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      Lessons learned from SARS: The experience of the Health Protection Agency, England

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          Summary

          The United Kingdom was assessed as a low risk country throughout the 2003 global SARS outbreaks. Despite this, 368 reports of potential SARS cases were made to the Health Protection Agency (HPA) between March and July 2003. The public health actions undertaken in response to these reports, the establishment of reporting mechanisms and the development of guidance documents were substantial. Lessons learned from mounting a UK response to SARS included: the importance of international collaboration; formation of a UK-wide, multidisciplinary Task Force; flexible case reporting mechanisms; integration of surveillance and laboratory data; generation of prompt and web-accessible guidance and advice; availability of surge capacity; and contingency planning. Lessons learned are being incorporated into the HPA's preparedness to prevent and control future newly emerging infectious disease threats.

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          Is Open Access

          SARS in Healthcare Facilities, Toronto and Taiwan

          The healthcare setting was important in the early spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in both Toronto and Taiwan. Healthcare workers, patients, and visitors were at increased risk for infection. Nonetheless, the ability of individual SARS patients to transmit disease was quite variable. Unrecognized SARS case-patients were a primary source of transmission and early detection and intervention were important to limit spread. Strict adherence to infection control precautions was essential in containing outbreaks. In addition, grouping patients into cohorts and limiting access to SARS patients minimized exposure opportunities. Given the difficulty in implementing several of these measures, controls were frequently adapted to the acuity of SARS care and level of transmission within facilities. Although these conclusions are based only on a retrospective analysis of events, applying the experiences of Toronto and Taiwan to SARS preparedness planning efforts will likely minimize future transmission within healthcare facilities.
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            SARS Transmission and Hospital Containment

            An outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was detected in Singapore at the beginning of March 2003. The outbreak, initiated by a traveler to Hong Kong in late February 2003, led to sequential spread of SARS to three major acute care hospitals in Singapore. The critical factor in containing this outbreak was early detection and complete assessment of movements and follow-up of patients, healthcare workers, and visitors who were contacts. Visitor records were important in helping identify exposed persons who could carry the infection into the community. In the three hospital outbreaks, three different containment strategies were used to contain spread of infection: closing an entire hospital, removing all potentially infected persons to a dedicated SARS hospital, and managing exposed persons in place. On the basis of this experience, if a nosocomial outbreak is detected late, a hospital may need to be closed in order to contain spread of the disease. Outbreaks detected early can be managed by either removing all exposed persons to a designated location or isolating and managing them in place.
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              Roles and functions of a European Union Public Health Centre for Communicable Diseases and other threats to health.

              An international consensus has been reached that a European Union (EU) Technical Coordination Structure (TCS) for communicable diseases is needed to improve Europe s future response to international communicable disease threats within and beyond its boundaries. After the American events of September 11 2001 and the deliberate releases of anthrax, the EU created a Health Security Committee, adopted a civil protection decision, and established for 18 months a team to develop responses for deliberate releases of biological and chemical agents. These two initiatives, the network s approach and health security work, must converge into a single stream addressing health protection for the people of Europe. They could be combined into a European Centre for Communicable Diseases that is planned to become active by 2005.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                Public Health
                Public Health
                Public Health
                Published by Elsevier Ltd.
                0033-3506
                1476-5616
                16 November 2005
                January 2006
                16 November 2005
                : 120
                : 1
                : 27-32
                Affiliations
                [a ]Health Protection Agency Centre for Infections, 61 Colindale Avenue, London NW9 5EQ, UK
                [b ]Health Protection Agency North West, Vernon Pritchard Court, 57a Upper Northgate Street, Chester CH1 4EF, UK
                Author notes
                [* ]Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 20 8327 6270; fax: +44 20 8200 7868. valerie.delpech@ 123456hpa.org.uk
                Article
                S0033-3506(05)00238-6
                10.1016/j.puhe.2005.10.003
                7118739
                16297417
                d7feae84-e29e-400c-8e68-95201c67eb44
                Copyright © 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

                Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website. Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active.

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                Public health
                sars,surveillance,public health,lessons learned,england,health protection agency
                Public health
                sars, surveillance, public health, lessons learned, england, health protection agency

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