It is predicted that there will be a severe shortage of ventilators in coming weeks
for the respiratory support of patients severely affected by COVID-19. NICE has recently
issued guidelines which set out decision-making procedures for allocation of intensive
care and ventilation.
1
These essentially state that factors that affect the probability of survival, such
as frailty, are relevant but it eschews consideration of factors such as age, length
of life, quality of life or disability. The NICE guidance represents a compromise
between utilitarianism and egalitarianism, partly because of fears of discrimination
under the Equality Act 2010. We argue that appealing to probability of survival may
constitute indirect discrimination under the Equality Act in the same way as appealing
to length of life (via age) and quality of life (via disability). In each case, what
is important is that a proportionate approach is taken. We argue that instead of focussing
on chance of survival, all of probability, length and quality of life ought to be
relevant to allocation of resources, albeit only when they are significantly lowered.
While both equality and utility are important values for distributive justice, current
practice represents an unstable and incoherent compromise.
In ethics, there are two broad approaches to this problem: egalitarianism and utilitarianism.
According to egalitarianism, every person should be treated equally according to need.
Equal treatment for equal need. Philosopher John Harris argues that each rational
person wants at least three things from health care: (i) the maximum possible life-expectancy
for him or her; (ii) the best quality of life for him or her; (iii) the best opportunity
or chance for him or her of getting both (i) and (ii).
2
Treating people as equals involves giving equal weight to each person’s own claim.
As Harris recognised, a principle of equality cannot only be selectively invoked by
those with disability (on pain of itself being discriminatory) but also applies to
those who happen to have poor prognoses or diseases which are expensive diseases to
treat.
3
The UK National Health Service (NHS) is founded on egalitarian principles. As the
first principle of the NHS constitution states, ‘The service is designed to improve,
prevent, diagnose and treat both physical and mental health problems with equal regard.’
4
Equality of access requires that we ignore the probability of a patient benefiting
from treatment. However, this is inconsistent with accepted practice. For example,
every day older women in Britain are denied access to in vitro fertilisation because
they have a lower chance of a successful outcome.
Egalitarianism requires only consideration of need. It rejects consideration of probability,
length or quality of life. As John Taurek famously argued, faced with the decision
to rescue five people or one, we should toss a coin because that gives everyone an
equal chance of what matters most to him or her: their life.
5
When not everyone can be saved, egalitarianism requires lotteries or other procedures
to fairly allocate resources.
In contrast, according to utilitarianism, the right course of action is that action
which maximises utility, or the good produced. English philosopher Jeremy Bentham
is the father of utilitarianism and is famous for his phrase, “the greatest good for
the greatest number.”
Utilitarianism requires consideration of the probability of success, length and quality
of life. Utilitarianism is actually at the heart of the NHS and the allocation of
medical resources. The Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) used by Clinical Commissioning
Groups (CCGs) is a measure of the utility of medical treatments. It is a year of life
adjusted by its quality. The cost per QALY of £20,000 to £30,000 limit is a utilitarian,
not egalitarian, limit. (It is worth noting that every country has a limit on how
much it spends on a treatment.)
The current practice guidelines issued by the NICE are neither utilitarian nor egalitarian.
They differentiate between people on the basis of probability of survival (as predicted,
supposedly, by frailty) but not length or quality of life. This will maximise the
numbers of lives saved but not give everyone an equal chance, nor will it maximise
the good of the outcome in terms of years of life saved, adjusted for their quality.
The rationing of limited resources is an issue for distributive justice.
Triage
Under conditions of sufficient resources, egalitarianism is uncontroversial. However,
it is highly counterintuitive when it comes to allocating limited resources. It involves
giving a person an equal chance of accessing a resource no matter how low their chance
of benefiting, how briefly they would benefit, and how small the improvement in their
quality of life would be. It requires, for example, giving a child with Trisomy 18
an equal chance of receiving a heart transplant as an otherwise normal child with
heart failure.
