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      Identifying genetic markers of adaptation for surveillance of viral host jumps

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          Key Points

          • Viral host jumps can lead to major public health threats. The most recent pandemics were caused by viruses that were transmitted from animal reservoirs to humans, such as influenza A viruses and severe acute respiratory syndrome-coronavirus. Adaptation of the virus to the new host is often cited as the cause of such emergence.

          • Distinguishing the genetic changes that are due to adaptation from those that are due to random events is hard in any biological context; virus host jumps are no exception. We present four different mechanisms by which viruses may emerge in a new host. Although all four mechanisms could produce the same genetic pattern in new hosts, only two are due to adaptation. We illustrate which data need to be collected to distinguish between the four mechanisms.

          • Future risk of viral host jumps to humans could be assessed by genetic surveillance of viruses in reservoir hosts, but only when genetic adaptation is required for a host jump and when precursors of this adaptation can be detected.

          • Bioinformatic analyses of surveillance data are key stepping stones for identifying putative genetic markers of viral adaptation from enormous pools of genetic data. Confirmation of which of these putative markers are due to adaptation requires experimental validation by using reverse genetics and host models from reservoir and new host species, and corroborating results with epidemiological and ecological data.

          • Our review of the current literature on four well-studied viral host jumps shows that research on host-jump processes unfolds in four broad stages: virus sample collection and genetic analysis; experiments in vitro or in cell culture; in vivo experiments in model hosts; and in vivo experiments in natural hosts. We evaluate the issues in using these types of data for validating adaptive hypotheses, and identify opportunities to collect further data that would enable better discrimination among emergence mechanisms.

          • A detailed understanding of viral host jumps and the assessment of future risk requires multidisciplinary research efforts with input from field ecologists, microbiologists, immunologists, epidemiologists, bioinformaticians and evolutionary biologists, and the use of use of diverse approaches (field sampling, laboratory experiments, data analysis and mathematical modelling).

          Supplementary information

          The online version of this article (doi:10.1038/nrmicro2440) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

          Abstract

          Transmission of viruses between species can lead to severe disease in the new host. However, little is known about the requirements for cross-species transmission. Pepin and colleagues describe the experiments required to improve our understanding of this process and how this can identify markers that can be used to predict transmission.

          Supplementary information

          The online version of this article (doi:10.1038/nrmicro2440) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

          Abstract

          Adaptation is often thought to affect the likelihood that a virus will be able to successfully emerge in a new host species. If so, surveillance for genetic markers of adaptation could help to predict the risk of disease emergence. However, adaptation is difficult to distinguish conclusively from the other processes that generate genetic change. In this Review we survey the research on the host jumps of influenza A, severe acute respiratory syndrome-coronavirus, canine parvovirus and Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus to illustrate the insights that can arise from combining genetic surveillance with microbiological experimentation in the context of epidemiological data. We argue that using a multidisciplinary approach for surveillance will provide a better understanding of when adaptations are required for host jumps and thus when predictive genetic markers may be present.

          Supplementary information

          The online version of this article (doi:10.1038/nrmicro2440) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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          Most cited references76

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          Emerging Infectious Diseases of Wildlife-- Threats to Biodiversity and Human Health

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            Avian flu: influenza virus receptors in the human airway.

            Although more than 100 people have been infected by H5N1 influenza A viruses, human-to-human transmission is rare. What are the molecular barriers limiting human-to-human transmission? Here we demonstrate an anatomical difference in the distribution in the human airway of the different binding molecules preferred by the avian and human influenza viruses. The respective molecules are sialic acid linked to galactose by an alpha-2,3 linkage (SAalpha2,3Gal) and by an alpha-2,6 linkage (SAalpha2,6Gal). Our findings may provide a rational explanation for why H5N1 viruses at present rarely infect and spread between humans although they can replicate efficiently in the lungs.
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              Characterization of the 1918 influenza virus polymerase genes.

              The influenza A viral heterotrimeric polymerase complex (PA, PB1, PB2) is known to be involved in many aspects of viral replication and to interact with host factors, thereby having a role in host specificity. The polymerase protein sequences from the 1918 human influenza virus differ from avian consensus sequences at only a small number of amino acids, consistent with the hypothesis that they were derived from an avian source shortly before the pandemic. However, when compared to avian sequences, the nucleotide sequences of the 1918 polymerase genes have more synonymous differences than expected, suggesting evolutionary distance from known avian strains. Here we present sequence and phylogenetic analyses of the complete genome of the 1918 influenza virus, and propose that the 1918 virus was not a reassortant virus (like those of the 1957 and 1968 pandemics), but more likely an entirely avian-like virus that adapted to humans. These data support prior phylogenetic studies suggesting that the 1918 virus was derived from an avian source. A total of ten amino acid changes in the polymerase proteins consistently differentiate the 1918 and subsequent human influenza virus sequences from avian virus sequences. Notably, a number of the same changes have been found in recently circulating, highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses that have caused illness and death in humans and are feared to be the precursors of a new influenza pandemic. The sequence changes identified here may be important in the adaptation of influenza viruses to humans.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                kmp29@psu.edu
                Journal
                Nat Rev Microbiol
                Nat. Rev. Microbiol
                Nature Reviews. Microbiology
                Nature Publishing Group UK (London )
                1740-1526
                1740-1534
                12 October 2010
                2010
                : 8
                : 11
                : 802-813
                Affiliations
                [1 ]GRID grid.29857.31, ISNI 0000 0001 2097 4281, Department of Physics, , Pennsylvania State University, ; University Park, 16802 Pennsylvania USA
                [2 ]Kirchenhölzle 18, 79104 Freiburg Germany
                [3 ]GRID grid.453035.4, ISNI 0000 0004 0533 8254, Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health, ; Bethesda, 20892 Maryland USA
                [4 ]GRID grid.19006.3e, ISNI 0000 0000 9632 6718, Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, , University of California Los Angeles, ; 90095 California USA
                [5 ]GRID grid.29857.31, ISNI 0000 0001 2097 4281, Departments of Biology and Entomology, , Centre for Infectious Disease Dynamics, Pennsylvania State University, ; University Park, 16827 Pennsylvania USA
                Article
                BFnrmicro2440
                10.1038/nrmicro2440
                7097030
                20938453
                8aefca3d-4742-47d7-b312-64eb55856dcc
                © Nature Publishing Group, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited. All Rights Reserved. 2010

                This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted research re-use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for the duration of the World Health Organization (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic.

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                © Springer Nature Limited 2010

                genetic markers,virus-host interactions,viral epidemiology

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