Blog
About

44
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
0 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: found
      • Article: found
      Is Open Access

      Rethinking fast and slow based on a critique of reaction-time reverse inference

      Read this article at

      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Abstract

          Do people intuitively favour certain actions over others? In some dual-process research, reaction-time (RT) data have been used to infer that certain choices are intuitive. However, the use of behavioural or biological measures to infer mental function, popularly known as ‘reverse inference', is problematic because it does not take into account other sources of variability in the data, such as discriminability of the choice options. Here we use two example data sets obtained from value-based choice experiments to demonstrate that, after controlling for discriminability (that is, strength-of-preference), there is no evidence that one type of choice is systematically faster than the other. Moreover, using specific variations of a prominent value-based choice experiment, we are able to predictably replicate, eliminate or reverse previously reported correlations between RT and selfishness. Thus, our findings shed crucial light on the use of RT in inferring mental processes and strongly caution against using RT differences as evidence favouring dual-process accounts.

          Abstract

          In cognitive neuroscience, it is common practice to use reaction time data to infer whether decisions are intuitive or deliberate. Here the authors demonstrate that they can replicate, eliminate and reverse previously reported correlations between selfishness and reaction time.

          Related collections

          Most cited references 59

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: not found
          • Article: not found

          A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation

           E. Fehr,  K. Schmidt (1999)
            Bookmark
            • Record: found
            • Abstract: found
            • Article: not found

            An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment.

            The long-standing rationalist tradition in moral psychology emphasizes the role of reason in moral judgment. A more recent trend places increased emphasis on emotion. Although both reason and emotion are likely to play important roles in moral judgment, relatively little is known about their neural correlates, the nature of their interaction, and the factors that modulate their respective behavioral influences in the context of moral judgment. In two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using moral dilemmas as probes, we apply the methods of cognitive neuroscience to the study of moral judgment. We argue that moral dilemmas vary systematically in the extent to which they engage emotional processing and that these variations in emotional engagement influence moral judgment. These results may shed light on some puzzling patterns in moral judgment observed by contemporary philosophers.
              Bookmark
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: not found
              • Article: not found

              z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments

                Bookmark

                Author and article information

                Journal
                Nat Commun
                Nat Commun
                Nature Communications
                Nature Pub. Group
                2041-1723
                02 July 2015
                2015
                : 6
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research, Department of Economics, University of Zurich , Zürich 8006, Switzerland
                [2 ]Department of Psychology, The Ohio State University , 1827 Neil Avenue, 200E Lazenby Hall, Columbus Ohio 43210, USA
                [3 ]Department of Economics, The Ohio State University , 1945 North High Street, 415 Arps Hall, Columbus, Ohio 43210, USA
                [4 ]Department of Economics, University of Zurich , Zürich 8006, Switzerland
                Author notes
                [*]

                These authors contributed equally to this work.

                Article
                ncomms8455
                10.1038/ncomms8455
                4500827
                26135809
                Copyright © 2015, Nature Publishing Group, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited. All Rights Reserved.

                This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if the material is not included under the Creative Commons license, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to reproduce the material. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

                Categories
                Article

                Uncategorized

                Comments

                Comment on this article