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      Transmissibility of 1918 pandemic influenza

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          Abstract

          The 1918 influenza pandemic killed 20–40 million people worldwide 1 , and is seen as a worst-case scenario for pandemic planning. Like other pandemic influenza strains, the 1918 A/H1N1 strain spread extremely rapidly. A measure of transmissibility and of the stringency of control measures required to stop an epidemic is the reproductive number, which is the number of secondary cases produced by each primary case 2 . Here we obtained an estimate of the reproductive number for 1918 influenza by fitting a deterministic SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered) model to pneumonia and influenza death epidemic curves from 45 US cities: the median value is less than three. The estimated proportion of the population with A/H1N1 immunity before September 1918 implies a median basic reproductive number of less than four. These results strongly suggest that the reproductive number for 1918 pandemic influenza is not large relative to many other infectious diseases 2 . In theory, a similar novel influenza subtype could be controlled. But because influenza is frequently transmitted before a specific diagnosis is possible and there is a dearth of global antiviral and vaccine stores, aggressive transmission reducing measures will probably be required.

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          The online version of this article (doi:10.1038/nature03063) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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          Containing pandemic influenza with antiviral agents.

          I Longini (2004)
          For the first wave of pandemic influenza or a bioterrorist influenza attack, antiviral agents would be one of the few options to contain the epidemic in the United States until adequate supplies of vaccine were available. The authors use stochastic epidemic simulations to investigate the effectiveness of targeted antiviral prophylaxis to contain influenza. In this strategy, close contacts of suspected index influenza cases take antiviral agents prophylactically. The authors compare targeted antiviral prophylaxis with vaccination strategies. They model an influenza pandemic or bioterrorist attack for an agent similar to influenza A virus (H2N2) that caused the Asian influenza pandemic of 1957-1958. In the absence of intervention, the model predicts an influenza illness attack rate of 33% of the population (95% confidence interval (CI): 30, 37) and an influenza death rate of 0.58 deaths/1,000 persons (95% Cl: 0.4, 0.8). With the use of targeted antiviral prophylaxis, if 80% of the exposed persons maintained prophylaxis for up to 8 weeks, the epidemic would be contained, and the model predicts a reduction to an illness attack rate of 2% (95% Cl: 0.2, 16) and a death rate of 0.04 deaths/1,000 persons (95% CI: 0.0003, 0.25). Such antiviral prophylaxis is nearly as effective as vaccinating 80% of the population. Vaccinating 80% of the children aged less than 19 years is almost as effective as vaccinating 80% of the population. Targeted antiviral prophylaxis has potential as an effective measure for containing influenza until adequate quantities of vaccine are available.
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            Different epidemic curves for severe acute respiratory syndrome reveal similar impacts of control measures.

            Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has been the first severe contagious disease to emerge in the 21st century. The available epidemic curves for SARS show marked differences between the affected regions with respect to the total number of cases and epidemic duration, even for those regions in which outbreaks started almost simultaneously and similar control measures were implemented at the same time. The authors developed a likelihood-based estimation procedure that infers the temporal pattern of effective reproduction numbers from an observed epidemic curve. Precise estimates for the effective reproduction numbers were obtained by applying this estimation procedure to available data for SARS outbreaks that occurred in Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and Canada in 2003. The effective reproduction numbers revealed that epidemics in the various affected regions were characterized by markedly similar disease transmission potentials and similar levels of effectiveness of control measures. In controlling SARS outbreaks, timely alerts have been essential: Delaying the institution of control measures by 1 week would have nearly tripled the epidemic size and would have increased the expected epidemic duration by 4 weeks.
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              A mathematical model for the global spread of influenza

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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                cmills@mit.edu
                Journal
                Nature
                Nature
                Nature
                Nature Publishing Group UK (London )
                0028-0836
                1476-4687
                2004
                : 432
                : 7019
                : 904-906
                Affiliations
                [1 ]GRID grid.38142.3c, ISNI 000000041936754X, Department of Epidemiology, , Harvard School of Public Health, ; 677 Huntington Avenue, Massachusetts 02115 Boston, USA
                [2 ]GRID grid.38142.3c, ISNI 000000041936754X, Department of Biostatistics, , Harvard School of Public Health, ; 677 Huntington Avenue, Massachusetts 02115 Boston, USA
                [3 ]GRID grid.38142.3c, ISNI 000000041936754X, Department of Immunology and Infectious Diseases, , Harvard School of Public Health, ; 677 Huntington Avenue, Massachusetts 02115 Boston, USA
                Article
                BFnature03063
                10.1038/nature03063
                7095078
                15602562
                90a67b23-5a73-402e-b44f-8ef12f518a56
                © Macmillan Magazines Ltd. 2005

                This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted research re-use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for the duration of the World Health Organization (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic.

                History
                : 17 August 2004
                : 27 September 2004
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                © Springer Nature Limited 2004

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