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      Impact of the COVID‐19 pandemic on surgical services: early experiences at a nominated COVID‐19 centre

      research-article
      , BHSc MHSM 1 , 2 , , MBBS BBiomed, MPhil 1 , 2 , 3 , , MD, PhD, FMH (Surgery) 1 , 4 , , Bphty (Hons), PhDDA 3 , 5 , , MBBS, MS, FRACS 1 , 3 , 4 , , MBBS (Hons), MS, FRACS 1 , 2 , 3 , 5
      Anz Journal of Surgery
      John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd

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          Abstract

          Introduction The evolving coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic represents an unprecedented and largely unanticipated challenge to the delivery of surgical care in Australia and New Zealand. The first confirmed COVID‐19 case in Australia occurred on 25 January 2020. Since then, 2675 patients have been diagnosed nationally, resulting in 12 deaths (at the time of writing). New South Wales has been the most affected state based on case volume, with 1219 documented cases. During the initial response in New South Wales, all patients with confirmed COVID‐19 requiring hospitalization were managed at a nominated COVID‐19 centre (Westmead Hospital). As the pandemic evolved and the confirmed cases increased, a second COVID‐19 centre was established at Royal Prince Alfred (RPA) Hospital on 4 March 2020. RPA is a 900‐bed teaching hospital located in metropolitan Sydney, which provides surgical care for the local community but also serves as a quaternary referral centre for complex surgical services including advanced gastrointestinal malignancy, complex cardiovascular and neurosurgery, and renal and liver transplantation. As the third week of the response period at RPA comes to an end, this article aims to share our initial experience as a dedicated COVID‐19 centre by describing the issues faced in providing acute and elective surgical care, the broad impacts on staff and the early strategies adopted to address these challenges. Early impact on surgical services The aim of the initial response was to prepare the hospital to provide care for a high volume of COVID‐19 patients, while maintaining the limited delivery of surgical care to emergency and high priority elective cases. All non‐essential surgical services were reduced with immediate effect (9 March 2020), including all category C patients (within 365 days) and most category B patients (90 days). This involved the conversion of the perioperative and day stay units as well as the co‐located endoscopy suite into a dedicated COVID‐19 screening clinic. This reduced the demand for post‐operative intensive care unit (ICU) beds, which was a known resource required to be available in the event of a surge in COVID‐19 patients. Notwithstanding this, the competing demands for ICU beds necessarily meant that many of the complex surgical services offered at RPA needed to be rationed with careful liaison between services to ensure that patients underwent surgery within an appropriate timeframe. In line with the curtailing of surgical workload, theatre sessions continue to be scheduled week by week, often with twice weekly teleconferences within individual surgical departments. Instead of having routine designated lists for individual surgeons, lists have become communal within each department, with surgeons listing urgent patients with the understanding that the procedure may be performed by a trusted colleague. This temporary change in culture and collegiality has been important and allowed the patient needs to be prioritized. Weekly scheduling has presented a challenge to planning patient care, particularly for those with cancer and who reside in regional and remote areas. Nursing coordinators have played a vital role in organizing and communicating schedule changes as well as reassuring patients. Management of COVID‐19 patients requiring surgery To date, no COVID‐19‐positive patient has required surgery at RPA. However, material efforts have been put into planning for this occurrence. A specific operating theatre has been designated to accommodate any COVID‐19‐positive patients, which contains laminar airflow with minimal distance between the operating theatre and re‐designed COVID‐19 clinic. Protocols regarding intubation and extubation have been developed by anaesthetics, as concerns exist regarding aerosolization of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 particles which can survive up to 3 h in aerosols.1 Patients will be recovered in theatre after surgery. Equally, all patients undergoing elective surgery are currently being screened with health questionnaires and temperature checks at entry onto hospital grounds. If patients fail to pass screening, then elective surgery is being postponed if clinically justifiable. In addition, protocols regarding the cleaning and disinfection of the operating theatre are being developed in accordance with the available instructions, which is critical given that severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 particles can survive up to 72 h on surfaces.1 Attention has also turned towards the potential risk of staff exposure during specific surgical procedures based on data showing that human immunodeficiency virus, human papilloma virus and activated Corynebacterium can be detected in surgical smoke.2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 In particular, the use of laparoscopy in COVID‐19 patients is concerning, as particle concentration in smoke generated during laparoscopy is higher than at open surgery.1, 2 Accordingly, the sudden release of trocar valves for venting, instrument exchanges or extraction incisions resulting in the brisk release of pneumoperitoneum could result in the exposure of operating theatre staff. These issues pose a significant challenge to the safe delivery of common minimally invasive general surgical procedures such as appendicectomy and cholecystectomy. Preliminary advice for the management of such scenarios is being provided,1, 6 but requires constant updating as the evidence grows. Alternate treatment decisions With reduced capacity, staff redeployment and rising concerns about safety, many alternative management options are being considered to accommodate the necessary changes to surgical care. For complex cancer patients, surgeons have commenced the difficult