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      Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design

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      Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
      Oxford University Press (OUP)

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          Journal
          Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
          Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
          Oxford University Press (OUP)
          8756-6222
          1465-7341
          January 01 1991
          January 01 1991
          : 7
          : special
          : 24-52
          Article
          10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
          a1739443-b1a0-442d-a06c-3b5dd3cc5c80
          © 1991
          History

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