I. INTRODUCTION
In South Africa, like in many other countries around the world, the COVID-19 pandemic
is first and foremost a public health crisis. To address the public health crisis,
government has taken extraordinary measures to curb the spread of infections, including
requiring people quarantine at home and non-essential businesses to close. On 15 March
2020, South Africa declared the COVID-19 pandemic a national disaster in terms of
the Disaster Management Act No 57 of 2002 (as amended). As part of a broader response
to the COVID-19 pandemic, on 19 March 2020, the Minister of Trade and Industry published
Consumer and Customer Protection Regulations and National Disaster Management Regulations
and Directions, which establish factors for assessing excessive pricing cases during
the national disaster period. These regulations respond to the COVID-19 pandemic panic
buying increase in demand and the corresponding spike in prices, for particular goods
and services.
II. FACTORS TO DETERMINE COVID-19 EXCESSIVE PRICES
The regulations published in South Africa state that during the period of the national
disaster, a material price increase in a listed good or service which either: (i)
does not correspond to or is not equivalent to the increase in the cost of providing
that good or service; or (ii) increases the net margin or markup on that good or service
above its average margin or markup in the three-month period prior to 1 March 2020,
is a relevant and critical factor for determining whether a dominant firm’s price
is excessive and indicates prima facie that the price is excessive in terms of the
Competition Act No 89 of 1998, as amended (the ‘Competition Act’). The regulations
specifically relate to dominant firms supplying basic food and consumer items, emergency
products and services, medical and hygiene supplies, and emergency clean-up products
and services. Furthermore, the regulations state that price increases that have the
just mentioned features will be considered unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, and
unjust in terms of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Note that under the CPA, a firm
does not need to be dominant.
The regulations are appropriate in this immediate period of the COVID-19 national
disaster, where market conditions are such that very high prices are unable to stimulate
effective entry allowing the market to properly self-correct in a reasonable time
frame. The COVID-19 restrictions entrench entry and expansion barriers in the immediate
period. This means that prices will not be competed down, meaning that firms alleged
to be excessively pricing have a captive customer base.
III. COVID-19 EXCESSIVE PRICING CASES
In the two weeks following the declaration of the State of National Disaster, the
Competition Commission (the ‘Commission’) received a total of 559 complaints. Approximately
250 of these relate to matters that fall outside the scope of the Competition Act
as well as the applicable regulations. The balance of the complaints was against retailers
and suppliers for charging excessive prices for products related to COVID-19 essentials.
The majority of the complaints related to hand sanitizers and face masks, followed
by toilet paper, flu medication, and other products.
The Commission has embarked on an expedited preliminary investigation process. Respondent
firms are given 48 hours to confirm or rebut the allegations. Some of the large national
retailers have instituted pricing discipline across their branches, including Massmart
(owned by Walmart), who have decided to freeze their prices in all its stores for
the duration of the nationwide lockdown. Others have chosen to share information on
promotional pricing with the Commission.
On 9 April 2020, the Commission referred its first case of the COVID-19 pandemic excessive
pricing to the Competition Tribunal (the ‘Tribunal’) for adjudication. The case alleges
excessive pricing for the supply of facial masks against Babelegi Workwear Overall
Manufacturers & Industrial Supplies CC (‘Babelegi’).
1
Babelegi is a manufacturer of industrial workwear and supplier of protective clothing
and equipment. As shown in Table 1, the Commission alleges that Babelegi significantly
increased its prices of facial masks following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic
in South Africa, with prices increasing over 10-fold.
Table 1.
Prices and markups of facial markups earned by Babelegi between December 2019 and
March 2020
Sequence of events
Cost per box (Rand)
Cost per mask (Rand)
Selling price per box (Rand)
Selling price mask (Rand)
Markup (%)
9 December 2019
41
2.05
50.60
2.53
23
31 January 2020
41
2.05
91
4.55
122
4 February 2020
41
2.05
85
4.25
107
10 February 2020
41
2.05
350
17.50
753
5 March 2020
41
2.05
500
25
1120
18 March 2020
440
22
550
27.50
25
26 March 2020
440
22
550
27.50
25
Source: Competition Commission referral to the Tribunal on 9 April 2020.
In Competition Commission v Babelegi, the Commission alleges that Babelegi contravened
the Competition Act by charging excessive prices for facial masks from 31 January
2020 to 5 March 2020. With markups earned topping 1120 per cent, it is a case of extreme
exploitation of consumers in times of a pandemic.
