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      The role of care home fees in the public costs and distributional effects of potential reforms to care home funding for older people in England

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          Abstract

          In England, Local Authorities (LAs) contribute to the care home fees of two-thirds of care home residents aged 65+ who pass a means test. LAs typically pay fees below those faced by residents excluded from state support. Most proposals for reform of the means test would increase the proportion of residents entitled to state support. If care homes receive the LA fee for more residents, they might increase fees for any remaining self-funders. Alternatively, the LA fee might have to rise. We use two linked simulation models to examine how alternative assumptions on post-reform fees affect projected public costs and financial gains to residents of three potential reforms to the means test. Raising the LA fee rate to maintain income per resident would increase the projected public cost of the reforms by between 22% and 72% in the base year. It would reduce the average gain to care home residents by between 8% and 12%. Raising post-reform fees for remaining self-funders or requiring pre-reform self-funders to meet the difference between the LA and self-funder fees, reduces the gains to residents by 28–37%. For one reform, residents in the highest income quintile would face losses if the self-funder fee rises.

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            Medicare and Medicaid: conflicting incentives for long-term care.

            The structure of Medicare and Medicaid creates conflicting incentives regarding dually eligible beneficiaries without coordinating their care. Both Medicare and Medicaid have an interest in limiting their costs, and neither has an incentive to take responsibility for the management or quality of care. Examples of misaligned incentives are Medicare's cost-sharing rules, cost shifting within home health care and nursing homes, and cost shifting across chronic and acute care settings. Several policy initiatives--capitation, pay-for-performance, and the shift of the dually eligible population's Medicaid costs to the federal government--may address these conflicting incentives, but all have strengths and weaknesses. With the aging baby boom generation and projected federal and state budget shortfalls, this issue will be a continuing focus of policymakers in the coming decades.
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              The effect of Medicaid reimbursement on quality of care in nursing homes.

              This study uses a nationally representative sample of nursing homes and nursing home residents to examine the effect of Medicaid reimbursement on quality of care. The analysis shows that both reimbursement approach and level affect nursing home quality, as measured by case-mix adjusted staff to resident ratios. The analysis also shows that staffing ratios have a significant impact on resident outcomes, and these impacts vary by professional category of staff. Reimbursement does not have a significant impact on outcomes, however.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Health Economics, Policy and Law
                HEPL
                Cambridge University Press (CUP)
                1744-1331
                1744-134X
                January 2013
                April 02 2012
                January 2013
                : 8
                : 1
                : 47-73
                Article
                10.1017/S1744133112000035
                cb15134e-266e-47f0-855c-d94e02c342cf
                © 2013

                https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms

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