Table 1
Approaches to distributive justice
Table 1
Egalitarianism
Utilitarianism
NICE Guidance
Probability of survival
-
+
+
Length of life
-
+
-
Quality of life
-
+
-
Every process of medical triage seeks to maximise the benefits that may be derived
from available medical resources at any particular point in time. Decisions about
where medical resources may be most effectively used recognise the relative urgency
of the need, but also the extent to which meeting one person’s needs may prevent the
needs of others to be met. In well-resourced nations these decisions generally only
mean that some patient may need to wait longer than others to receive treatment. But
in times of crisis, like a pandemic, these decisions become more acute and the reality
that there are not sufficient resources to treat everyone must be addressed. If the
principles that apply to triaging patients are ethical and legal when there is not
a crisis, they should also be ethical and legal when there is a crisis. The decisions
will certainly become more difficult, but this does not invalidate the principles.
Doctors’ legal duties
A doctor’s duties are ostensibly egalitarian, in the sense they are required to treat
each patient in accordance with their clinical need. A doctor has a ‘duty to provide
a treatment that he [sic] considers to be in the interests of the patient and that
the patient is prepared to accept.’
6
The doctor is not under an obligation to provide medical treatment just because a
patient demands it.
7
It is the doctor’s responsibility to use their professional skills and knowledge to
identify clinically appropriate treatment. A doctor will fulfil their duty if they
act ‘in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical
men skilled in that particular art’.
8
There must also be a ‘logical basis’ for the professional opinion or approach.
9
It is recognised that a doctor has a duty to provide treatment in the best interests
of their patient, but this duty must be understood in the context in which a doctor
provides treatment and the treatments that are available.
What is also important to recognise is that doctors frequently (even in non-pandemic
situations) make judgements not only about best interests but also about the just
allocation of limited resources. These often masquerade as judgements of futility.
10
It is also important to recognise that considerations of probability of outcome are
inegalitarian. They fail to respect a principle of equality.
11
If Peter’s chance of survival with treatment is 30% and Paul’s is 40%, equality of
opportunity requires tossing a coin (or some kind of lottery). Indeed, even if Zak’s
chance is 1%, equality still requires he gets an equal chance of the best outcome
for him (provided it is in his interests).
Effective use of limited resources
While doctors may focus on the clinical need of their patient, they work in a system
that relies on utilitarian principles. Decisions in the NHS must be made to ensure
limited medical resources are allocated ethically, efficiently and effectively.
12
The courts have repeatedly acknowledged that healthcare is a limited resource and
that difficult decisions must be made to ensure these resources are used effectively.
The case of R v Cambridge Health Authority, Ex parte B is illustrative of this. The
case involved a 10 yr old child with cancer, for whom previous treatments had been
unsuccessful and whose parents were seeking two phases of treatments that each had
around a 10% chance of success and would cost £75,000. The Health Authority had determined
it would not fund the treatment. Sir Thomas Bingham recognised:
‘I have no doubt that in a perfect world any treatment which a patient, or a patient’s
family, sought would be provided if doctors were willing to give it, no matter how
much it cost, particularly when a life was potentially at stake. It would however,
in my view, be shutting one’s eyes to the real world if the court were to proceed
on the basis that we do live in such a world… Difficult and agonising judgments have
to be made as to how a limited budget is best allocated to the maximum advantage of
the maximum number of patients.’
13
These pragmatic decisions were made in times of relative abundance, yet even then
it was recognised there were circumstances in which because resources could be more
effectively used elsewhere some patients may need to miss out on potentially beneficial
treatments. It has been recognised there is a wide discretion for the state to determine
how resources should be appropriately allocated:
‘There is no enforceable individual entitlement to a particular level or location
of care from the NHS….That is consistent with article 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR), which does not give a patient a right to any particular type
of medical treatment from the State, given the fair balance that has to be struck
between the competing interests of the individual and society as a whole and the wide
margin of appreciation enjoyed by States especially in the assessment of the priorities
in the context of allocation of limited state resources’.
14
In the NHS, CCGs determine the broad categories of health services that will be purchased
and NHS Trusts provide those services in accordance with the agreed standards.
15
In purchasing appropriate services, there is not an absolute duty to provide particular
services, and the CCG is ‘entitled to have regard to the resources available to it’.
