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      Why health promotion matters to the COVID-19 pandemic, and vice versa

      editorial
      Health Promotion International
      Oxford University Press

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          Abstract

          At the time I am writing this editorial, the world is overwhelmed by the pandmic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus. In a desperate attempt to contain the further spread of the virus and the diffusion of the COVID-19 disease it causes, governments across the world have taken measures that are unprecedented. Entire cities, regions and countries are sealed off, travel is banned, schools and universities are closed, shops are running out of stocks, and all economic, cultural and social activities have come to a stop. Never before in modern history has a health problem had such an overwhelming impact on society. Health (or rather the threat of ill health) has become the prevailing concern that takes precedence over all others issues, making health in all policies become a reality, albeit not in the way it was intended. At first sight, this pandemic and the world’s response to it seems far removed from the health promotion perspectives we publish and that the International Union for Health Promotion and Education advocates for. When all hands are called on deck to prevent a contagious virus from spreading and to reinforce hospital staff facing a tsunami of patients suffering from a potentially deadly disease, there seems to be little need for specialists whose expertise lies at the other end of the continuum of care spectrum (Springer and Phillips, 2006). The real war heroes in the battle against the CoV-2 virus are virologists, epidemiologists, doctors and nurses, and even if many of the actions taken serve a preventative purpose, their focus is on the prevention of disease, not on promoting health. Yet on the other hand, many of the measures that are now taken to prevent citizens and health workers from getting infected imply a change of behaviour. Hand washing, wearing face masks and protective gloves and ‘social distancing’ (which should really be termed ‘spatial distancing’) are all forms of human behaviour. As the expertise with regard to health behaviour change is one of the core competencies of health educators and promoters, their advice may help governments to achieve the required behaviour change. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the rapid and continuous evolution of the COVID-19 problem and the scale of the measures that are put in place may, rightly or wrongly, create the perception that the existing health system is failing to protect citizens against the spread of the virus. This creates a need for people to regain control of their health, to protect oneself against the disease and to deal with its disruptive consequences. Enabling people to increase control over their health and its determinants is at the core of health promotion. As such, health promotion may paradoxically be more important in this time of crisis than ever before. As a discipline within public health and a field of professional practice, health promotion can contribute to addressing the CoV-2 virus threat at different levels (Brownson et al., 2010): at the downstream level focusing on individual behaviour change and disease management, at the midstream level through interventions affecting organizations and communities and at the upstream level through informing policies affecting the population. IMPROVING PREVENTIVE BEHAVIOUR CHANGE MEASURES To contain the spread of the CoV-2 virus, health authorities have tried to enhance protective behaviour amongst citizens, first by issuing warnings and recommendations about the new virus, and at a later stage by imposing legal restrictions, in some cases involving a complete ‘lock-down’. These measures have met with varying degrees of success. Especially in the beginning of the epidemic the public’s response to warnings was often weak and ineffective, thus wasting opportunities to effectively contain the spread of the disease. And even when the scale of the problem became pandemic, a significant number of people did (and continue to) not strictly follow the recommendations. This lack of adherence is often condemned as irresponsible and selfish, but that need not necessarily be the case. Changing people’s behaviour is simply not as easy as just informing them of the risks. Years of research in protective health behaviour informed by theoretical models such as the Health Belief Model (Champion and Skinner, 2008) or the Protection Motivation Theory (Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1986) have shown that people will only act on health warnings if they: believe that they are personally susceptible to develop the condition against which protection is required; perceive the condition as severe; perceive the preventive action as effective to reduce the threat; and believe they are capable to perform the preventive action. It is clear that in the case of COVID-19 these conditions are not always fulfilled. People may not consider themselves at risk (e.g. if they have not been in contact with others who have been contaminated), may underestimate the seriousness of the condition (e.g. when they are told that most fatalities are older people or people with pre-existing morbidity) or may not see themselves as capable to perform the preventive behaviours. On the other hand, the wide coverage of the pandemic by the media and the scope of the preventive measures that are taken also create anxiety. While a certain level of concern is an important driver for protective behaviour, too much anxiety can elicit cognitive avoidance strategies which minimize the perceived threat (Croyle et al., 2013). In a similar vein, an individual’s social identity needs in interaction with contextual factors can increase and mitigate the actual rejection of evidence—a phenomenon that is known as knowledge resistance (Klintman, 2019). Nevertheless, changing people’s transmission-related behaviours across society remains important to flatten the peak of the epidemic. Drawing on widely accepted behaviour change principles, Michie et al. (2020) make the following recommendations to reduce the transmission of COVID-19 in the population: motivate people to adopt preventive behaviour by presenting them with clear rationale, preferably in the form of a mental model of the transmission process; create social norms that encourage preventive behaviour, through campaigns targeting people’s self-identity and by getting people to give each other feedback; create the right level and type of emotion by coupling health warnings with concrete advice for protective action; give advice on how risk behaviours can be replaced by more effective ones, rather than just asking to stop them; and make the behaviour easy, for instance by building it into existing routines or using nudges. Health promoters can suggest to authorities to follow these recommendations when setting up campaigns to prevent further transmission of the CoV-2 virus. It will increase the likelihood that people will effectively change