Aristotle’s Theory of Self-Perception

Abstract

The analysis of the Aristotelian theory of self-perception (DA II 5) starts with an in-depth discussion of an aporia present in the text. After having excluded that the problem has to be reconnected to the mind-body relationship, it is shown that both spiritualist and ‘literal’ interpretations are unable to explain the text in all its parts in a satisfactory way. In particular, it is shown that the ability to perceive oneself as a subject who perceives, implies a relationship between sense organs and a sensitive object, such that, in certain respects, the sense organ is connected to the sensible object, because that is what makes it active, but in other respects, it is detached from it, without ceasing to be active. Through an analysis of the terms in which Aristotle introduces the issue and a discussion of recent critical bibliography it is finally argued that in order to explain the perception of oneself it is not necessary to assume alleged mental activities, parallel to bodily activities. On the contrary, the perception of oneself is explained on the basis of a general hylomorphic setting, which requires to consider a formal level, as well as a material one.