Introduction
US universities continue to loom large in the worlds of higher education today. They
consistently top many global university rankings and attract international students
and faculty from around the world. In Making the World Global: US Universities and
the Production of the Global Imaginary, Isaac Kamola tells a compelling story about
how US universities produced academic knowledge that became self-referential and embedded
in the very language we use to articulate about our social, economic, and political
environments. The implications are clear. How we engage and study the world is inherently
political. In this intervention, I want to address two themes Kamola put forth in
his opening statement. First, “whether one could write a similar book…about how universities
participate in the reproduction of the world” through another perspective than globalization.
I will show that this is indeed possible by situating the findings from Stevens, Miller-Idriss
and Shami (2018) Seeing the World: How US Universities Make Knowledge in a Global
Era in the context of Making the World Global. I argue that, when read together, Seeing
the World and Making the World Global weave a revealing tapestry of the impressive
role US universities played in shaping the worlds of higher education today. The second
theme I want to engage with is the academics vs. politics divide that inspired Kamola
to write Making the World Global. My intention is to support Kamola’s observation
that academics/politics is very much a false dichotomy and the time is ripe to apply
academic rigor to its unmasking; I will do so from the perspective of academic time.
Reading seeing the world and making the world global
Rarely does one have the pleasure to read—by chance at the same time—two fantastic
books that offered convincing accounts of how US universities profoundly configured
the ways in which academic knowledge is produced for and about the world. In Making
the World Global, Kamola detailed how interactions between different institutions
and actors in the worlds of higher education over time, and across space, contributed
to the imaginary of “the world as self-evidently ‘global’.” To what extent did disciplines
in the social sciences—political science, sociology, economics, and others—play a
role in these developments? Are the developments we see today the result of interdisciplinarity,
or something else? In Seeing the World, Stevens, Miller-Idriss, and Shami demonstrated
that how academic knowledge production is organized matters in determining what is
of value—academically, politically. Both Seeing the World and Making the World Global
thus make the same overarching argument, but from different perspectives: the former
applied an organizational perspective to show how social science disciplines crowded
out interdisciplinarity in the arts-and-sciences cores in US universities; the latter
focused on globalization to show how academic knowledge produced in US universities
crowded out those generated elsewhere (notably in Africa).
Seeing the World detailed the rise, fall, and contemporary existence of area studies,
an interdisciplinary way of organizing knowledge production in the arts-and-sciences
cores in US universities. To draw out this narrative, Stevens, Miller-Idriss, and
Shami distilled three schemata that informed how academic leaders in US universities
conceptualized the relationship between their institutions and the (rest of the) world.
In the civilizational schema, universities are seen as knowledge depositories and
the world as a collection of distinct and bounded cultural, linguistic, and ethno-religious
units. The task for the Professor was to “go out” and gather as much insights about,
and objects of, these civilizations. The onset of World War II and the Cold War introduced
and reinforced another schema—national service—that framed the new role of US universities
as consultants to American governments. In our more current and marketized language,
the Professor became the service provider to the US state. According to the national
schema, the world was understood as an array of problems and opportunities for US
geopolitical interests, broadly defined as seeking to create a “virtuous democratic
modernity.” Throughout this period, area studies as a field thrived, as generous funding
flowed to support student mobility, extended research stays for faculty, foreign language
training, and more.
Stevens, Miller-Idriss, and Shami observed that the end of the Cold War, global integration
of production, and chronic budget crises in the higher education sector marked the
start of the decline of area studies as a field. Indeed, as “not-departments,” the
centers and institutes that housed the field of area studies were not able to compete
with departments structured by disciplines, populated by tenure-line faculty, and
conferred doctoral degrees. For them, this period saw the ushering in of the now familiar
global schema, which depicted the world as a web of complex flows—of people, capital,
ideas, goods, and services—to be traversed and exploited. Institutionally, US universities
became cosmopolitan entities built on numerous memoranda of understanding (for research;
mobility of students, faculty, staff; credit transfer; and more), with a global reach
as manifested in satellite campuses, joint degrees, and many other forms of deep collaboration.
While remaining a service provider, the Professor now worked for clients around the
world. Today, area studies as a field continues to face strong resistance from disciplinary
departments due to the primacy of theoretical and quantitative modes of inquiry in
social sciences, the huge cost associated with learning another language, and disciplinary
departments’ need to retain status.
For me, both Seeing the World and Making the World Global told a story of institutionalization,
particularly how structures adopted earlier, and the ideas they promoted, endured
over time as core features or as sediments of the sector or organization. In the case
of Seeing, despite experiencing strong de-funding, “not-departments” and the field
of area studies continue to exist in US universities today. According to Stevens,
Miller-Idriss, and Shami, “not-departments” survived by leveraging their resources
through a complex system of co-sponsorship featuring a “stone soup” strategy: the
addition of individual contributions (stone by stone) that would ultimately result
in the needed resources being available for the objective (an event, mobility stay,
or language training). In Making, the observation that globalization has transformed
into a self-referential master trope confirms that “the global” has become a core
feature in the worlds of higher education. My own reading and research into higher
education policy developments in Europe and in Asia support Kamola’s conclusion—as
I shall explain.
