Hospital prices and market structure in the hospital and insurance industries

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An Introduction to the Bootstrap

Bradley Efron, R.J. Tibshirani (1994)

Statistics is a subject of many uses and surprisingly few effective practitioners. The traditional road to statistical knowledge is blocked, for most, by a formidable wall of mathematics. The approach in An Introduction to the Bootstrap avoids that wall. It arms scientists and engineers, as well as statisticians, with the computational techniques they need to analyze and understand complicated data sets.

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The effects of market structure and bargaining position on hospital prices.

Glenn A Melnick, Jack Zwanziger, Anil Bamezai … (1992)

PPOs and HMOs have gained widespread acceptance due in part to the belief that excess capacity and competitive market conditions can be leveraged to negotiate lower prices with health care providers. We investigated prices obtained in different types of markets by the largest PPO in California. Our findings indicate that greater hospital competition leads to lower prices. Furthermore, as the importance of a hospital to the PPO in an area increases, the price rises substantially. Our testing of alternative methods for defining hospital geographic markets reveals that the common practice of using counties to define the market leads to an underestimate of the price-increasing effects of a merger.

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Hospital competition in HMO networks.

Robert Town, Gregory Vistnes (2001)

We develop a framework for analyzing bargaining relationships between hospitals and HMOs under selective contracting. Using a unique dataset on hospitals in the Los Angeles area from 1990 to 1993, we estimate the determinants of actual negotiated prices paid to hospitals by two major HMOs. We find that a hospital's bargaining power, and thus its price, decrease when the HMO can readily turn to alternative networks that exclude the hospital. We simulate the effect of hypothetical hospital mergers on bargaining power and find that some hospital mergers, even in urban areas with many nearby hospitals, can lead to significant price increases.

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Journal

Journal ID (publisher-id): applab

Title: Health Economics, Policy and Law

Abbreviated Title: HEPL

Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)

ISSN (Print): 1744-1331

ISSN (Electronic): 1744-134X

Publication date Created: October 2010

Publication date (Print): May 2010

Volume: 5

Issue: 04

Pages: 459-479

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DOI: 10.1017/S1744133110000083

PubMed ID: 20478106

SO-VID: b048b29c-397d-4d60-b77a-9c8c5ea9ca87

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Hospital prices and market structure in the hospital and insurance industries

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Special series: Knowledge Exchange and the Creative Industries

Most cited references 23

An Introduction to the Bootstrap

The effects of market structure and bargaining position on hospital prices.

Hospital competition in HMO networks.

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