Impact of Accountable Care Organizations on Utilization, Care, and Outcomes: A Systematic Review

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Abstract

Since 2010, more than 900 accountable care organizations (ACOs) have formed payment contracts with public and private insurers in the United States; however, there has not been a systematic evaluation of the evidence studying impacts of ACOs on care and outcomes across payer types. This review evaluates the quality of evidence regarding the association of public and private ACOs with health service use, processes, and outcomes of care. The 42 articles identified studied ACO contracts with Medicare ( N = 24 articles), Medicaid ( N = 5), commercial ( N = 11), and all payers ( N = 2). The most consistent associations between ACO implementation and outcomes across payer types were reduced inpatient use, reduced emergency department visits, and improved measures of preventive care and chronic disease management. The seven studies evaluating patient experience or clinical outcomes of care showed no evidence that ACOs worsen outcomes of care; however, the impact on patient care and outcomes should continue to be monitored.

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Most cited references 41

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An overview of reviews evaluating the effectiveness of financial incentives in changing healthcare professional behaviours and patient outcomes.

Sasha Shepperd, Gerd Flodgren, Elena Parmelli … (2010)

There is considerable interest in the effectiveness of financial incentives in the delivery of health care. Incentives may be used in an attempt to increase the use of evidence-based treatments among healthcare professionals or to stimulate health professionals to change their clinical behaviour with respect to preventive, diagnostic and treatment decisions, or both. Financial incentives are an extrinsic source of motivation and exist when an individual can expect a monetary transfer which is made conditional on acting in a particular way. Since there are numerous reviews performed within the healthcare area describing the effects of various types of financial incentives, it is important to summarise the effectiveness of these in an overview to discern which are most effective in changing health professionals' behaviour and patient outcomes. To conduct an overview of systematic reviews that evaluates the impact of financial incentives on healthcare professional behaviour and patient outcomes. We searched the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) (The Cochrane Library); Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effectiveness (DARE); TRIP; MEDLINE; EMBASE; Science Citation Index; Social Science Citation Index; NHS EED; HEED; EconLit; and Program in Policy Decision-Making (PPd) (from their inception dates up to January 2010). We searched the reference lists of all included reviews and carried out a citation search of those papers which cited studies included in the review. We included both Cochrane and non-Cochrane reviews of randomised controlled trials (RCTs), controlled clinical trials (CCTs), interrupted time series (ITSs) and controlled before and after studies (CBAs) that evaluated the effects of financial incentives on professional practice and patient outcomes, and that reported numerical results of the included individual studies. Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed the methodological quality of each review according to the AMSTAR criteria. We included systematic reviews of studies evaluating the effectiveness of any type of financial incentive. We grouped financial incentives into five groups: payment for working for a specified time period; payment for each service, episode or visit; payment for providing care for a patient or specific population; payment for providing a pre-specified level or providing a change in activity or quality of care; and mixed or other systems. We summarised data using vote counting. We identified four reviews reporting on 32 studies. Two reviews scored 7 on the AMSTAR criteria (moderate, score 5 to 7, quality) and two scored 9 (high, score 8 to 11, quality). The reported quality of the included studies was, by a variety of methods, low to moderate. Payment for working for a specified time period was generally ineffective, improving 3/11 outcomes from one study reported in one review. Payment for each service, episode or visit was generally effective, improving 7/10 outcomes from five studies reported in three reviews; payment for providing care for a patient or specific population was generally effective, improving 48/69 outcomes from 13 studies reported in two reviews; payment for providing a pre-specified level or providing a change in activity or quality of care was generally effective, improving 17/20 reported outcomes from 10 studies reported in two reviews; and mixed and other systems were of mixed effectiveness, improving 20/31 reported outcomes from seven studies reported in three reviews. When looking at the effect of financial incentives overall across categories of outcomes, they were of mixed effectiveness on consultation or visit rates (improving 10/17 outcomes from three studies in two reviews); generally effective in improving processes of care (improving 41/57 outcomes from 19 studies in three reviews); generally effective in improving referrals and admissions (improving 11/16 outcomes from 11 studies in four reviews); generally ineffective in improving compliance with guidelines outcomes (improving 5/17 outcomes from five studies in two reviews); and generally effective in improving prescribing costs outcomes (improving 28/34 outcomes from 10 studies in one review). Financial incentives may be effective in changing healthcare professional practice. The evidence has serious methodological limitations and is also very limited in its completeness and generalisability. We found no evidence from reviews that examined the effect of financial incentives on patient outcomes.

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The long-term effect of premier pay for performance on patient outcomes.

Ashish Jha, Karen Joynt, E. Orav … (2012)

Pay for performance has become a central strategy in the drive to improve health care. We assessed the long-term effect of the Medicare Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID) on patient outcomes. We used Medicare data to compare outcomes between the 252 hospitals participating in the Premier HQID and 3363 control hospitals participating in public reporting alone. We examined 30-day mortality among more than 6 million patients who had acute myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, or pneumonia or who underwent coronary-artery bypass grafting (CABG) between 2003 and 2009. At baseline, the composite 30-day mortality was similar for Premier and non-Premier hospitals (12.33% and 12.40%, respectively; difference, -0.07 percentage points; 95% confidence interval [CI], -0.40 to 0.26). The rates of decline in mortality per quarter at the two types of hospitals were also similar (0.04% and 0.04%, respectively; difference, -0.01 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.02 to 0.01), and mortality remained similar after 6 years under the pay-for-performance system (11.82% for Premier hospitals and 11.74% for non-Premier hospitals; difference, 0.08 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.30 to 0.46). We found that the effects of pay for performance on mortality did not differ significantly among conditions for which outcomes were explicitly linked to incentives (acute myocardial infarction and CABG) and among conditions not linked to incentives (congestive heart failure and pneumonia) (P=0.36 for interaction). Among hospitals that were poor performers at baseline, mortality was similar in the two groups of hospitals at the start of the study (15.12% and 14.73%; difference, 0.39 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.36 to 1.15), with similar rates of improvement per quarter (0.10% and 0.07%; difference, -0.03 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.08 to 0.02) and similar mortality rates at the end of the study (13.37% and 13.21%; difference, 0.15 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.70 to 1.01). We found no evidence that the largest hospital-based pay-for-performance program led to a decrease in 30-day mortality. Expectations of improved outcomes for programs modeled after Premier HQID should therefore remain modest.

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Performance differences in year 1 of pioneer accountable care organizations.

J McWilliams, Michael Chernew, Bruce Landon … (2015)

In 2012, a total of 32 organizations entered the Pioneer accountable care organization (ACO) program, in which providers can share savings with Medicare if spending falls below a financial benchmark. Performance differences associated with characteristics of Pioneer ACOs have not been well described.