their behaviour. ACKNOWLEDGING THE ROLE OF HEALTH LITERACY AND INFORMATION BIAS In times of crisis people want to be well informed, so they know what individual preventive measures they must take and how they can deal with the consequences. With respect to COVID-19, there is an abundance of information available, with official and unofficial websites continuously updating recommendations and instructions, and news media covering the situation around the clock. The question is, however, whether all this information is useful. A bombardment of communication, although well intended, can create confusion. Therefore, coordination of key messaging between the health sector and other sectors is necessary in pandemic responses (Smith and Judd, 2020) Moreover, for information to be helpful it must not only be available, but also understood, accepted and applied. Research on health literacy has shown that more than a third of the population worldwide has difficulties in finding, understanding, evaluating and using information that is necessary to manage their health (Sørensen et al., 2015; Duong et al., 2017). Authorities should take that into account when informing the public about COVID-19 and adapt the information to the literacy needs of the people they want to reach. That means the response to the pandemic should be looked at through an equity lens (Smith and Judd, 2020), with attention for those who are the most vulnerable in pandemics, such as elderly, migrants or people with disabilities. Okan et al. (2020) give the following recommendations to take health literacy into account when communicating about the CoV-2: provide information in an understandable way, recognizing that people and groups with low health literacy may need more explanation and different communication formats such as animations that explain the virus, the disease, its transmission and protective measures; explain the situation transparently and clarify the overriding objectives repeatedly, to prepare people for the fact that interventions and recommendations might change when new evidence arrives and scenarios must be adapted; communicate new evidence and information without being afraid to correct earlier messages and statements if necessary; and avoid blaming, but instead strengthen the well-informed responsibility of the individual while showing solidarity with vulnerable population groups. Authorities also need to acknowledge that taking up health information is an active cognitive process. To inform themselves about the virus and ways to protect themselves, people actively select information sources and information from within these sources, some of which may be contradictory. Information processing theory teaches us that this selection is influenced by context, emotions and selective attention (Estes, 2014), thus introducing a potential selection bias whereby more attention is paid to some information than to other. The use of cognitive schemes to process this information adds another form of bias, namely confirmation bias (i.e. the tendency to seek information that confirms the beliefs already held and to ignore or discard information that contradicts these beliefs). Likewise, the activation of cognitive schemes to filter, classify and assimilate information and make connections with already available knowledge that takes place when trying to understand and appraise the information about the virus and to judge the importance of preventive measures can again cause a series of biases. In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, the most important ones are possibly negative information bias (i.e. the tendency to attach more importance to negative than to positive information, resulting in « catastrophic thinking »), positive information bias (i.e. the tendency to consider oneself as less at risk for negative consequence, causing « unrealistic optimism »), and familiarity or recency bias (i.e. things that are familiar or recent are more easily retrieved from memory and therefore more easily considered as « true »). Since information about COVID-19 is also diffused via social media, there is an additional risk that false information is accessed and taken for truth. Among the persistent ‘myths’ about CoV-2 are the belief that the virus was made in a laboratory or otherwise engineered, that cold weather or hand dryers can kill it, that young people cannot get infected, or that antibiotics or vaccines against pneumonia protect against the infection. These false beliefs can be reinforced by the false consensus that is created when information is shared on social media, leading to the ‘echo chamber’ or ‘illusion of truth’ effect, basically implying that information that is often repeated tends to be more easily considered as true. To counter these effects, some basic principles can be applied to limit the spread of biased, false or misleading information, such as encouraging people to cross check the accuracy and credibility of information, to check the source of information (where does it come from, who is behind the information, what is the intention, why was it shared, when was it published), to verify the information by consulting a second source, to consult family members and trusted health professionals about information that is ‘doubtful’, and to think twice before sharing information that has not been fact-checked (Okan et al., 2020). EMPOWERING ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNITIES While preventing the further spread of COVID-19 relies heavily on informing and encouraging the population to adopt protective behaviours, these efforts may be more successful if the advice from experts is combined with local community knowledge. Experience with the way the Ebola epidemic was responded to in African countries shows that in an environment of trust, community partners can help to improve the understanding of disease control protocols and suggest moderate changes that better reflect the community’s sensitivities without compromising safety (Marais et al., 2015). Such an approach not only prevents stigmatization and fear-driven responses among affected individuals, families and communities that can hamper preventive efforts, but also act as a powerful lever to enhance adherence and mobilize community engagement. Community engagement can make a substantial difference in health outcomes, and strengthen the capacity to deal with the disruptive effects of the pandemic at organizational and community level. When schools, creches, universities, offices, churches, shops, restaurants and sports fields are closed, the usual structures and mechanisms around which people organize their daily lives are no longer functioning. Communication and interaction can to some extent be replaced by digital means in the form of online meetings, e-learning platforms or distance learning tools, but these tools do not provide the same depth of interaction as face-to-face meetings and require sufficient digital skills and organizational support. Furthermore, they do not allow the same level of ‘informal’ contact that make human interactions meaningful, and are difficult to implement at a level that goes beyond the organization and involves