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      The tendency to stop collecting information is linked to illusions of causality

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          Abstract

          Previous research proposed that cognitive biases contribute to produce and maintain the symptoms exhibited by deluded patients. Specifically, the tendency to jump to conclusions (i.e., to stop collecting evidence soon before making a decision) has been claimed to contribute to delusion formation. Additionally, deluded patients show an abnormal understanding of cause-effect relationships, often leading to causal illusions (i.e., the belief that two events are causally connected, when they are not). Both types of bias appear in psychotic disorders, but also in healthy individuals. In two studies, we test the hypothesis that the two biases (jumping to conclusions and causal illusions) appear in the general population and correlate with each other. The rationale is based on current theories of associative learning that explain causal illusions as the result of a learning bias that tends to wear off as additional information is incorporated. We propose that participants with higher tendency to jump to conclusions will stop collecting information sooner in a causal learning study than those participants with lower tendency to jump to conclusions, which means that the former will not reach the learning asymptote, leading to biased judgments. The studies provide evidence in favour that the two biases are correlated but suggest that the proposed mechanism is not responsible for this association.

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          Most cited references74

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          The case for motivated reasoning.

          Ziva Kunda (1990)
          It is proposed that motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes--that is, strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. The motivation to be accurate enhances use of those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas the motivation to arrive at particular conclusions enhances use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion. There is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions. These ideas can account for a wide variety of research concerned with motivated reasoning.
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            Judgment of contingency in depressed and nondepressed students: sadder but wiser?

            How are humans' subjective judgments of contingencies related to objective contingencies? Work in social psychology and human contingency learning predicts that the greater the frequency of desired outcomes, the greater people's judgments of contingency will be. Second, the learned helplessness theory of depression provides both a strong and a weak prediction concerning the linkage between subjective and objective contingencies. According to the strong prediction, depressed individuals should underestimate the degree of contingency between their responses and outcomes relative to the objective degree of contingency. According to the weak prediction, depressed individuals merely should judge that there is a smaller degree of contingency between their responses and outcomes than nondepressed individuals should. In addition, the present investigation deduced a new strong prediction from the helplessness theory: Nondepressed individuals should overestimate the degree of contingency between their responses and outcomes relative to the objective degree of contingency. In the experiments, depressed and nondepressed students were present with one of a series of problems varying in the actual degree of contingency. In each problem, subjects estimated the degree of contingency between their responses (pressing or not pressing a button) and an environmental outcome (onset of a green light). Performance on a behavioral task and estimates of the conditional probability of green light onset associated with the two response alternatives provided additional measures for assessing beliefs about contingencies. Depressed students' judgments of contingency were surprisingly accurate in all four experiments. Nondepressed students, on the other hand, overestimated the degree of contingency between their responses and outcomes when noncontingent outcomes were frequent and/or desired and underestimated the degree of contingency when contingent outcomes were undesired. Thus, predictions derived from social psychology concerning the linkage between subjective and objective contingencies were confirmed for nondepressed students but not for depressed students. Further, the predictions of helplessness theory received, at best, minimal support. The learned helplessness and self-serving motivational bias hypotheses are evaluated as explanations of the results. In addition, parallels are drawn between the present results and phenomena in cognitive psychology, social psychology, and animal learning. Finally, implications for cognitive illusions in normal people, appetitive helplessness, judgment of contingency between stimuli, and learning theory are discussed.
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              A systematic review and meta-analysis of the psychosis continuum: evidence for a psychosis proneness-persistence-impairment model of psychotic disorder.

              A systematic review of all reported incidence and prevalence studies of population rates of subclinical psychotic experiences reveals a median prevalence rate of around 5% and a median incidence rate of around 3%. A meta-analysis of risk factors reveals associations with developmental stage, child and adult social adversity, psychoactive drug use, and also male sex and migrant status. The small difference between prevalence and incidence rates, together with data from follow-up studies, indicates that approximately 75-90% of developmental psychotic experiences are transitory and disappear over time. There is evidence, however, that transitory developmental expression of psychosis (psychosis proneness) may become abnormally persistent (persistence) and subsequently clinically relevant (impairment), depending on the degree of environmental risk the person is additionally exposed to. The psychosis proneness-persistence-impairment model considers genetic background factors impacting on a broadly distributed and transitory population expression of psychosis during development, poor prognosis of which, in terms of persistence and clinical need, is predicted by environmental exposure interacting with genetic risk.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                manuelamoreno@ugr.es
                Journal
                Sci Rep
                Sci Rep
                Scientific Reports
                Nature Publishing Group UK (London )
                2045-2322
                16 February 2021
                16 February 2021
                2021
                : 11
                : 3942
                Affiliations
                [1 ]GRID grid.4489.1, ISNI 0000000121678994, Department of Developmental and Educational Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, , University of Granada, ; Granada, Spain
                [2 ]GRID grid.14724.34, ISNI 0000 0001 0941 7046, Department of Methods and Experimental Psychology, Faculty of Psychology and Education, , University of Deusto, ; Bilbao, Spain
                [3 ]GRID grid.4489.1, ISNI 0000000121678994, Department of Social Psychology, Faculty of Psychology, , University of Granada, ; Granada, Spain
                Article
                82075
                10.1038/s41598-021-82075-w
                7887230
                33414495
                87e77450-e3c4-4025-ac5a-1ef3ec152436
                © The Author(s) 2021

                Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

                History
                : 5 June 2020
                : 12 January 2021
                Funding
                Funded by: Agencia Estatal de Investigación of the Spanish Government (AEI)
                Award ID: RTI2018-096700-J-I00
                Award ID: PSI2017-83196-R
                Award ID: PSI2016-78818-R
                Award Recipient :
                Funded by: Basque Government
                Award ID: Grant IT955-16
                Award Recipient :
                Categories
                Article
                Custom metadata
                © The Author(s) 2021

                Uncategorized
                psychology,human behaviour
                Uncategorized
                psychology, human behaviour

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