18
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
0 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: found
      • Article: not found

      Pandemic influenza: mass gatherings and mass infection

      letter

      Read this article at

      ScienceOpenPublisherPMC
      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Abstract

          Mass gatherings, such as this year's Beijing Olympic Games, typically involve travel and extended close contact among participants and spectators. Influenza is one of the most frequently identified respiratory viruses in travellers, 1 and the high density of people at mass events further increases the risk of transmission. Despite this, the epidemiology of influenza outbreaks in large congregations is poorly understood. Variability of venues and the infrequency of mass events may have been barriers for systematic study of communicable diseases in these situations. However, because the venue does not change and the event occurs every year, the Islamic Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, does provide an excellent opportunity to research infectious diseases that not only affect a mass event but also have the potential for pandemic spread. Infectious diseases at the Hajj have been reported for centuries. During the first Hajj in 632AD, the pilgrims had febrile illness known locally as “Yethrib fever”, which is now believed to be malaria. 2 Subsequently, major epidemics such as plague and cholera have been reported. Over the past decades there have been several intercontinental outbreaks of meningococcal disease, first caused by serogroup A and later by W135. 3 Currently, respiratory infections are the commonest illnesses encountered at the Hajj and include, among others, influenza, pertussis, and tuberculosis. 3 Depending on study design, the occurence of seasonal influenza at the Hajj ranges from 6% to 38%, affecting both domestic and overseas pilgrims.4, 5, 6 So far, no human case of avian influenza A (H5N1) has been reported at the Hajj or in Saudi Arabia, but cases of H5N1 in human beings (table ) have been reported in Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey, countries from which many people make the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Counting Bangladesh, Iraq, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, and Djibouti, a total of nine countries with predominantly Muslim populations have already been affected by the virus. As of July 25, 2008, over half (214/385) of the reported number of H5N1 influenza cases have been in Muslims. 7 Furthermore, there was an outbreak of H5N1 influenza in Saudi poultry earlier last year. Table Muslim countries with H5N1 influenza that send pilgrims on Hajj Population (millions) Proportion of population who are Muslim Number of pilgrims per year Number of cases of H5N1 influenza 7 H5N1 case fatality (%) 7 Indonesia 237·5 86·1% 200 000 135 110 (81%) Pakistan 167·8 97% 150 000 3 1 (33%) Turkey 71·9 99·8% 120 000 12 4 (33%) Nigeria 138·3 50% 90 000 1 1 (100%) Egypt 81·7 90% 75 000 50 22 (44%) Bangladesh 153·6 83% 65 000 1 0 (0%) Iraq 28·2 97% 30 000 3 2 (67%) Azerbaijan 8·2 93·4% 4000 8 5 (63%) Djibouti 0·5 94% 2000 1 0 (0%) Total .. .. 736 000 214 145 (68%) The recent account of likely human-to-human transmission of H5N1 influenza in China, reported by Wang and colleagues, 8 alerts us to the possibility of a pandemic arising from mass events such as the Hajj pilgrimage. In Wang and colleagues' report the index case was a young salesman whose source of exposure could not be ascertained; for the second case, which concerned his retired father, the infected son was the only apparent source of exposure. Genomic sequencing showed that the viruses from both patients were essentially homologous. This is the third example of potential person-to-person transmission of H5N1 influenza after the Thai and Indonesian family clusters. 8 What can be done to prevent an influenza outbreak during the Hajj? An awareness campaign and better surveillance can have an important role. Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a good example of the success of this approach. During the 2003 episode, of 8000 cases of SARS reported worldwide at least 142 were travel-associated. 9 However, tight measures taken by Saudi authorities, which included applying a ban on visitors from SARS-hit countries, home quarantine for domestic travellers, installation of thermal cameras in major airports, and ensuring facilities for rapid detection of SARS virus, prevented establishment of the virus in the country. 10 Initial results from studies of prototype vaccines against H5N1 influenza were disappointing, with two or more doses, of high antigenic content, being necessary to induce protective immunity. 11 Also, from our experience with seasonal influenza, we can assume that the H5N1 vaccine could be ineffective despite good immunogenicity if the pandemic strain does not match with the vaccine strain(s). Three studies from Pakistan, Malaysia, and Iran have so far assessed the effectiveness of seasonal influenza vaccine against influenza-like illness among Hajj pilgrims. The Pakistani and Malaysian studies reported the vaccine to be effective; however, the Iranian study, which was done over two consecutive influenza seasons, reported that the vaccine was effective during the 2003 Hajj but not during the 2004 Hajj.12, 13, 14 Virological surveillance reports suggest that the rate of influenza in vaccinated pilgrims might not significantly differ from that in unvaccinated pilgrims.5, 6 Stockpiling antiviral drugs is another important control strategy but resistance can be a problem. Therefore, a multi-pronged approach will be required to prevent pandemic influenza at mass gatherings such as the Hajj. Key elements of this approach include education and awareness, improved surveillance, rapid diagnosis, and containment with antiviral treatment of cases and close contacts, non-pharmacological interventions including surgical masks, and, above all, coordinated global research with viral typing in countries of origin and sharing of these data. Because the recent report of probable inter-human transmission of H5N1 occurred in China, 8 the host of this year's Olympic Games, we believe that pandemic influenza should be an important consideration in public-health planning for the event. With data from other mass sporting events, we can postulate that respiratory and gastrointestinal infections will predominate during this year's Olympic season. Respiratory illnesses were the leading medical encounters during the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, USA; a hospital electronic medical record-based public-health surveillance system deployed during the event suggested a substantial increase in influenza during the games. 15 For the past few years the Hajj has been a winter event. At this time of year, there is increased risk of human influenza and also the possibility of dual infection with human and avian viruses, potentially leading to a genetically altered influenza virus of high virulence and transmissibility. The latest report of likely inter-human transmission of H5N1 influenza suggests that the virus is slowly becoming more adapted to human beings. 8 If the transmission among human beings becomes sustained, mass gatherings could help spread the virus all over the world at a very rapid pace. Therefore, coordinated global response and research is a high priority.