the larger community. Yet while the switch to different modes of operating creates a lot of insecurity and stress, many communities react by showing high levels of solidarity and mutual support. These expressions of a positive mindset, which are not uncommon in times of crisis, show the communities’ resilience, and provide a strong basis to build on to help organizations and communities cope with the unfamiliar situation, re-organize and regain control. Health promotion has a long tradition of helping organizations and communities to increase control over the factors that define health. The Ottawa Charter emphasizes the importance of community action, in the sense of needs assessments, setting priorities, joint planning, capacity building, strengthening local partnerships, intersectoral working and enhancing public participation and social support (Nutbeam, 1998). All of these activities aim to create empowered communities, where individuals and organizations apply their skills and resources in collective efforts to address health priorities and meet their respective health needs. Importantly, community action builds on the existing strengths and capacities within a community, to further strengthen its resilience. The models, strategies and case examples of successful community action and empowerment documented by health promotion researchers and practitioners over the years can provide guidance to communities facing the challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic. In a similar way, the expertise of health promotors with creating healthy settings, or places where people actively use and shape the (organizational) environment so as to create or solve problems relating to health, can be a source of inspiration and support for schools, universities and workplaces that have to deal with the longer-term disruptive effects of the pandemic. Such actions can take different forms, but will usually involve some form of organizational development, including changes to the physical environment, the organizational structure, the administration and even the management (Nutbeam, 1998). LEARNING FROM THE CRISIS The above paragraphs illustrate that health promotion can contribute in several ways to tackle the challenge of the COVID-19 threat and its societal impact. But health promotion can also learn from the crisis. One thing that has become clear in the current crisis is that infectious diseases can pose a major threat to public health. In its effort to move away from a strongly disease-oriented approach to public health, health promotion has traditionally focused on non-communicable disease, where it has significantly contributed to the progress made in areas like tobacco and obesity prevention. But with the exception of HIV/AIDS, the application of health promotion principles and methods to tackle infectious diseases has been largely neglected. As a result, public health professionals who deal with communicable diseases are often unaware of the approaches used by health promoters (ECDC, 2014), although there is a good reason to assume that these can be usefully adapted and applied to preventing infectious diseases as well. That would require, however, that health promotion researchers and practitioners develop a keen interest in infectious diseases. McQueen (2015) argues that to further the cause of health promotion applied to both infectious and non-communicable disease, health promotion needs to focus more on intervention research and understand the processes involved in implementation, rather than on outcomes and causality. As interventions are dynamic and subject to change during implementation, participatory methods should be further developed, recognized and documented in the scientific literature and in research protocols. A second lesson to be learnt from the COVID-19 crisis is that human health is not an isolated issue. There is a general consensus that the SARS-CoV-2 virus is of animal origin, jumped species boundaries to infect humans either before or after it evolved to its current pathogenic state (Andersen et al., 2020), and could then very rapidly spread in a globalized economic system characterized by high levels of interconnectedness and mobility. Health promotion has never paid much attention to zoonotic causes of human health, but the current crisis suggests that maybe it should. A good starting point would be to embrace the concept of ‘One Health’, which recognizes the interconnection between people, animals, plants and their shared environment, with the goal to achieve optimal health outcomes (Atlas et al., 2010; Calistri et al., 2013). After all, the collaborative, multisectoral and transdisciplinary nature of the One Health approach is very much akin to health promotion’s principles and strategies. It also links very well with the growing interest of health promotion researchers and practitioners for sustainable development, as exemplified by recent projects (e.g. INHERIT; https://www.inherit.eu) and by the choice of ‘planetary health and sustainable development’ as the theme for the latest IUHPE World Conference on Health Promotion (Ratima, 2019). A third lesson to be drawn from the COVID-19 pandemic is that health promotion should not wait until a crisis happens, but prepare itself to respond swiftly. To deal with an epidemic effectively, we must not only understand viruses and how they spread, but also the ways in which people make decisions, organizations operate and communities relate in reaction to them (Kickbusch and Sakellarides, 2006). Health promotion researchers should learn from crisis situations, analyse the reactions and document the learnings. A good example is the way the Singaporean government dealt with the SARS outbreak in 2003, where it was shown that, rather than the actual knowledge about the virus, the high confidence and trust in the government’s ability to cope with SARS was a key factor in controlling the crisis (Deurenberg-Yap et al., 2005). This confirms findings from other studies highlighting the importance of trust in dealing with crisis situations (Siegrist and Zingg, 2014). In a similar vein, a comparison between the response to Hurricane Katarina in New Orleans and to SARS in Toronto put the success of the Toronto response down to social cohesion (Matthews, 2006, cited by Kickbusch and Sakellarides, 2006). These and other findings call for further research on the ways trust in public institutions can be enhanced and social capital can be mobilized in order to make populations more resilient against crises. Just like the banking and terrorism crises before it, the COVID-19 pandemic teaches us that the faith in the predictability and control of events that has dominated our thinking since the Enlightment may be too optimistic. We have to accept uncertainty and learn to live with it. The only certainty we have is that the world will be different after COVID-19. As a consequence, this crisis can also be a turning point for health promotion. Confucius, in all his wisdom, believed that it is the study of the past that helps to define the future. But in the current situation, it may well be the present that gives us directions in which to look forward.

