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Abstract
Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos
Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility,
the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition
and deliberate reasoning. Intuitive thoughts, like percepts, are highly accessible.
Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of
prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution,
and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional
for extensional attributes. Variations in the accessibility of rules explain the occasional
corrections of intuitive judgments. The study of biases is compatible with a view
of intuitive thinking and decision making as generally skilled and successful.