+1 Recommend
1 collections
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: found
      • Article: found
      Is Open Access



      Read this article at

          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.


          ABSTRACT According to prioritarianism, an influential theory of distributive justice, we have a stronger (non-egalitarian) reason to benefit people the worse off these people are (Parfit 2012). Many authors have adopted a consequentialist version of prioritarianism. On this account, we have a consequentialist reason to benefit the worse off because the state of affairs where the worse off gains a given amount of utility is more valuable than the state of affairs where the better off gains roughly the same amount of utility. In this paper, we argue that the consequentialist approach to prioritarianism is problematic. However, it doesn't follow that the prioritarian doctrine per se is groundless. We then suggest that we can make sense of prioritarianism by appeal to a contractualist approach.

          Translated abstract

          RESUMO De acordo com o prioritarianismo, uma teoria influente da justiça distributiva, temos um motivo forte (não igualitário) para beneficiar as pessoas, por piores que tais pessoas sejam (Parfit, 2012). Diversos autores têm adotado uma versão consequencialista de prioritarianismo. Nesse sentido, temos um motivo consequencialista para beneficiar ainda que piores por causa do estado de coisas em que os piores que ganham uma dada quantidade de utilidade são mais valiosos do que o estado de coisas em que os melhores ganham aproximadamente a mesma quantidade de utilidade. Neste artigo, argumentamos que a abordagem consequencialista ao prioritarianismo é problemática. Entretanto, não se acompanha que a doutrina prioritarista seja, por si, sem base. Então sugerimos do que podemos fazer algum sentido no prioritarianismo por apelo a uma abordagem contraditória.

          Related collections

          Most cited references9

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: not found
          • Article: not found

          The Trolley Problem

            • Record: found
            • Abstract: found
            • Article: not found

            Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory

            It is argued that Rawls does not offer a viable alternative to utilitarian morality. It is shown that the maximin principle would lead to absurd decisions. Thus, it is unfortunate that Rawls bases his theory on the assumption that the maximin principle would serve as decision rule in the original position. The present writer has shown (prior to Rawls's first paper on this subject) that we can obtain a highly satisfactory theory of morality, one in the utilitarian tradition, if we assume that in the original position expected-utility maximization would be used as a decision rule. Rawls's theory is unacceptable because it would force us to discriminate against the legitimate human needs of all individuals enjoying good fortune in any way— whether by being relatively well-to-do, or by being in reasonably good health, or by having good intellectual ability or artistic talent, etc.
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: found
              • Article: not found

              Another Defence of the Priority View

              This article discusses the relation between prioritarian and egalitarian principles, whether and why we need to appeal to both kinds of principle, how prioritarians can answer various objections, especially those put forward by Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve, the moral difference between cases in which our acts could affect only one person or two or more people, veil of ignorance contractualism and utilitarianism, what prioritarians should claim about cases in which the effects of our acts are uncertain, the relative moral importance of actual and expectable benefits, whether people should sometimes be given various chances of receiving benefits, and principles that appeal to competing claims.

                Author and article information

                Role: ND
                Role: ND
                Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia
                Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da UFMG (Belo Horizonte, MG, Brazil )
                September 2018
                : 59
                : 141
                : 943-956
                [1] Guangzhou Shi Guangdong orgnameSun Yat-sen University China
                [2] Shatin NT orgnameThe Chinese University of Hong Kong The People's Republic of China

                This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

                : 06 September 2017
                : 09 November 2017
                Page count
                Figures: 0, Tables: 0, Equations: 0, References: 16, Pages: 14

                SciELO Brazil


                Prioritarianismo,consequencialismo,contratualismo,justiça distributiva,Prioritarianism,Consequentialism,Contractualism,Distributive Justice


                Comment on this article