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          The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2

          To the Editor — Since the first reports of novel pneumonia (COVID-19) in Wuhan, Hubei province, China 1,2 , there has been considerable discussion on the origin of the causative virus, SARS-CoV-2 3 (also referred to as HCoV-19) 4 . Infections with SARS-CoV-2 are now widespread, and as of 11 March 2020, 121,564 cases have been confirmed in more than 110 countries, with 4,373 deaths 5 . SARS-CoV-2 is the seventh coronavirus known to infect humans; SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 can cause severe disease, whereas HKU1, NL63, OC43 and 229E are associated with mild symptoms 6 . Here we review what can be deduced about the origin of SARS-CoV-2 from comparative analysis of genomic data. We offer a perspective on the notable features of the SARS-CoV-2 genome and discuss scenarios by which they could have arisen. Our analyses clearly show that SARS-CoV-2 is not a laboratory construct or a purposefully manipulated virus. Notable features of the SARS-CoV-2 genome Our comparison of alpha- and betacoronaviruses identifies two notable genomic features of SARS-CoV-2: (i) on the basis of structural studies 7–9 and biochemical experiments 1,9,10 , SARS-CoV-2 appears to be optimized for binding to the human receptor ACE2; and (ii) the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 has a functional polybasic (furin) cleavage site at the S1–S2 boundary through the insertion of 12 nucleotides 8 , which additionally led to the predicted acquisition of three O-linked glycans around the site. 1. Mutations in the receptor-binding domain of SARS-CoV-2 The receptor-binding domain (RBD) in the spike protein is the most variable part of the coronavirus genome 1,2 . Six RBD amino acids have been shown to be critical for binding to ACE2 receptors and for determining the host range of SARS-CoV-like viruses 7 . With coordinates based on SARS-CoV, they are Y442, L472, N479, D480, T487 and Y4911, which correspond to L455, F486, Q493, S494, N501 and Y505 in SARS-CoV-2 7 . Five of these six residues differ between SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV (Fig. 1a). On the basis of structural studies 7–9 and biochemical experiments 1,9,10 , SARS-CoV-2 seems to have an RBD that binds with high affinity to ACE2 from humans, ferrets, cats and other species with high receptor homology 7 . Fig. 1 Features of the spike protein in human SARS-CoV-2 and related coronaviruses. a, Mutations in contact residues of the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein. The spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 (red bar at top) was aligned against the most closely related SARS-CoV-like coronaviruses and SARS-CoV itself. Key residues in the spike protein that make contact to the ACE2 receptor are marked with blue boxes in both SARS-CoV-2 and related viruses, including SARS-CoV (Urbani strain). b, Acquisition of polybasic cleavage site and O-linked glycans. Both the polybasic cleavage site and the three adjacent predicted O-linked glycans are unique to SARS-CoV-2 and were not previously seen in lineage B betacoronaviruses. Sequences shown are from NCBI GenBank, accession codes MN908947, MN996532, AY278741, KY417146 and MK211376. The pangolin coronavirus sequences are a consensus generated from SRR10168377 and SRR10168378 (NCBI BioProject PRJNA573298) 29,30 . While the analyses above suggest that SARS-CoV-2 may bind human ACE2 with high affinity, computational analyses predict that the interaction is not ideal 7 and that the RBD sequence is different from those shown in SARS-CoV to be optimal for receptor binding 7,11 . Thus, the high-affinity binding of the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein to human ACE2 is most likely the result of natural selection on a human or human-like ACE2 that permits another optimal binding solution to arise. This is strong evidence that SARS-CoV-2 is not the product of purposeful manipulation. 2. Polybasic furin cleavage site and O-linked glycans The second notable feature of SARS-CoV-2 is a polybasic cleavage site (RRAR) at the junction of S1 and S2, the two subunits of the spike 8 (Fig. 1b). This allows effective cleavage by furin and other proteases and has a role in determining viral infectivity and host range 12 . In addition, a leading proline is also inserted at this site in SARS-CoV-2; thus, the inserted sequence is PRRA (Fig. 1b). The turn created by the proline is predicted to result in the addition of O-linked glycans to S673, T678 and S686, which flank the cleavage site and are unique to SARS-CoV-2 (Fig. 1b). Polybasic cleavage sites have not been observed in related ‘lineage B’ betacoronaviruses, although other human betacoronaviruses, including HKU1 (lineage A), have those sites and predicted O-linked glycans 13 . Given the level of genetic variation in the spike, it is likely that SARS-CoV-2-like viruses with partial or full polybasic cleavage sites will be discovered in other species. The functional consequence of the polybasic cleavage site in SARS-CoV-2 is unknown, and it will be important