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      A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality.

      American Psychologist
      American Psychological Association (APA)

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          Abstract

          Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning. Intuitive thoughts, like percepts, are highly accessible. Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes. Variations in the accessibility of rules explain the occasional corrections of intuitive judgments. The study of biases is compatible with a view of intuitive thinking and decision making as generally skilled and successful.

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          Most cited references145

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          Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk

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            Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty

            Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297-323
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              Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.

              This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                American Psychologist
                American Psychologist
                American Psychological Association (APA)
                1935-990X
                0003-066X
                2003
                2003
                : 58
                : 9
                : 697-720
                Article
                10.1037/0003-066X.58.9.697
                14584987
                d5b0e2da-5fe1-4463-81a4-61afce3b6cec
                © 2003
                History

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