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      Active Inference, Curiosity and Insight

        , , , , ,
      Neural Computation
      MIT Press - Journals

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          Abstract

          <p class="first" id="d15407246e132">This article offers a formal account of curiosity and insight in terms of active (Bayesian) inference. It deals with the dual problem of inferring states of the world and learning its statistical structure. In contrast to current trends in machine learning (e.g., deep learning), we focus on how people attain insight and understanding using just a handful of observations, which are solicited through curious behavior. We use simulations of abstract rule learning and approximate Bayesian inference to show that minimizing (expected) variational free energy leads to active sampling of novel contingencies. This epistemic behavior closes explanatory gaps in generative models of the world, thereby reducing uncertainty and satisfying curiosity. We then move from epistemic learning to model selection or structure learning to show how abductive processes emerge when agents test plausible hypotheses about symmetries (i.e., invariances or rules) in their generative models. The ensuing Bayesian model reduction evinces mechanisms associated with sleep and has all the hallmarks of "aha" moments. This formulation moves toward a computational account of consciousness in the pre-Cartesian sense of sharable knowledge (i.e., con: "together"; scire: "to know"). </p>

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          Most cited references72

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          Is Open Access

          A nonequilibrium equality for free energy differences

          An expression is derived for the classical free energy difference between two configurations of a system, in terms of an ensemble of finite-time measurements of the work performed in parametrically switching from one configuration to the other. Two well-known equilibrium identities emerge as limiting cases of this result.
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            How to grow a mind: statistics, structure, and abstraction.

            In coming to understand the world-in learning concepts, acquiring language, and grasping causal relations-our minds make inferences that appear to go far beyond the data available. How do we do it? This review describes recent approaches to reverse-engineering human learning and cognitive development and, in parallel, engineering more humanlike machine learning systems. Computational models that perform probabilistic inference over hierarchies of flexibly structured representations can address some of the deepest questions about the nature and origins of human thought: How does abstract knowledge guide learning and reasoning from sparse data? What forms does our knowledge take, across different domains and tasks? And how is that abstract knowledge itself acquired?
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              Active Inference: A Process Theory.

              This article describes a process theory based on active inference and belief propagation. Starting from the premise that all neuronal processing (and action selection) can be explained by maximizing Bayesian model evidence-or minimizing variational free energy-we ask whether neuronal responses can be described as a gradient descent on variational free energy. Using a standard (Markov decision process) generative model, we derive the neuronal dynamics implicit in this description and reproduce a remarkable range of well-characterized neuronal phenomena. These include repetition suppression, mismatch negativity, violation responses, place-cell activity, phase precession, theta sequences, theta-gamma coupling, evidence accumulation, race-to-bound dynamics, and transfer of dopamine responses. Furthermore, the (approximately Bayes' optimal) behavior prescribed by these dynamics has a degree of face validity, providing a formal explanation for reward seeking, context learning, and epistemic foraging. Technically, the fact that a gradient descent appears to be a valid description of neuronal activity means that variational free energy is a Lyapunov function for neuronal dynamics, which therefore conform to Hamilton's principle of least action.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Neural Computation
                Neural Computation
                MIT Press - Journals
                0899-7667
                1530-888X
                October 2017
                October 2017
                : 29
                : 10
                : 2633-2683
                Article
                10.1162/neco_a_00999
                28777724
                9ae10189-df33-4a83-b3f8-dc0625923bf2
                © 2017
                History

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