to determine its impact on transmissibility and pathogenesis in animal models. Experiments with SARS-CoV have shown that insertion of a furin cleavage site at the S1–S2 junction enhances cell–cell fusion without affecting viral entry 14 . In addition, efficient cleavage of the MERS-CoV spike enables MERS-like coronaviruses from bats to infect human cells 15 . In avian influenza viruses, rapid replication and transmission in highly dense chicken populations selects for the acquisition of polybasic cleavage sites in the hemagglutinin (HA) protein 16 , which serves a function similar to that of the coronavirus spike protein. Acquisition of polybasic cleavage sites in HA, by insertion or recombination, converts low-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses into highly pathogenic forms 16 . The acquisition of polybasic cleavage sites by HA has also been observed after repeated passage in cell culture or through animals 17 . The function of the predicted O-linked glycans is unclear, but they could create a ‘mucin-like domain’ that shields epitopes or key residues on the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein 18 . Several viruses utilize mucin-like domains as glycan shields involved immunoevasion 18 . Although prediction of O-linked glycosylation is robust, experimental studies are needed to determine if these sites are used in SARS-CoV-2. Theories of SARS-CoV-2 origins It is improbable that SARS-CoV-2 emerged through laboratory manipulation of a related SARS-CoV-like coronavirus. As noted above, the RBD of SARS-CoV-2 is optimized for binding to human ACE2 with an efficient solution different from those previously predicted 7,11 . Furthermore, if genetic manipulation had been performed, one of the several reverse-genetic systems available for betacoronaviruses would probably have been used 19 . However, the genetic data irrefutably show that SARS-CoV-2 is not derived from any previously used virus backbone 20 . Instead, we propose two scenarios that can plausibly explain the origin of SARS-CoV-2: (i) natural selection in an animal host before zoonotic transfer; and (ii) natural selection in humans following zoonotic transfer. We also discuss whether selection during passage could have given rise to SARS-CoV-2. 1. Natural selection in an animal host before zoonotic transfer As many early cases of COVID-19 were linked to the Huanan market in Wuhan 1,2 , it is possible that an animal source was present at this location. Given the similarity of SARS-CoV-2 to bat SARS-CoV-like coronaviruses 2 , it is likely that bats serve as reservoir hosts for its progenitor. Although RaTG13, sampled from a Rhinolophus affinis bat 1 , is ~96% identical overall to SARS-CoV-2, its spike diverges in the RBD, which suggests that it may not bind efficiently to human ACE2 7 (Fig. 1a). Malayan pangolins (Manis javanica) illegally imported into Guangdong province contain coronaviruses similar to SARS-CoV-2 21 . Although the RaTG13 bat virus remains the closest to SARS-CoV-2 across the genome 1 , some pangolin coronaviruses exhibit strong similarity to SARS-CoV-2 in the RBD, including all six key RBD residues 21 (Fig. 1). This clearly shows that the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein optimized for binding to human-like ACE2 is the result of natural selection. Neither the bat betacoronaviruses nor the pangolin betacoronaviruses sampled thus far have polybasic cleavage sites. Although no animal coronavirus has been identified that is sufficiently similar to have served as the direct progenitor of SARS-CoV-2, the diversity of coronaviruses in bats and other species is massively undersampled. Mutations, insertions and deletions can occur near the S1–S2 junction of coronaviruses 22 , which shows that the polybasic cleavage site can arise by a natural evolutionary process. For a precursor virus to acquire both the polybasic cleavage site and mutations in the spike protein suitable for binding to human ACE2, an animal host would probably have to have a high population density (to allow natural selection to proceed efficiently) and an ACE2-encoding gene that is similar to the human ortholog. 2. Natural selection in humans following zoonotic transfer It is possible that a progenitor of SARS-CoV-2 jumped into humans, acquiring the genomic features described above through adaptation during undetected human-to-human transmission. Once acquired, these adaptations would enable the pandemic to take off and produce a sufficiently large cluster of cases to trigger the surveillance system that detected it 1,2 . All SARS-CoV-2 genomes sequenced so far have the genomic features described above and are thus derived from a common ancestor that had them too. The presence in pangolins of an RBD very similar to that of SARS-CoV-2 means that we can infer this was also probably in the virus that jumped to humans. This leaves the insertion of polybasic cleavage site to occur during human-to-human transmission. Estimates of the timing of the most recent common ancestor of SARS-CoV-2 made with current sequence data point to emergence of the virus in late November 2019 to early December 2019 23 , compatible with