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      BlackRock ve ABD Hegemonyası

      Bilgi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi
      Degisim Yayinlari

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          Abstract

          1980’lerde başlayan uluslararası ekonomi politik gelişmeler kurumsal yönetişim rejimini de etkileyerek, varlık yöneticisi kapitalizmi olarak adlandırılan bir sürece girilmesine ve bu sürecin sonunda yeni ekonomi politik aktörler olan dev varlık yöneticisi şirketlerinin önemli ölçüde büyümesine sebep olmuştur. Ekonomik sistemde hâkimiyetin, rızaya dayalı tahakküm biçimi olarak hegemonyanın ön koşullarından birisi olarak sayılması, bu şirketlerin en büyüğü olan BlackRock’ın ABD hegemonyasındaki konumunun değerlendirilmesinin önünü açmıştır. Konuyla ilgili eserlerin incelendiği literatür taramasının yanında yorumsamacı yaklaşımdan yararlanılarak yapılan çalışmada BlackRock’ı ABD hegemonyası perspektifinden araştırmak hedeflenmiştir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda yapılan araştırmanın sonucunda, yönetimi altındaki varlıkların 10 trilyon dolara ulaştığı BlackRock’ın; ABD ile yakın ilişkisi, ekonomik kriz dönemlerindeki kurtarıcı rolü, dünyanın en büyük finans kuruluşlarına (merkez bankaları dahil) danışmanlık yapması, hissedar olduğu binlerce şirketin genel kurulunda oylama hakkı bulunması ve 2012’den itibaren her yıl yayınlanan mektuplar aracılığıyla küresel ekonomik sisteme önemli ölçüde etki etme kabiliyeti bir bütün olarak değerlendirildiğinde ABD hegemonyası lehine konumlandığı gözükmektedir.

          Abstract

          The international political economy developments that started in the 1980s also affected the corporate governance regime, leading to a process called asset manager capitalism, and at the end of this process, giant asset manager companies, which are new political economy actors, grew significantly. Counting dominance in the economic system as one of the preconditions of hegemony as a form of domination based on consent has paved the way for the evaluation of the position of BlackRock, the largest of these companies, in the US hegemony. In addition to the literature review of the relevant studies on the subject, the study, using a hermeneutic approach, aims to investigate BlackRock from the perspective of US hegemony. As a result of the research conducted for this purpose, BlackRock, whose assets under management (AUM) have reached 10 trillion dollars, seems to be positioned in favor of US hegemony when its close relationship with the US, its role as a savior in times of economic crisis, its consultancy to the world's largest financial institutions (including central banks), its voting rights in the general assembly of thousands of companies in which it is a shareholder, and its ability to significantly influence the global economic system through letters published every year since 2012 are evaluated as a whole.

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          Most cited references23

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          Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations : An Essay in Method

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            Hidden power of the Big Three? Passive index funds, re-concentration of corporate ownership, and new financial risk

            Since 2008, a massive shift has occurred from active toward passive investment strategies. The passive index fund industry is dominated by BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, which we call the “Big Three.” We comprehensively map the ownership of the Big Three in the United States and find that together they constitute the largest shareholder in 88 percent of the S&P 500 firms. In contrast to active funds, the Big Three hold relatively illiquid and permanent ownership positions. This has led to opposing views on incentives and possibilities to actively exert shareholder power. Some argue passive investors have little shareholder power because they cannot “exit,” while others point out this gives them stronger incentives to actively influence corporations. Through an analysis of proxy vote records we find that the Big Three do utilize coordinated voting strategies and hence follow a centralized corporate governance strategy. However, they generally vote with management, except at director (re-)elections. Moreover, the Big Three may exert “hidden power” through two channels: First, via private engagements with management of invested companies; and second, because company executives could be prone to internalizing the objectives of the Big Three. We discuss how this development entails new forms of financial risk.
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              The Lonely Superpower

                Author and article information

                Contributors
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                Journal
                Bilgi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi
                Degisim Yayinlari
                1302-1761
                December 02 2023
                Article
                10.54838/bilgisosyal.1351358
                d9074281-04a6-44db-a1e3-49b7a2c036aa
                © 2023
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