16
Just because a treatment would offer a patient a clinical benefit, this does not mean
it must be provided, ‘the need to demonstrate clinical effectiveness and value for
money is only the first stage in assessing priority. Effectiveness and value for money
are minimum requirements to enable prioritisation for funding, but are not the sole
criteria that must be met for funding to be agreed’.
17
During a pandemic these principles should not change. A person should not be entitled
to demand a particular level of care and NHS services should allocate care ethically,
efficiently and effectively. This may include identifying when treatment may be the
most beneficial and providing it in circumstances that would maximise this benefit.
Direct discrimination
The Critical Care National Clinical Reference Group, who authored the NICE guidance,
recently released a statement that provides background to the NICE guidance. It suggests
‘It is not appropriate to ask clinical staff to make rationing decisions (ie make
value judgements as to whether one person has a more established case for treatment
based on ethical considerations alone) as this introduces considerable potential for
introduction of unconscious bias and inconsistency in decision making’.
18
The document goes on to discuss that it is unlawful to make decisions on the basis
of age alone.
19
The statement clearly arose out of concern about suggestions made in the media that
people over a particular age should not receive intensive care treatment during the
COVID-19 crisis.
20
As the Critical Care National Clinical Reference Group’s statement suggests, it would
be unlawful to make decisions solely on the basis of age or disability. The Equality
Act 2010 provides it is unlawful to discriminate, either directly or indirectly, on
the basis of protected characteristics. Two characteristics relevant to this discussion
are age and disability.
21
Discrimination on the basis of age or disability occurs if a criterion or practice
is applied that would mean a person of a particular age or with a disability will
be placed at a particular disadvantage when compared with a person who is not of that
age or does not have that disability and it cannot be shown it is a proportionate
means of achieving a legitimate aim.
22
The Act applies to the provision of health services in the NHS.
23
Enactment of a policy to give preferential access to intensive care on the basis of
age or lack of disability appears to be prima facie discrimination. For example, if
a policy were implemented that people over the age of 80 with COVID-19 should not
be admitted to ICU, people over the age of 80 will be disadvantaged on the basis of
their age.
This gives rise to the question of whether a policy of not providing intensive care
treatment based on age or disability during a pandemic is a ‘proportionate means of
achieving a legitimate aim’.
24
It has been recognised in relation to age based discrimination in employment that
governments should be ‘accorded a margin of discretion when it comes to assessing
proportionate means’.
25
Further, direct age discrimination may be justified on the basis of ‘social policy
objectives’.
26
Any measures must be appropriate to achieve the legitimate aim and necessary to do
so, and that the gravity of the effects of the discrimination must be weighed against
the importance of the legitimate aims.
27
It is possible that there will not be sufficient intensive care resources available
to treat everyone who needs intensive care. This means difficult decisions will need
to be made, often in a short amount of time, about who should receive the available
resources. Age and disability are two factors that may indicate a reduced probability
of benefitting from intensive care treatment, both in the short and long term. In
the short term because intensive care treatment is less likely to return an older
person or a person with other physical impairments back to a state of full health.
And in the long term because older people and people with some disabilities may have
a reduced life expectancy and so will survive for a shorter period of time even if
they are discharged. In light of the reduced short and long term benefits relative
to the rest of the population, it may be argued that discriminating on the basis of
age and disability is an proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The legitimate
aim is maximising the benefit that can be obtained from limited intensive care resources.
It may be argued the measure is proportionate because it provides an effective criterion
for making fast decisions using objective criteria.
It is, however, unlikely that this argument would be accepted because age based or
disability based thresholds are not proportionate. While maximising benefit derived
from limited intensive care resources is a legitimate aim, age or disability based
thresholds may not be a proportionate response to achieving this aim. This is because
they are not necessary to achieve the aim and the consequences for those not provided
treatment are grave. The aim of ensuring the benefits derived from treatments are
maximised may be achieved by assessing the likely effectiveness and outcomes for each
individual. Whilst age or disability may be indicative at a population level of a
reduced benefit, at an individual level they are imprecise and there are a range of
other potentially relevant factors. For example, if Bob is 80 and expected to live
5 more years and John is 45 and expected to live 40 years, it may be argued that John
should be given priority. But this is only using age as a proxy for what is actually
at issue. If John was only expected to live one year longer, it would make sense to
prioritise Bob.