the earliest retrospectively confirmed cases 24 . Hence, this scenario presumes a period of unrecognized transmission in humans between the initial zoonotic event and the acquisition of the polybasic cleavage site. Sufficient opportunity could have arisen if there had been many prior zoonotic events that produced short chains of human-to-human transmission over an extended period. This is essentially the situation for MERS-CoV, for which all human cases are the result of repeated jumps of the virus from dromedary camels, producing single infections or short transmission chains that eventually resolve, with no adaptation to sustained transmission 25 . Studies of banked human samples could provide information on whether such cryptic spread has occurred. Retrospective serological studies could also be informative, and a few such studies have been conducted showing low-level exposures to SARS-CoV-like coronaviruses in certain areas of China 26 . Critically, however, these studies could not have distinguished whether exposures were due to prior infections with SARS-CoV, SARS-CoV-2 or other SARS-CoV-like coronaviruses. Further serological studies should be conducted to determine the extent of prior human exposure to SARS-CoV-2. 3. Selection during passage Basic research involving passage of bat SARS-CoV-like coronaviruses in cell culture and/or animal models has been ongoing for many years in biosafety level 2 laboratories across the world 27 , and there are documented instances of laboratory escapes of SARS-CoV 28 . We must therefore examine the possibility of an inadvertent laboratory release of SARS-CoV-2. In theory, it is possible that SARS-CoV-2 acquired RBD mutations (Fig. 1a) during adaptation to passage in cell culture, as has been observed in studies of SARS-CoV 11 . The finding of SARS-CoV-like coronaviruses from pangolins with nearly identical RBDs, however, provides a much stronger and more parsimonious explanation of how SARS-CoV-2 acquired these via recombination or mutation 19 . The acquisition of both the polybasic cleavage site and predicted O-linked glycans also argues against culture-based scenarios. New polybasic cleavage sites have been observed only after prolonged passage of low-pathogenicity avian influenza virus in vitro or in vivo 17 . Furthermore, a hypothetical generation of SARS-CoV-2 by cell culture or animal passage would have required prior isolation of a progenitor virus with very high genetic similarity, which has not been described. Subsequent generation of a polybasic cleavage site would have then required repeated passage in cell culture or animals with ACE2 receptors similar to those of humans, but such work has also not previously been described. Finally, the generation of the predicted O-linked glycans is also unlikely to have occurred due to cell-culture passage, as such features suggest the involvement of an immune system 18 . Conclusions In the midst of the global COVID-19 public-health emergency, it is reasonable to wonder why the origins of the pandemic matter. Detailed understanding of how an animal virus jumped species boundaries to infect humans so productively will help in the prevention of future zoonotic events. For example, if SARS-CoV-2 pre-adapted in another animal species, then there is the risk of future re-emergence events. In contrast, if the adaptive process occurred in humans, then even if repeated zoonotic transfers occur, they are unlikely to take off without the same series of mutations. In addition, identifying the closest viral relatives of SARS-CoV-2 circulating in animals will greatly assist studies of viral function. Indeed, the availability of the RaTG13 bat sequence helped reveal key RBD mutations and the polybasic cleavage site. The genomic features described here may explain in part the infectiousness and transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 in humans. Although the evidence shows that SARS-CoV-2 is not a purposefully manipulated virus, it is currently impossible to prove or disprove the other theories of its origin described here. However, since we observed all notable SARS-CoV-2 features, including the optimized RBD and polybasic cleavage site, in related coronaviruses in nature, we do not believe that any type of laboratory-based scenario is plausible. More scientific data could swing the balance of evidence to favor one hypothesis over another. Obtaining related viral sequences from animal sources would be the most definitive way of revealing viral origins. For example, a future observation of an intermediate or fully formed polybasic cleavage site in a SARS-CoV-2-like virus from animals would lend even further support to the natural-selection hypotheses. It would also be helpful to obtain more genetic and functional data about SARS-CoV-2, including animal studies. The identification of a potential intermediate host of SARS-CoV-2, as well as sequencing of the virus from very early cases, would similarly be highly informative. Irrespective of the exact mechanisms by which SARS-CoV-2 originated via natural selection, the ongoing surveillance of pneumonia in humans and other animals is clearly of utmost importance.
