Antoine Lemay , Marina Krotofil , José M. Fernandez , Scott Knight
September 2014
2nd International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2014 (ICS-CSR 2014) (ICSCSR)
ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2014 (ICS-CSR 2014)
11-12 September 2014
Secure control, ICS security, state estimation, control loop
There are almost as many ways to implement Industrial Control Systems as there are ways to control industrial systems. This produces a wide-varying range of possible architectures for the SCADA networks that control them. This paper organizes SCADA networks based on these various control architectures in order to evaluate how different controlmodels and architectures can affect the threat model.We observe that distributed control, with control logic in the endpoints, is more susceptible to attacks on SCADA endpoints and that distributed state architectures,with centralized control, ismore susceptible to attacks on the SCADA master.
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