IV. ASSESSING COVID-19 EXCESSIVE PRICING CASES
The Competition Act prohibits dominant firms from pricing excessively to the detriment
of customers or consumers. An excessive price is determined by reference to whether
the price concerned is higher than a competitive price, and whether such difference
is unreasonable, considering all relevant factors. The excessive pricing prohibition
in the Competition Act provides an open list of these relevant factors including,
the respondent’s price cost margin and the prices charged (by the respondent or relevant
comparator firm) in similar but competitive markets. It also makes provision for the
Minister of Trade and Industry to publish regulations regarding the calculation and
determination of excessive prices as an additional factor. The excessive pricing prohibition
in the Competition Act provides that, if there is a prima facie case that a price
charged by a dominant firm is excessive, the onus shifts to the respondent to prove
that such is reasonable.
The Competition Act requires an adjudicator to consider ‘all relevant factors’ when
determining whether a price is unreasonably higher than the competitive price. The
Commission, as the prosecutor, has discretion to choose its approach to assessing
when a price is excessive. To the extent that the Commission only establishes a prima
facie case through the factors set out in the regulations, the Commission is not obliged
to consider in all cases the other factors identified in the open list set up in the
Competition Act. On the other hand, the Tribunal, as the adjudicator, is not bound
by the Commission’s discretion. Even when this discretion does exit. The Tribunal
is entitled to find, given the available evidence, that if the Commission establishes
a prima facie case for excessive pricing using the factors set out in the regulations,
given the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, such an analysis is
sufficiently rigorous to establish a prima facie case.
The excessive pricing regulations allow dominant firms to defend price increases if
they can show that they are related to an increase in costs, which includes raw material
costs. For example, if the index price for grain (wheat) increases over the COVID-19
national disaster period, due to increased demand, millers can implement corresponding
price increases in the price of flour. Similarly, if a medical supplier is suddenly
forced to import products, rather than purchase them locally because local supplies
run out it can pass the transport and other costs of doing so on to its customer.
The excessive pricing prohibition in the Competition Act also shifts the burden to
firms alleged to be charging high prices to justify why the price is not excessive.
Some firms are currently operating in an environment where other costs (eg servicing
debt) have increased dramatically because of the weakening Rand (exchange rate), and
the investment implications of the ratings downgrade, such firms could adjust their
prices to respond to these changes, even though these increases are not tied directly
to cost increases as conceptualized by the regulations.
Demand is a relevant factor to the assessment of when prices are excessive because
customers are generally willing to pay more for features they consider valuable. Those
specific features do not necessarily imply higher production costs, but they increase
the economic value of the product. For example, the economic value of hand sanitizers
and face masks in the COVID-19 crisis period cannot be measured by any reliable cost-price
formula. Prices for hand sanitizers and face masks may increase in this immediate
period of the COVID-19 crisis because demand has risen relative to the immediately
available supply. In normal times, such price increases would signal to other firms
that they should increase their production and where to sell. The problem with the
COVID-19 pandemic period is that such attempts by other firms to re-position are limited
by government actions that restrict movements. As a consequence, conventional tools
to assess the abuse of market power may not be as useful, as restrictions on movement
of people to contain COVID-19 infections could confer market power to firms that did
not previously hold such a position in the market—meaning stricter enforcement rules
may have to be applied.
V. TRIBUNAL RULES FOR COVID-19 EXCESSIVE PRICE COMPLAINT
On 3 April 2020, the Minister of Trade and Industry published regulations dealing
with Tribunal rules regulating complaint referrals for alleged COVID-19 excessive
pricing. The rules specify an expedited process for adjudicating COVID-19 excessive
pricing cases. The rules have dispensed with the ordinary time frames for the exchange
of pleadings provided for in terms of the Competition Act. Instead, once a COVID-19
excessive pricing complaint has been referred to the Tribunal, the respondent has
72 hours to file its answering papers, with the complainant’s reply (if any) due within
24 hours thereafter. Any factual and/or expert testimony is to be incorporated in
this time frame, unless the Tribunal directs otherwise. Within 48 hours from the close
of pleadings, the Tribunal will set the matter down for hearing. Hearing will take
place remotely, via audio or video conferencing.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whereas some jurisdictions do not have provisions to tackle excessive pricing in their
competition laws, cases such as the Competition Commission v Babelegi in South Africa
do validate the need for competition regulation scrutiny over pricing conduct. It
is the COVID-19 crisis in this instance, but recent cases on excessive pricing in
pharmaceuticals in the UK, Italy, South Africa, and the European Commission point
to the increasing need to assess the pricing conduct of firms. The recent COVID-19-related
cases in South Africa point to the usefulness of competition legislation that not
only responds to cartels, mergers, and exclusionary conduct but also recognizes that
markets may yield less optimal outcomes resulting to excessively high prices of products
and services.