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            COVID‐19: Vulnerability and the power of privilege in a pandemic

            On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization announced that COVID‐19 was characterised as a pandemic—a global first for coronavirus. 1 Coronaviruses are a large family of viruses that cause illness such as the common cold to more severe diseases such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. 2 A novel coronavirus is typically a new strain of the infectious disease that has not been previously identified in humans. 2 COVID‐19 is the most recent version of a novel coronavirus. 2 COVID‐19 has received significant public and government attention over the past weeks after it was first detected in the Wuhan province of China in December 2019, with subsequent epidemics in China, Italy, Republic of Korea and Iran. 1 As of 12 March 2020, 125 000 cases were reported from 118 countries and territories globally, with predictions this will continue to rise rapidly. 3 This has led to an array of public health measures being advocated by the WHO, including four critical areas for action—(a) prepare and be ready; (b) detect, protect and treat; (c) reduce transmission; and (d) innovate and learn. 3 This has been complemented, to varying degrees, through concurrent action by local, state and national governments worldwide. There can be a tendency in the health promotion profession to think of infectious diseases from a biomedical viewpoint. As such, the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases is sometimes perceived to be the responsibility of the clinical realm. Yet, the reality is that both nonclinical and clinical public health responses are required—and sometimes we need to relax professional boundaries to work collaboratively for the health and wellbeing of our communities. We need to work in partnership with health surveillance teams, epidemiologists, environmental health scientists, public health physicians, infectious disease physicians, general practitioners, nurses, allied health professions, health policy‐makers, health planners, health geographers and many others, to reduce the risks associated with pandemics. We also need to work across sectors to achieve the best possible outcomes. The health promotion profession plays a vital role in pandemics, and this has been abundantly evident in the responses to COVID‐19. Messaging about health and hygiene, particularly hand‐washing, is one example of the role that health promotion has played—ultimately drawing on our expertise in delivering health education, and implementing health‐related mass media and social marketing campaigns. Over the last two decades, information technology and social media have transformed the way we can reach people during pandemics. Indeed, social media has catapulted the ability to reach large populations, while also simultaneously targeting vulnerable and at‐risk populations, to deliver health messages, such as those associated with hand‐washing. Over the past few weeks, there has been a steady flow of memes urging people to wash their hands, often with thoughtful use of graphics alongside a successful use of humour. JS's personal favourite, was an online post from Round Rock Texas that read: ‘Texas Coronavirus Protection—wash your hands like you just got done slicing jalapenos for a batch of nachos and you need to take your contacts out (that's like 20 seconds scrubbing, y'all)’. It delivers an essential public health message in a factual, yet contextually relevant and humorous way. However, social media can also have its pitfalls. Misinformation and fake news are rampant. This has the potential to stifle health promotion efforts in times of need, such as during the current COVID‐19 pandemic. Therefore, it is important to know who is saying what, why, and with what level of authority. As mentioned above, we also need to be mindful of cross‐sectoral communication efforts during pandemics. As an example, JS received 12 emails from his children's schools and 14 from his current workplaces about COVID‐19—a total of 26 emails from educational institutions in both Australia and the United States. Email topics ranged from: hygiene issues such as hand washing and sanitiser use; social distancing, self‐isolation and self‐quarantining strategies such as cancellation of school activities and fundraisers; proposed adoption of online learning options, and flexibility about attendance at school/work, including possible closures; travel restrictions imposed by schools and universities associated with concerts, plays, public events/seminars and conferences; guidance to limit travel on public transport; and advice about when to seek help and access local health services if myself or my family members experience symptoms associated with COVID‐19. This bombardment of communication, albeit extremely useful, emphasises the importance of coordination in key messaging between health, education and various other sectors, when planning and implementing effective pandemic responses. In health promotion, we need new strategies to communicate important health messages in a concise and meaningful way that makes it easy and accessible for citizens to understand, navigate and take action. We also need to be careful how we convey content through electronic communication channels and consider an appropriate level of frequency of such communication to achieve optimal impact. Without doing so, there is potential to reinforce community ambivalence at one end of the spectrum and create panic at the other. The recent toilet paper saga in Australia, whereby stocks of toilet paper were rapidly depleted from grocery stores in response to the perceived likelihood of home quarantining measures, is one such example (albeit somewhat humorous and embarrassing). Panic buying like this reinforces the powerful ramifications of communication gone wrong. Health literacy research that embraces new and emerging technologies will be particularly important to guide online health promotion efforts of this nature in the future. To emphasise the importance of getting health communication right, the Australian Medical Association were particularly critical of the mixed‐messaging of public health directives between the Australian, State and Territory Governments concerning COVID‐19. 4 There was concern about how this mixed‐messaging was being interpreted by the Australian public, but also how it was likely to impact health professionals and the use of Australia's hospitals and health care system more broadly. The Australian Government has since committed a $2.4 billion health package to protect all Australians from COVID‐19, including vulnerable groups such as the elderly, those with chronic conditions and Indigenous communities. 5 The US Government pledged $50 billion on the same day. Importantly, the Australian health package includes $30 million for implementing an information campaign to provide people with practical advice on how they can play their part in containing the virus and staying healthy. 