          Related collections

          Most cited references14

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: found
          • Article: not found

          Health risks at the Hajj

          Summary Annually, millions of Muslims embark on a religious pilgrimage called the “Hajj” to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. The mass migration during the Hajj is unparalleled in scale, and pilgrims face numerous health hazards. The extreme congestion of people and vehicles during this time amplifies health risks, such as those from infectious diseases, that vary each year. Since the Hajj is dictated by the lunar calendar, which is shorter than the Gregorian calendar, it presents public-health policy planners with a moving target, demanding constant preparedness. We review the communicable and non-communicable hazards that pilgrims face. With the rise in global travel, preventing disease transmission has become paramount to avoid the spread of infectious diseases, including SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), avian influenza, and haemorrhagic fever. We examine the response of clinicians, the Saudi Ministry of Health, and Hajj authorities to these unique problems, and list health recommendations for prospective pilgrims.
            Bookmark
            • Record: found
            • Abstract: found
            • Article: not found

            Probable limited person-to-person transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus in China.

            In December, 2007, a family cluster of two individuals infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus was identified in Jiangsu Province, China. Field and laboratory investigations were implemented immediately by public-health authorities. Epidemiological, clinical, and virological data were collected and analysed. Respiratory specimens from the patients were tested by reverse transcriptase (RT) PCR and by viral culture for the presence of H5N1 virus. Contacts of cases were monitored for symptoms of illness for 10 days. Any contacts who became ill had respiratory specimens collected for H5N1 testing by RT PCR. Sera were obtained from contacts for H5N1 serological testing by microneutralisation and horse red-blood-cell haemagglutinin inhibition assays. The 24-year-old index case died, and the second case, his 52-year-old father, survived after receiving early antiviral treatment and post-vaccination plasma from a participant in an H5N1 vaccine trial. The index case's only plausible exposure to H5N1 virus was a poultry market visit 6 days before the onset of illness. The second case had substantial unprotected close exposure to his ill son. 91 contacts with close exposure to one or both cases without adequate protective equipment provided consent for serological investigation. Of these individuals, 78 (86%) received oseltamivir chemoprophylaxis and two had mild illness. Both ill contacts tested negative for H5N1 by RT PCR. All 91 close contacts tested negative for H5N1 antibodies. H5N1 viruses isolated from the two cases were genetically identical except for one non-synonymous nucleotide substitution. Limited, non-sustained person-to-person transmission of H5N1 virus probably occurred in this family cluster.
              Bookmark
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: found
              • Article: not found

