Interface theory (Hoffman, Singh & Prakesh, 2015) is the radical hypothesis that fitness, not truth, dictates the evolution of perceptual systems. They show, with simulations, that this means veridical mappings (ones that preserve at least some of the structure of the world) are routinely out-competed by non-veridical interfaces. They take particular aim at the direct perception, ecological approach to perception (Gibson, 1966, 1979; Turvey, Shaw Reed & Mace, 1981) and work to show that such a system never gets out of the evolutionary gate. This commentary defends the ecological approach from the supposedly radical implications of interface theory by showing that a) Gibson does not make the mistakes he is accused of and, more substantively b) that the ecological hypothesis is so different in kind to the inferential, representational view of perception that it simply falls outside the scope of interface theory’s critiques. The heart of this defence is identifying the profoundly different ontologies (assumptions about the nature of the world to be perceived) underlying inferential and ecological approaches. The ecological ontology makes the direct perception of behaviourally relevant properties of the world possible, no inference required, and I will review how modern ecological psychology scientifically investigates this hypothesis. Interface theory is a strong, clear formalisation of the inferential world-view, but it has no implications for the ecological approach and the scientific game remains afoot.