A more targeted and proportionate approach
While it may be unlawful discrimination to exclude people over a particular age or
with a particular disability from accessing treatment, this does not necessarily preclude
a utilitarian approach. A utilitarian approach seeks to ensure the greatest good to
the greatest number. The NICE guidance states frailty and co-morbidity should be a
relevant consideration to assess the likelihood of survival, suggesting probability
of survival should be considered in determining whether treatment should be provided.
This would not be directly discriminatory because, although age or disability may
impact an assessment of the probability of survival, it is the probability of survival
that is determinative. As identified above, this concern with probability of survival
stems from a utilitarian concern that treatments be used in a way that will maximise
the number of people who will survive.
If this approach is accepted, it is not clear why further measures would not be employed
to maximise utility. This could include considering the length of life available to
the person. This would not be directly discriminatory because if the person’s age
were changed but their life expectancy did not then the decision would not be different.
For example if Bob was 80 and had a life expectancy of 8 years and John was 40 and
had a life expectancy of 48 years, John would be provided treatment. But imagine now
that Bob has a life expectancy of 8 years, while John (because he has an incurable
malignancy) has a life expectancy of only 4 years, the decision would be reversed.
This suggests the protected characteristic of age is not the basis on which the decision
is made.
It may also be argued that quality of life could also be considered. It could similarly
be argued that this would not constitute direct discrimination because a person with
a disability would be treated the same way as a person without one if they had the
same quality of life. The difficulty for this position is that assessments of quality
of life generally appear to be intrinsically linked to disability. For example, Quality
Adjusted Life Year (QALY) assessments identify reduced quality of life through disability.
If an assessment of quality of life was nothing more than an assessment of the level
of a person’s disability, then making decisions on this basis would constitute direct
discrimination. However, if the assessment could be conducted on some other basis
(for example the person’s subjective assessment of their quality of life) or with
other relevant factors, it may not necessarily constitute direct discrimination. Ultimately,
this would depend on whether it was considered a proportionate, and a measure that
overtly devalued the lives of people with disabilities is unlikely to be considered
proportionate.
Indirect discrimination
Although criteria based on length of life and quality of life do not necessarily constitute
direct discrimination, it may be argued that making decisions on this basis constitutes
indirect discrimination in relation to age and disability. Indirect discrimination
occurs when a criterion or practice would place a person at a comparative disadvantage
to someone who did not share the protected characteristic.
28
Decisions made on the basis of life expectancy and quality of life are indirectly
discriminatory because older people and people with some disabilities will be placed
at a disadvantage if those with a greater life expectancy or greater quality of life
are preferred. If this argument is accepted though, it must also be recognised that
making assessments on the basis of frailty to determine the probability of survival
may equally constitute indirect discrimination. Older people and people with particular
disabilities will be assessed as more frail and are less likely to survive COVID-19.
While criteria for length of life and quality of life are likely to be prima facie
indirect discrimination, so too is the NICE guidance’s probability of survival.
This leaves the question of whether this is a proportionate response to a legitimate
aim. All three considerations appear to have the same aim, ensuring limited resources
are used effectively and efficiently by ensuring the maximum possible benefit is derived.
This is plainly a legitimate aim, the NHS is required to allocate resources ethically,
efficiently and effectively.
29
So are the three considerations proportionate to achieving this aim? In relation to
each consideration, the answer may be that it depends on the extent to which they
are imposed. For example, in relation to probability of survival, it may be proportionate
to prefer a person with a 90% chance of survival over a person with a 5% chance of
survival, but it may not be proportionate to prefer to a person with a 40% chance
of survival over a person with a 30% chance. In relation to length of life, it may
be proportionate to prefer a person who is likely to live 40 years over a person who
is likely to live 6 months, but it may not be to prefer a person who is likely to
live 10 years over a person who is likely to live 8 years. In relation to quality
of life, it may be proportionate to prefer an otherwise healthy person over a minimally
conscious or unconscious person, but it may not be proportionate to prefer a person
who is blind over one who is not.