task of using alternative therapies such as systemic chemotherapy and radiation therapy where appropriate to buy more time until the patients can be scheduled for their procedure. The longer term impacts of this delay to surgical treatment will be monitored; however, it is also the delays to assessment that may be putting patients at risk and is more difficult to measure. Acute general surgical problems, such as appendicitis, diverticulitis and abscesses, are conditions that are continuing to require acute management during this period. Traditionally, appendicitis is treated surgically; however, medical management of acute uncomplicated appendicitis has been shown to be safe and effective in certain patients, and is currently being considered locally as an appropriate strategy in this climate. Similarly, routine outpatient management of acute uncomplicated diverticulitis has been proposed as compared to a short period (1–3 days) of inpatient antibiotic therapy which has been the usual practice at RPA until now. Likewise, abscesses are usually drained in the operating theatres. With reduced surgical services, these changes allow the surgical workforce to be effectively reallocated to manage these acute surgical presentations while minimizing the need for admissions or theatre‐based interventions. Finally, restricted access to face‐to‐face meetings in itself has posed decision‐making challenges for surgeons in clinically relevant forums such as multidisciplinary team meetings and for effective inter‐ and intra‐departmental communication. Multiple online conferencing platforms have bridged the gap for now allowing staff to work at home and in keeping with appropriate social distancing recommendations. Surgical education and training Further to the clinical and operational effects of COVID‐19, the crisis also presents a challenge to the ongoing provision of education and training for all staffing groups, but in particular our trainees within the Surgical and Education Training Program and those in non‐accredited positions. Their exposure to adequate case numbers will be severely limited for a sustained period of time and redeployment to directly assist in the COVID‐19 response has already taken priority. This has largely been within the COVID‐19 clinic but future demand may necessitate additional immediate training to participate in ICU and emergency department shifts. In addition, cancellation of face‐to‐face organized teaching sessions occurred within the first week of the response efforts. It is currently unclear what the longer term impact will be upon their career progression but it seems likely it will set all groups back by 6–12 months, and will have flow on effects to medical students. Local efforts are being made to shift face‐to‐face education and training towards online platforms to minimize the disruption where possible. Although this mode of delivery may not be as effective,8 it does present an opportunity for innovative approaches to be utilized. This has included the provision of take‐home suturing packs for self‐directed learning, the compilation of online teaching modules and the delivery of tutorials using various applications. Surgical research The impact of COVID‐19 on surgical research is inevitable, representing an unprecedented challenge to the strong academic programme established at RPA.9 A priority for the active surgical studies has been to ensure the safety and well‐being of patients, research participants, clinicians and researchers. Discontinuation or temporary suspension of current surgical research has been implemented where appropriate. Changes in the way interventions are being delivered along with alternative methods for patient recruitment, assessment and follow‐up are also being applied, including a reduction in face‐to‐face contact and the introduction of remote communication. Limitation of surgical services presents a significant research challenge as it may introduce bias into surgical studies, affect recruitment rates and periods, and compromise budgets. Guidance on how to manage this during the pandemic has been released.10 To contribute to the limited global evidence, efforts are being implemented to collect information on altered clinical decision‐making and surgical and patient‐reported outcomes, to allow us to comprehensively measure the effects of COVID‐19. At RPA, existing prospective cohort studies and surgical trials are being amended to capture the COVID‐19 status of patients where possible and this is recommended to take place in all centres to enhance our collective understanding. The CovidSurg Cohort Study is an international, multicentre, prospective cohort study investigating outcomes of surgery in patients with COVID‐19 and will be key to improving their surgical outcomes. Hospitals across Australia and New Zealand are encouraged to participate.11 Staff well‐being The disruption caused by COVID‐19 extends to having a detrimental impact on the well‐being of surgical staff at all levels and across all disciplines. This includes widespread distress and heightened anxiety being felt for a range of personal and organizational related reasons. Larger surgical units, such as upper gastrointestinal and colorectal surgery, have subdivided medical staff into smaller and strictly isolated teams in order to reduce the risk of an entire department becoming unwell or requiring home isolation at once, which whilst prudent has been difficult on staff. Local efforts to boost staff morale and encourage solidarity are being made through numerous innovative activities and close monitoring of staff welfare will need to continue throughout the crisis. Conclusion The response to the COVID‐19 pandemic at RPA is evolving rapidly and the number of confirmed cases is expected to continue rising. Strategies to address the challenges outlined above are being implemented quickly in an attempt to minimize the impact of COVID‐19 on surgical services; however, we are sailing in ‘uncharted waters’ with minimal data or past experiences on which to base decisions. Future post‐pandemic evaluations will likely demonstrate ineffective or unnecessary actions or missed opportunities. Lessons will be learned in retrospect and the impact of COVID‐19 is likely to have a lasting effect on how surgical services are delivered in Australia and New Zealand.