5 We trust health promotion professionals with expertise in health literacy, health communication, and social marketing will be consulted throughout its development. We also trust that health promoters will be involved in the multi‐million dollar primary care and research responses outlined by the Australian Prime Minister. At this juncture, it is worth reflecting on who is most vulnerable in pandemics. While COVID‐19 has the potential to impact everyone in society, these impacts will be felt differentially. That is, the way we prepare, protect, treat, reduce transmission and innovate, needs to be viewed from a health equity lens. It is essential to recognise that pandemics—and the respective Government and corporate decisions that emanate—both influence and are influenced by social, economic and political determinants of health. As the WHO Director‐General has recently stated—‘all countries must strike a fine balance between protecting health, preventing economic and social disruption, and respecting human rights’. 3 However, knowing what this ‘fine balance’ constitutes can be difficult. As such, it helps to reflect on what we know. While we do not know much about COVID‐19, we do now how pandemics can impact vulnerable populations. We know that many developing countries do not have the surveillance systems, health resources and health infrastructure to respond in a manner that can slow the harms of COVID‐19 in the way we would like. 6 , 7 , 8 We know that there are vulnerable populations, such as: the elderly, those with disabilities, people in prison, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, people with chronic conditions, and people from Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) backgrounds, that will be impacted disproportinately by COVID‐19, particularly if assertive health promotion action is absent. 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 We know that people from low socio‐economic backgrounds, those who work in casual employment, and many racial and ethnic minorities, are unlikely to have the necessary financial resources to make self‐distancing and self‐isolation a viable option within the context of their daily livelihoods. 12 , 13 , 14 We know that access to health services in some countries, including basic primary health care, is contingent upon insurance and user‐pays systems that already make them inaccessible to the people most at‐risk. 15 , 16 We know that the elderly and people with disabilities rely on public transport to access essential services, including food shopping and health services that are required during pandemics. 17 , 18 We know that vulnerable populations may not have the necessary language and literacy skills to understand and appropriately respond to pandemic messaging. 19 We know that mental health concerns among the most vulnerable within our communities will be exacerbated by expectations to self‐isolate if not approached sensitively. 20 , 21 We know that governments have trouble implementing strategies focused on reducing health inequities through action on social determinants of health. 22 We know all these things, but what do we do about them? Most of the evidence‐based discussion presented above demonstrates the power of privilege in a pandemic. It indicates that those most vulnerable will be the hardest hit. The health promotion community must ensure that considerations of health equity and social justice principles remain at the forefront of pandemic responses. 12 , 14 This will not be easy at a time when neoliberal forces pitch population health against national economic stability. While hand‐washing is a significant health promotion intervention, it can also act as a useful façade for advancing actions that enhance equitable social and economic outcomes for those most vulnerable during pandemics. The WHO has encouraged us to think innovatively. 1 , 3 The health promotion profession can lead this charge and advocate for a national public health social media campaign and other pragmatic measures that reach people most in need. This will help support them to get accurate and timely information to prepare and reduce the risk to themselves, their families, friends and their community.
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              Measuring health literacy in Asia: Validation of the HLS-EU-Q47 survey tool in six Asian countries

              Background Health literacy has been increasingly recognized as one of the most important social determinants for health. However, an appropriate and comprehensive assessment tool is not available in many Asian countries. This study validates a comprehensive health literacy survey tool European health literacy questionnaire (HLS-EU-Q47) for the general public in several Asian countries. Methods A cross-sectional survey based on multistage random sampling in the target countries. A total of 10,024 participants aged ≥15 years were recruited during 2013–2014 in Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The questionnaire was translated into local languages to measure general health literacy and its three domains. To evaluate the validity of the tool in these countries, data were analyzed by confirmatory factor analysis, internal consistency analysis, and regression analysis. Results The questionnaire was shown to have good construct validity, satisfactory goodness-of-fit of the data to the hypothetical model in three health literacy domains, high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha >0.90), satisfactory item-scale convergent validity (item-scale correlation ≥0.40), and no floor/ceiling effects in these countries. General health literacy index score was significantly associated with level of education (P from <0.001 to 0.011) and perceived social status (P from <0.001 to 0.016), with evidence of known-group validity. Conclusions The HLS-EU-Q47 was a satisfactory and comprehensive health literacy survey tool for use in Asia.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Health Promot Int
                Health Promot Int
                heapro
                Health Promotion International
                Oxford University Press
                0957-4824
                1460-2245
                16 April 2020
                16 April 2020
                : daaa042
                Affiliations
                Psychological Sciences Research Institute Place Cardinal Mercier 10 , 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
                Author notes
                Article
                daaa042
                10.1093/heapro/daaa042
                7184433
                32297931
                aa06e242-8686-4f3f-bf1e-f36ecb5b329e
                © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com

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                Public health
                Public health

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