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      Evaluation of lateral flow devices for identification of infected poultry by testing swab and feather specimens during H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks in Vietnam

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          Abstract

          Please cite this paper as: Slomka et al. (2012) Evaluation of lateral flow devices for identification of infected poultry by testing swab and feather specimens during H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks in Vietnam. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses 6(5), 318–327.

          Background  Evaluation of two commercial lateral flow devices (LFDs) for avian influenza (AI) detection in H5N1 highly pathogenic AI infected poultry in Vietnam.

          Objectives  Determine sensitivity and specificity of the LFDs relative to a validated highly sensitive H5 RRT PCR.

          Methods  Swabs (cloacal and tracheal) and feathers were collected from 46 chickens and 48 ducks (282 clinical specimens) and tested by both LFDs and H5 RRT PCR. A subset of 59 chicken and 34 duck specimens was also tested by virus isolation (VI), the ‘gold standard’.

          Results  Twenty‐six chickens and 15 ducks were shown to be infected by at least one RRT PCR positive clinical specimen per bird. Bird‐level sensitivity for the Anigen LFD was 84·6% for chickens and 53·3% for ducks, and for the Quickvue LFD 65·4% for chickens and 33·3% for ducks. Comparison of the three clinical specimens revealed that chicken feathers were the most sensitive with 84% and 56% sensitivities for Anigen and Quickvue respectively. All 21 RRT PCR positive swabs from ducks were negative by both LFDs. However, duck feather testing gave sensitivities of 53·3% and 33·3% for Anigen and Quickvue respectively. Specificity was 100% for both LFDs in all investigations.

          Conclusions  Although LFDs were less sensitive than AI RRT PCR and VI, high titre viral shedding in H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) infected and diseased chickens is sufficient for a proportion of birds to be identified as AI infected by LFDs. Feathers were the optimal specimen for LFD testing in such diseased HPAI scenarios, particularly for ducks where swab testing by LFDs failed to identify any infected birds. However, specimens should be forwarded to the laboratory for confirmation by more sensitive diagnostic techniques.

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          Ducks: The “Trojan Horses” of H5N1 influenza

          Abstract Wild ducks are the main reservoir of influenza A viruses that can be transmitted to domestic poultry and mammals, including humans. Of the 16 hemagglutinin (HA) subtypes of influenza A viruses, only the H5 and H7 subtypes cause highly pathogenic (HP) influenza in the natural hosts. Several duck species are naturally resistant to HP Asian H5N1 influenza viruses. These duck species can shed and spread virus from both the respiratory and intestinal tracts while showing few or no disease signs. While the HP Asian H5N1 viruses are 100% lethal for chickens and other gallinaceous poultry, the absence of disease signs in some duck species has led to the concept that ducks are the “Trojan horses” of H5N1 in their surreptitious spread of virus. An important unresolved issue is whether the HP H5N1 viruses are maintained in the wild duck population of the world. Here, we review the ecology and pathobiology of ducks infected with influenza A viruses and ducks’ role in the maintenance and spread of HP H5N1 viruses. We also identify the key questions about the role of ducks that must be resolved in order to understand the emergence and control of pandemic influenza. It is generally accepted that wild duck species can spread HP H5N1 viruses, but there is insufficient evidence to show that ducks maintain these viruses and transfer them from one generation to the next.
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            Continued evolution of H5N1 influenza viruses in wild birds, domestic poultry, and humans in China from 2004 to 2009.

            Despite substantial efforts to control H5N1 avian influenza viruses (AIVs), the viruses have continued to evolve and cause disease outbreaks in poultry and infections in humans. In this report, we analyzed 51 representative H5N1 AIVs isolated from domestic poultry, wild birds, and humans in China during 2004 to 2009, and 21 genotypes were detected based on whole-genome sequences. Twelve genotypes of AIVs in southern China bear similar H5 hemagglutinin (HA) genes (clade 2.3). These AIVs did not display antigenic drift and could be completely protected against by the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 (GS/GD/1/96)-based oil-adjuvanted killed vaccine and recombinant Newcastle disease virus vaccine, which have been used in China. In addition, antigenically drifted H5N1 viruses, represented by A/chicken/Shanxi/2/06 (CK/SX/2/06), were detected in chickens from several provinces in northern China. The CK/SX/2/06-like viruses are reassortants with newly emerged HA, NA, and PB1 genes that could not be protected against by the GS/GD/1/96-based vaccines. These viruses also reacted poorly with antisera generated from clade 2.2 and 2.3 viruses. The majority of the viruses isolated from southern China were lethal in mice and ducks, while the CK/SX/2/06-like viruses caused mild disease in mice and could not replicate in ducks. Our results demonstrate that the H5N1 AIVs circulating in nature have complex biological characteristics and pose a continued challenge for disease control and pandemic preparedness.
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              Origin and evolution of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in Asia.

              Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by H5N1 viruses were reported almost simultaneously in eight neighbouring Asian countries between December 2003 and January 2004, with a ninth reporting in August 2004, suggesting that the viruses had spread recently and rapidly. However, they had been detected widely in the region in domestic waterfowl and terrestrial poultry for several years before this, and the absence of widespread disease in the region before 2003, apart from localised outbreaks in the Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region (SAR), is perplexing. Possible explanations include limited virus excretion by domestic waterfowl infected with H5N1, the confusion of avian influenza with other serious endemic diseases, the unsanctioned use of vaccines, and the under-reporting of disease as a result of limited surveillance. There is some evidence that the excretion of the viruses by domestic ducks had increased by early 2004, and there is circumstantial evidence that they can be transmitted by wild birds. The migratory birds from which viruses have been isolated were usually sick or dead, suggesting that they would have had limited potential for carrying the viruses over long distances unless subclinical infections were prevalent. However, there is strong circumstantial evidence that wild birds can become infected from domestic poultry and potentially can exchange viruses when they share the same environment. Nevertheless, there is little reason to believe that wild birds have played a more significant role in spreading disease than trade through live bird markets and movement of domestic waterfowl. Asian H5N1 viruses were first detected in domestic geese in southern China in 1996. By 2000, their host range had extended to domestic ducks, which played a key role in the genesis of the 2003/04 outbreaks. The epidemic was not due to the introduction and spread of a single virus but was caused by multiple viruses which were genotypically linked to the Goose/GD/96 lineage via the haemagglutinin gene. The H5N1 viruses isolated from China, including the Hong Kong SAR, between 1999 and 2004 had a range of genotypes and considerable variability within genotypes. The rising incidence and widespread reporting of disease in 2003/04 can probably be attributed to the increasing spread of the viruses from existing reservoirs of infection in domestic waterfowl and live bird markets leading to greater environmental contamination. When countries in the region started to report disease in December 2003, others were alerted to the risk and disease surveillance and reporting improved. The H5N1 viruses have reportedly been eliminated from three of the nine countries that reported disease in 2003/04, but they could be extremely difficult to eradicate from the remaining countries, owing to the existence of populations and, possibly, production and marketing sectors, in which apparently normal birds harbour the viruses.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Influenza Other Respir Viruses
                Influenza Other Respir Viruses
                10.1111/(ISSN)1750-2659
                IRV
                Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses
                Blackwell Publishing Ltd (Oxford, UK )
                1750-2640
                1750-2659
                12 December 2011
                September 2012
                : 6
                : 5 ( doiID: 10.1111/irv.2012.6.issue-5 )
                : 318-327
                Affiliations
                [ 1 ]Avian Virology Workgroup, OIE, FAO and EU Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza, Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency (AHVLA Weybridge), Addlestone, Surrey, UK.
                [ 2 ]National Center for Veterinary Diagnosis (NCVD), Hanoi, Vietnam.
                [ 3 ]AHVLA Bury, Rougham Hill, Bury St Edmunds, UK.
                Author notes
                [*]Dr Marek J. Slomka, Avian Virology Workgroup, Virology Department Bldg 64, Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency, (AHVLA‐Weybridge), Woodham Lane, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK. E‐mail: marek.slomka@ 123456ahvla.gsi.gov.uk
                Article
                IRV317
                10.1111/j.1750-2659.2011.00317.x
                5779812
                22151025
                d54a865c-79b4-4f93-ba3f-a165c8e38be2
                © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
                History
                Page count
                Figures: 2, Tables: 7, Pages: 10
                Categories
                Original Articles
                Original Article
                Custom metadata
                2.0
                September 2012
                Converter:WILEY_ML3GV2_TO_NLMPMC version:4.6.9 mode:remove_FC converted:04.11.2015

                Infectious disease & Microbiology
                flockside,h5n1 highly pathogenic avian influenza,lateral flow devices

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