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      Am I Self-Conscious? (Or Does Self-Organization Entail Self-Consciousness?)

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      Frontiers in Psychology
      Frontiers Media S.A.
      active inference, predictive processing, variational, free energy, Bayesian, model selection, dynamics

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          Abstract

          Is self-consciousness necessary for consciousness? The answer is yes. So there you have it—the answer is yes. This was my response to a question I was asked to address in a recent AEON piece ( https://aeon.co/essays/consciousness-is-not-a-thing-but-a-process-of-inference). What follows is based upon the notes for that essay, with a special focus on self-organization, self-evidencing and self-modeling. I will try to substantiate my (polemic) answer from the perspective of a physicist. In brief, the argument goes as follows: if we want to talk about creatures, like ourselves, then we have to identify the characteristic behaviors they must exhibit. This is fairly easy to do by noting that living systems return to a set of attracting states time and time again. Mathematically, this implies the existence of a Lyapunov function that turns out to be model evidence (i.e., self-evidence) in Bayesian statistics or surprise (i.e., self-information) in information theory. This means that all biological processes can be construed as performing some form of inference, from evolution through to conscious processing. If this is the case, at what point do we invoke consciousness? The proposal on offer here is that the mind comes into being when self-evidencing has a temporal thickness or counterfactual depth, which grounds inferences about the consequences of my action. On this view, consciousness is nothing more than inference about my future; namely, the self-evidencing consequences of what I could do.

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            Episodic memory: from mind to brain.

            Episodic memory is a neurocognitive (brain/mind) system, uniquely different from other memory systems, that enables human beings to remember past experiences. The notion of episodic memory was first proposed some 30 years ago. At that time it was defined in terms of materials and tasks. It was subsequently refined and elaborated in terms of ideas such as self, subjective time, and autonoetic consciousness. This chapter provides a brief history of the concept of episodic memory, describes how it has changed (indeed greatly changed) since its inception, considers criticisms of it, and then discusses supporting evidence provided by (a) neuropsychological studies of patterns of memory impairment caused by brain damage, and (b) functional neuroimaging studies of patterns of brain activity of normal subjects engaged in various memory tasks. I also suggest that episodic memory is a true, even if as yet generally unappreciated, marvel of nature.
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              Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self.

              The concept of the brain as a prediction machine has enjoyed a resurgence in the context of the Bayesian brain and predictive coding approaches within cognitive science. To date, this perspective has been applied primarily to exteroceptive perception (e.g., vision, audition), and action. Here, I describe a predictive, inferential perspective on interoception: 'interoceptive inference' conceives of subjective feeling states (emotions) as arising from actively-inferred generative (predictive) models of the causes of interoceptive afferents. The model generalizes 'appraisal' theories that view emotions as emerging from cognitive evaluations of physiological changes, and it sheds new light on the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie the experience of body ownership and conscious selfhood in health and in neuropsychiatric illness. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                Front Psychol
                Front Psychol
                Front. Psychol.
                Frontiers in Psychology
                Frontiers Media S.A.
                1664-1078
                24 April 2018
                2018
                : 9
                : 579
                Affiliations
                Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London (UCL) , London, United Kingdom
                Author notes

                Edited by: Jennifer Michelle Windt, Monash University, Australia

                Reviewed by: Julian Kiverstein, Academic Medical Center (AMC), Netherlands; John Michael, Central European University, Hungary

                *Correspondence: Karl Friston k.friston@ 123456ucl.ac.uk

                This article was submitted to Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology

                Article
                10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00579
                5928749
                29740369
                d17ce42d-6ef6-44ee-8742-2ad0dc065673
                Copyright © 2018 Friston.

                This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

                History
                : 05 January 2018
                : 05 April 2018
                Page count
                Figures: 1, Tables: 1, Equations: 0, References: 95, Pages: 10, Words: 9260
                Funding
                Funded by: Wellcome Trust 10.13039/100004440
                Award ID: 088130/Z/09/Z
                Categories
                Psychology
                Hypothesis and Theory

                Clinical Psychology & Psychiatry
                active inference,predictive processing,variational,free energy,bayesian,model selection,dynamics

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