In the interdisciplinary field of higher education studies, internationalization has
replaced globalization as the preferred concept to use since the early 2000s for describing
changes introduced in the higher education sector. In the main, internationalization
is used to refer to orchestrated responses from universities and governments (at the
local-, state-, national-, or regional-levels) around the world toward external pressures
for change. So, what explains this development? The debate remains inconclusive. For
instance, the shift could be driven by the usual academic search for a new term to
capture nuances in policy developments, or it could be the result of new actors emerging
in this sector (notably European Union member states, the European Commission, and
other transnational actors). What is generally agreed is that higher education institutions
and states around the world are now engaged in a global competition—for prestige,
talent, funding, or simply relevance. Moving forward to and beyond the mid-2010s,
other concepts such as higher education regionalism (Chou and Ravinet 2015) and knowledge
diplomacy are being increasingly used to describe particular forms of internationalization:
macro-regional coordination, or bilateral and multilateral cooperation between different
entities.
What is important for our discussion here is that the starting point for these concepts
and the policy developments they intend to capture is essentially “the global.” There
is generally an implicit acceptance or assumption among academics and policymakers
alike that universities and states today inhabit a deeply connected, interdependent
world. The policy framing thus becomes one in which “flow management” dominates and
is assessed: the removing of barriers, reducing friction, and ensuring the “free”
movement of knowledge, people, ideas, resources, and more. As Kamola rightly pointed
out, if the academic rigor and policy focus are placed on analyzing and ensuring “the
global,” it is hardly surprising that insights and developments outside the global
imaginary are considered, well, less essential, or completely irrelevant. The global
imaginary, put very simply, is the modality through which we see the past, understand
the present, and envision the future.
The continual institutionalization of “the global” in the higher education sector
did not take place in a vacuum: it benefitted from the growth in indicator development,
which serviced the rankings industry (see Erkkilä and Piironen 2019). By reducing
complexities to numbers, metrics, and embedded algorithms allow for comparisons that
were previously not made. This development has had a profound impact on the higher
education sector around the world. For instance, at the institutional-level, indicators
enabled the comparison of universities with distinct missions, founded in very different
historical contexts to serve diverse social, political, and economic needs, as if
the comparison made was based on a “most similar” research design and the results
“scientific.” In the same way, at the individual-level, aggregated citation indexes
are supposed to tell us about the research “value” of an academic, regardless of disciplines
or field. These developments have real-life implications, ranging from resource allocation
(or withdrawal) to the fundamental valuing/devaluing of academic labor, and more.
Indeed, if the basic definition of politics is “who gets what, when,” then developments
within the higher education sector are highly political; they point to the false dichotomy
of academics vs. politics.
In the same way that Kamola recognized the false divide between academics and politics,
I too believe academic rigor could be applied to analyze, make sense, recognize, and
explain the trends, exclusions, and growing imbalances in the worlds of higher education.
Below, I use the example of academic time to show how we may begin to do this.
Academic time in the worlds of higher education today
These days I have been thinking about time. Specifically, time in the academe and
how it is increasingly seen and discussed as a “problem.” Interestingly, when I last
had time was when I read Making the World Global and Seeing the World, and thought
about the state of higher education today. So how did time become problematic for
academics? And what does it mean for those who want time to be a continual supportive
resource for academic work rather than a weapon used against academic creativity?
My starting point is that academic time today is frequently acknowledged as the manifestation
of shifting power dynamics between, on the one hand, the Professor (the knowledge
creator and disseminator) and, on the other hand, Management, Students, Society, and
Others (different knowledge users and exploiters). In the main, time in the academy
has been measured by tasks the Professor performs (i.e., research, teaching, and service),
but its allocation has become increasingly complex as requests for today’s academic
labor grow from within and beyond the university and known core academic activities.
For scholars of politics, these requests can range from what appears to be routine
and associated with university corporatization to field-specific expertise with potentially
powerful implications. The complexity of the many requests we receive raises the question:
Who determines which task is done first? The Professor intrigued by new research directions
or enduring puzzling social phenomena? The Managers responding to market trends, student
and parental demands, or the administrative pursuit of “Academic Excellence?” The
Ministry approving degree programmes and curriculum reforms based on diverse national
and regional priorities? Or Others (and who are they)? Time order is very much a value
order: the task done first is more important than those that are done later. How decisions
are made in, across, or against time in the academy thus point to the ways that power
is generated, experienced, or used. Certainly, academic time as a “problem” has been
brought into sharper relief during the coronavirus pandemic when tasks multiplied
exponentially, professional lives wrapped around private ones as physical space compressed,
but it has long existed before COVID was coined.
One way to address the problematic nature of time in the academe is to give voice
to academics. Objectively, our lived experiences will reveal the profound temporal
reordering of university life and how the changes introduced enabling this transformation
are very political. According to existing concepts about academic time, our lived
experiences may point to the bounded nature of time (timeframes) and its irreversible
passage (temporality) in the academe; the timing (synchronization), sequence (order
of time) and duration (extent of time) of career stages (securing contracts and their
extensions), and potential exit from the profession; the multiple tempos (speed, pace,
and intensity) structuring all activities; and the distinct temporal modalities (our
understanding about past, present, and future time) that guide our narratives of professional
lives and how these intersect with private ones. More importantly, our lived experiences
will make visible the ways in which temporal orderings have quantitatively and qualitatively
alter everyday lives in the academe. Indeed, subjectively, the ways in which academics
have experienced the devaluation of knowledge labor and how we have sought to reclaim
our value would show how radical the higher education sector has very much transformed.