Taking a purely utilitarian approach may constitute indirect discrimination. But this
is may be the case whether the relevant consideration is probability of survival,
length of life or quality of life. If NICE is willing to accept one of these as a
relevant consideration (probability) it is not clear why all of them would not be
considered. What is important is that they are considered in a proportionate manner.
Precautionary utilitarianism
In order to achieve this proportionality, we suggest that what may be described as
‘precautionary utilitarianism’ should be adopted. This approach would give some weight
to ensuring equality of opportunity, recognising that people should not be discriminated
against arbitrarily. But it would still recognise that decisions should be made to
go some way towards the greatest good for the greatest number. A consequence of this
may be that some groups are placed at a disadvantage in accessing treatments. But
this is only because they would derive significantly less benefit from the treatments.
If the difference in the benefit they would derive would be marginal, it may not be
acceptable to differentiate between people on this basis. This means more minor differences
in probability, length or quality of life should be ignored, but more significant
differences should be relevant.
The proposed precautionary utilitarian approach appears to be consistent with lay
attitudes to determining how limited medical resources should be expended. In a survey
of lay attitudes, Arora and colleagues found that participants generally preferred
to direct treatment to patients with a higher chance of survival, higher life expectancy
and less severe disability.
30
However, they also found that as the relevant differences between the patients decreased,
participants were more supportive of an egalitarian approach.
31
Conclusions
The NICE guidance purports to adopt an egalitarian approach to the provision of ventilation
during a potential shortage arising from COVID-19. Despite this, it introduces the
utilitarian consideration that treatment should be provided to those with the greatest
probability of survival. The guidance provides no justification for this theoretical
inconsistency and instead suggests the introduction of further utilitarian considerations
would be unlawful discrimination.
The NICE guidance and the Critical Care National Clinical Reference Group appear to
oversimplify the questions of discrimination in order to draw a false distinction
between the type of rationing they condemn and the rationing they encourage. The Critical
Care National Clinical Reference Group equates rationing on the basis of a single
issue (which would be unlawful discrimination) with all rationing. A more nuanced
approach to rationing that is aimed at maximising the benefits derived from limited
resources would not be discriminatory, provided the focus was on a clinical assessment
of the person and the likely benefits they would derive from the treatment. The only
criteria that may be unlawful is quality of life. This is because of the way quality
of life assessments are generally conducted in practice, with disability centrally
linked to an assessment of a reduced quality of life. Despite this, the suggestion
that any utilitarian approach would lead to unlawful discrimination is unsustainable.
The current NICE guidance provides an unstable compromise between egalitarianism and
utilitarianism. It is not clear why utilitarian principles should apply to considerations
about the probability of survival, but egalitarian principles should be applied to
considerations about length and quality of life. Instead, a precautionary utilitarian
approach should be adopted. This would recognise the importance of achieving the greatest
good for the greatest number, but it would also recognise that in circumstances in
which there is little net gain in discriminating based on a relevant factor people
should be treated equally. We should consider, to some degree, not only the probability
of achieving a beneficial outcome but also the value of that outcome It is ethically
justifiable to give lower priority to patients who will have a significantly lower
chance of survival, and also those who will have a significantly reduced length or
quality of life. This strikes a balance between equality and utility.
32
The Critical Care National Clinical Reference Group claims “It [NICE guidance] explicitly
states that Critical Care clinicians are the primary decision makers with respect
to the provision of Critical Care treatments.” This is right. But their claim that
clinicians should not ration limited treatments is wrong. When they make decisions
on the basis of probability of beneficial outcome by appeals to frailty or co-morbidities,
they are rationing. Such rationing decisions are best made by clinicians in possession
of all the relevant facts. But they need to be guided in those decisions by ethical
principles. Those principles should balance equality and utility. Those principles
should be proportionate and consider probability, length and quality of life when
these are severely diminished.
Authors’ contributions
JS and DW conceived of the idea and discussed the outline. JC drafted the legal section.
JS drafted the ethics section. DW edited the manuscript. All authors approved the
final version.
Declaration of interests
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
Funding
JS and DW were supported by the Wellcome Trust WT203132. JS was supported by WT104848.
JS and JC through their involvement with the Murdoch Children’s Research Institute
were supported by the Victorian Government's Operational Infrastructure Support Program
as well as the Melbourne Law School