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      Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo (consciente e inconscientemente) sin saber que las creo

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          Abstract

          RESUMEN En un artículo publicado recientemente (2014) en esta revista, Javier Vidal argumenta que toda creencia de primera persona es una creencia consciente, una conclusión que pone en jaque ciertas teorías de la consciencia, como él mismo expone. El razonamiento de Vidal se basa en un argumento que muestra que uno conoce toda creencia de primera persona que tiene y en un principio (SC*) que vincula conocimiento y consciencia. Mi objetivo en este trabajo es mostrar que el razonamiento de Vidal no es sólido. En particular, hago patente que el argumento depende de rechazar la relación ampliamente aceptada en epistemología entre creencia y conocimiento. Además, argumento que SC* o bien prejuzga la cuestión o bien involucra una noción de consciencia no relevante para la discusión.

          Translated abstract

          SUMMARY In a recent paper in this journal (2014), Javier Vidal has argued that every first-person belief is a conscious one, a conclusion that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness as he shows. Vidal’s reasoning is builded upon an argument to the effect that one knows all first person beliefs that one has and a principle (SC*) that links knowledge and consciousness. My aim in this paper is to show that Vidal’s reasoning is unsound. In particular, I show that the argument depends upon the rejection of the relation, widely accepted in epistemology, between belief and knowledge. Moreover, I argue that SC* either begs the question or involves a notion of consciousness that is not relevant for the discussion.

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          Most cited references24

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          Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience.

          Ned Block (2007)
          How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases--when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority--and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is "Yes," then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is "Yes"? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.
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            Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access.

            Ned Block (2011)
            One of the most important issues concerning the foundations of conscious perception centers on the question of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of 'iconic memory' to argue that perceptual consciousness is richer (i.e., has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argument has been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the postulation of (i) a peculiar kind of generic conscious representation that has no independent rationale and (ii) an unmotivated form of unconscious representation that in some cases conflicts with what we know about unconscious representation. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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              Self-Reference and Self-Awareness

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                Author and article information

                Journal
                rhfi
                Crítica (México, D.F.)
                Crítica (Méx., D.F.)
                Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM (México, DF, Mexico )
                0011-1503
                2017
                : 49
                : 146
                : 37-60
                Affiliations
                [1] orgnameUniversidad Nacional Autónoma de México orgdiv1Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas Mexico msebastian@ 123456gmail.com
                Article
                S0011-15032017000200037 S0011-1503(17)04914600037
                10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.180
                a093f7ad-1af0-4c15-945d-210d234690ec

                This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

                History
                : 29 May 2017
                : 08 March 2016
                Page count
                Figures: 0, Tables: 0, Equations: 0, References: 52, Pages: 24
                Product

                SciELO Mexico

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                Artículos

                unconscious belief,higher-order thought theories,de se representation,consciousness,referencia de primera persona,creencia inconsciente,teorías de pensamiento de orden superior,representación de se,consciencia,first-person reference

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