19
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
0 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: not found
      • Article: not found

      Is Chinese Special? Four Aspects of Chinese Literacy Acquisition that Might Distinguish Learning Chinese from Learning Alphabetic Orthographies

      Educational Psychology Review
      Springer Nature

      Read this article at

      ScienceOpenPublisher
      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Related collections

          Most cited references83

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: not found
          • Article: not found

          Learning to Read Words: Theory, Findings, and Issues

            Bookmark
            • Record: found
            • Abstract: found
            • Article: not found

            Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate.

            Economists and biologists have proposed a distinction between two mechanisms--"strong" and "weak" reciprocity--that may explain the evolution of human sociality. Weak reciprocity theorists emphasize the benefits of long-term cooperation and the use of low-cost strategies to deter free-riders. Strong reciprocity theorists, in contrast, claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. To support this claim, they have generated a large body of evidence concerning the willingness of experimental subjects to punish uncooperative free-riders at a cost to themselves. In this article, I distinguish between a "narrow" and a "wide" reading of the experimental evidence. Under the narrow reading, punishment experiments are just useful devices to measure psychological propensities in controlled laboratory conditions. Under the wide reading, they replicate a mechanism that supports cooperation also in "real-world" situations outside the laboratory. I argue that the wide interpretation must be tested using a combination of laboratory data and evidence about cooperation "in the wild." In spite of some often-repeated claims, there is no evidence that cooperation in the small egalitarian societies studied by anthropologists is enforced by means of costly punishment. Moreover, studies by economic and social historians show that social dilemmas in the wild are typically solved by institutions that coordinate punishment, reduce its cost, and extend the horizon of cooperation. The lack of field evidence for costly punishment suggests important constraints about what forms of cooperation can or cannot be sustained by means of decentralised policing.
              Bookmark
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: not found
              • Article: not found

              Morphological awareness: Just “more phonological”? The roles of morphological and phonological awareness in reading development

                Bookmark

                Author and article information

                Journal
                Educational Psychology Review
                Educ Psychol Rev
                Springer Nature
                1040-726X
                1573-336X
                September 2016
                June 2015
                : 28
                : 3
                : 523-549
                Article
                10.1007/s10648-015-9318-2
                996c1e9e-6048-462a-8a76-264ce9fe9b23
                © 2016
                History

                Comments

                Comment on this article