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      Statistical Critiques of the Democratic Peace: Caveat Emptor : STATISTICAL CRITIQUES OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

      American Journal of Political Science
      Wiley-Blackwell

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          Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986.

          Democratic states are in general about as conflict- and war-prone as nondemocracies, but democracies have rarely clashed with one another in violent conflict. We first show that democracy, as well as other factors, accounts for the relative lack of conflict. Then we examine two explanatory models. The normative model suggests that democracies do not fight each other because norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes. The structural model asserts that complex political mobilization processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other to make violent conflict unfeasible. Using different data sets of international conflict and a multiplicity of indicators, we find that (1) democracy, in and of itself, has a consistent and robust negative effect on the likelihood of conflict or escalation in a dyad; (2) both the normative and structural models are supported by the data; and (3) support for the normative model is more robust and consistent.
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            An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace

            We examine formally the link between domestic political institutions and policy choices in the context of eight empirical regularities that constitute the democratic peace. We demonstrate that democratic leaders, when faced with war, are more inclined to shift extra resources into the war effort than are autocrats. This follows because the survival of political leaders with larger winning coalitions hinges on successful policy. The extra effort made by democrats provides a military advantage over autocrats. This makes democrats unattractive targets, since their institutional constraints cause them to mobilize resources for the war effort. In addition to trying harder, democrats are more selective in their choice of targets. Because defeat is more likely to lead to domestic replacement for democrats than for autocrats, democrats only initiate wars they expect to win. These two factors lead to the interaction between polities that is often referred to as the democratic peace.
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              Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions

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                Author and article information

                Journal
                American Journal of Political Science
                Wiley-Blackwell
                00925853
                April 2011
                April 2011
                : 55
                : 2
                : 247-262
                Article
                10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00487.x
                c8fe12d6-7feb-4e33-a740-24a0d35ef646
                © 2011

                http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1

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