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      Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts

      The RAND Journal of Economics
      JSTOR

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          Journal
          The RAND Journal of Economics
          The RAND Journal of Economics
          JSTOR
          07416261
          21 1986
          21 1986
          : 17
          : 1
          : 59
          Article
          10.2307/2555628
          c51dfdbb-d3aa-4950-b689-d3b5dabe30cd
          © 1986

          http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1

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