              Influenza a common viral infection among Hajj pilgrims: time for routine surveillance and vaccination.

              The annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia brings over two million people to a small confined area. Respiratory tract infection is the most common disease transmitted during this period. For most of the etiologic agents of upper respiratory tract infections, no vaccine or prophylaxis is available, except for influenza. Yearly influenza vaccination of high-risk groups is recommended, but no special recommendations are available for those performing the Hajj or other similar large congregational activities. Viral surveillance studies are being carried out through more than 100 centers around the world to identify newly emerging viruses. Saudi Arabia is not one of those centers and no routine surveillance takes place. Five hundred Hajj pilgrims presenting with upper respiratory tract symptoms from different parts of the world were screened by way of a throat swab for viral culture, including influenza A and B, parainfluenza, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), adenovirus, herpes simplex virus (HSV), and enteroviruses. Information was collected on age, sex, nationality, smoking habits and upper respiratory tract symptoms. Vaccination status for influenza and meningococcus was obtained by self-declaration, since most pilgrims did not have their vaccination cards with them. Only those with symptoms including at least fever, reported by the patient to be >38.3 degrees C, and/or sore throat were included. Pilgrims with any other symptoms, especially myalgia and fatigue alone, were excluded, since many of the physical chores during the pilgrimage may contribute to such symptoms. Fifty-four patients (10.8%) had positive viral throat cultures. Of these, 27 (50%) were influenza B, 13 (24.1%) were HSV, 7 (12.9%) were RSV, 4 (7.4%) were parainfluenza, and 3 (5.6%) were influenza A. No enteroviruses or adenoviruses were detected, and no multiple infections were detected. Only 22 (4.7%) pilgrims received the influenza vaccine. When the results are applied to the total number of pilgrims in 2003, an estimate of 24,000 cases of influenza is obtained. The findings from this study suggest a high incidence of influenza as a cause of upper respiratory tract infection among pilgrims, estimated to be 24,000 cases per Hajj season, excluding those becoming ill from contact with Hajj pilgrims returning home. They also indicate a very low vaccination rate for the influenza vaccine; as well as poor knowledge of its existence. Continued surveillance during the Hajj pilgrimage is necessary. The influenza vaccine should be a priority for those attending the Hajj pilgrimage, and should also be considered for antiviral prophylaxis.
                Bookmark

                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                Lancet Infect Dis
                Lancet Infect Dis
                The Lancet. Infectious Diseases
                Elsevier Ltd.
                1473-3099
                1474-4457
                4 August 2008
                September 2008
                4 August 2008
                : 8
                : 9
                : 526-527
                Affiliations
                [a ]Academic Unit of Child Health, Barts and the London Queen Mary's School of Medicine and Dentistry, London, UK
                [b ]Health Protection Agency, South East, London, UK
                [c ]Clinical Microbiology and Health Protection Agency Collaborating Laboratory, North West London Hospitals NHS Trust, London, UK
                [d ]King Abdulaziz Medical City, National Guard Health Affairs, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
                [e ]National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance of Vaccine Preventable Diseases, Children's Hospital at Westmead and University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
                Article
                S1473-3099(08)70186-5
                10.1016/S1473-3099(08)70186-5
                7128517
                18684671
                d0b680c4-635f-4815-b985-ab86ad37a353
                Copyright © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

                Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website. Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active.

                History
                Categories
                Article

                Infectious disease & Microbiology
                Infectious disease & Microbiology

                Comments

                Comment on this article