting new discoveries. Copyright (c) 2009 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
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            A study of cross-validation and bootstrap for accuracy estimation and model selection

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              A multispecies overkill simulation of the end-Pleistocene megafaunal mass extinction.

              J Alroy (2001)
              A computer simulation of North American end-Pleistocene human and large herbivore population dynamics correctly predicts the extinction or survival of 32 out of 41 prey species. Slow human population growth rates, random hunting, and low maximum hunting effort are assumed; additional parameters are based on published values. Predictions are close to observed values for overall extinction rates, human population densities, game consumption rates, and the temporal overlap of humans and extinct species. Results are robust to variation in unconstrained parameters. This fully mechanistic model accounts for megafaunal extinction without invoking climate change and secondary ecological effects.

                Author and article information

                Sci Rep
                Sci Rep
                Scientific Reports
                Nature Publishing Group
                31 March 2017
                : 7
                [1 ]Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC), Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid , 28911 Leganés, Madrid, Spain
                [2 ]CaSEs - Complexity and Socio-Ecological Dynamics Research Group , Barcelona, Spain
                [3 ]Department of Archaeology and Anthropology-IMF, CSIC (Spanish National Research Council) , Barcelona, Spain
                [4 ]Department of Humanities, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF) , Barcelona, Spain
                [5 ]INSISOC. Departamento de Ingeniería Civil, Universidad de Burgos, Edif. “La Milanera” , C/Villadiego, s/n.09001, Burgos, Spain
                [6 ]CONICET-CADIC. B , Houssay, 200, Ushuaia, 9410, Argentina
                [7 ]ICSE-UNTDF , Los Ñires, 2382, Ushuaia, 9410, Argentina
                [8 ]Department of Archaeology, University of York, The King’s Manor , Y01 7EP, York, UK
                [9 ]GSADI. Department of Sociology, Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB) , Barcelona, Spain
                Author notes
                Copyright © 2017, The Author(s)

                This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if the material is not included under the Creative Commons license, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to reproduce the material. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/




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