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      Anterior insular cortex and emotional awareness : Anterior Insular Cortex and Emotional Awareness

      1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,   1 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6
      Journal of Comparative Neurology
      Wiley

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          Abstract

          This paper reviews the foundation for a role of the human anterior insular cortex (AIC) in emotional awareness, defined as the conscious experience of emotions. We first introduce the neuroanatomical features of AIC and existing findings on emotional awareness. Using empathy, the awareness and understanding of other people's emotional states, as a test case, we then present evidence to demonstrate: 1) AIC and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are commonly coactivated as revealed by a meta-analysis, 2) AIC is functionally dissociable from ACC, 3) AIC integrates stimulus-driven and top-down information, and 4) AIC is necessary for emotional awareness. We propose a model in which AIC serves two major functions: integrating bottom-up interoceptive signals with top-down predictions to generate a current awareness state and providing descending predictions to visceral systems that provide a point of reference for autonomic reflexes. We argue that AIC is critical and necessary for emotional awareness. Copyright © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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          Most cited references128

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          Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of pain.

          Our ability to have an experience of another's pain is characteristic of empathy. Using functional imaging, we assessed brain activity while volunteers experienced a painful stimulus and compared it to that elicited when they observed a signal indicating that their loved one--present in the same room--was receiving a similar pain stimulus. Bilateral anterior insula (AI), rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brainstem, and cerebellum were activated when subjects received pain and also by a signal that a loved one experienced pain. AI and ACC activation correlated with individual empathy scores. Activity in the posterior insula/secondary somatosensory cortex, the sensorimotor cortex (SI/MI), and the caudal ACC was specific to receiving pain. Thus, a neural response in AI and rostral ACC, activated in common for "self" and "other" conditions, suggests that the neural substrate for empathic experience does not involve the entire "pain matrix." We conclude that only that part of the pain network associated with its affective qualities, but not its sensory qualities, mediates empathy.
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            Interoception: the sense of the physiological condition of the body.

            Converging evidence indicates that primates have a distinct cortical image of homeostatic afferent activity that reflects all aspects of the physiological condition of all tissues of the body. This interoceptive system, associated with autonomic motor control, is distinct from the exteroceptive system (cutaneous mechanoreception and proprioception) that guides somatic motor activity. The primary interoceptive representation in the dorsal posterior insula engenders distinct highly resolved feelings from the body that include pain, temperature, itch, sensual touch, muscular and visceral sensations, vasomotor activity, hunger, thirst, and 'air hunger'. In humans, a meta-representation of the primary interoceptive activity is engendered in the right anterior insula, which seems to provide the basis for the subjective image of the material self as a feeling (sentient) entity, that is, emotional awareness.
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              The functional architecture of human empathy.

              Empathy accounts for the naturally occurring subjective experience of similarity between the feelings expressed by self and others without loosing sight of whose feelings belong to whom. Empathy involves not only the affective experience of the other person's actual or inferred emotional state but also some minimal recognition and understanding of another's emotional state. In light of multiple levels of analysis ranging from developmental psychology, social psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical neuropsychology, this article proposes a model of empathy that involves parallel and distributed processing in a number of dissociable computational mechanisms. Shared neural representations, self-awareness, mental flexibility, and emotion regulation constitute the basic macrocomponents of empathy, which are underpinned by specific neural systems. This functional model may be used to make specific predictions about the various empathy deficits that can be encountered in different forms of social and neurological disorders.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Journal of Comparative Neurology
                J. Comp. Neurol.
                Wiley
                00219967
                October 2013
                October 2013
                August 23 2013
                : 521
                : 15
                : 3371-3388
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging; University College London; London United Kingdom WC1N 3BG
                [2 ]Virginia Tech Carilion Research Institute; Roanoke Virginia 24011
                [3 ]Fishberg Department of Neuroscience; Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai; New York New York 10029
                [4 ]Friedman Brain Institute; Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai; New York New York 10029
                [5 ]Department of Psychiatry; Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai; New York New York 10029
                [6 ]Department of Psychology, Queens College; The City University of New York; Flushing New York 11367
                Article
                10.1002/cne.23368
                3999437
                23749500
                a3d65ba5-799a-4375-9f13-d1de1b9597af
                © 2013

                http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1

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