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          Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as Compared with SARS-CoV-1

          To the Editor: A novel human coronavirus that is now named severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (formerly called HCoV-19) emerged in Wuhan, China, in late 2019 and is now causing a pandemic. 1 We analyzed the aerosol and surface stability of SARS-CoV-2 and compared it with SARS-CoV-1, the most closely related human coronavirus. 2 We evaluated the stability of SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1 in aerosols and on various surfaces and estimated their decay rates using a Bayesian regression model (see the Methods section in the Supplementary Appendix, available with the full text of this letter at NEJM.org). SARS-CoV-2 nCoV-WA1-2020 (MN985325.1) and SARS-CoV-1 Tor2 (AY274119.3) were the strains used. Aerosols (<5 μm) containing SARS-CoV-2 (105.25 50% tissue-culture infectious dose [TCID50] per milliliter) or SARS-CoV-1 (106.75-7.00 TCID50 per milliliter) were generated with the use of a three-jet Collison nebulizer and fed into a Goldberg drum to create an aerosolized environment. The inoculum resulted in cycle-threshold values between 20 and 22, similar to those observed in samples obtained from the upper and lower respiratory tract in humans. Our data consisted of 10 experimental conditions involving two viruses (SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1) in five environmental conditions (aerosols, plastic, stainless steel, copper, and cardboard). All experimental measurements are reported as means across three replicates. SARS-CoV-2 remained viable in aerosols throughout the duration of our experiment (3 hours), with a reduction in infectious titer from 103.5 to 102.7 TCID50 per liter of air. This reduction was similar to that observed with SARS-CoV-1, from 104.3 to 103.5 TCID50 per milliliter (Figure 1A). SARS-CoV-2 was more stable on plastic and stainless steel than on copper and cardboard, and viable virus was detected up to 72 hours after application to these surfaces (Figure 1A), although the virus titer was greatly reduced (from 103.7 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter of medium after 72 hours on plastic and from 103.7 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter after 48 hours on stainless steel). The stability kinetics of SARS-CoV-1 were similar (from 103.4 to 100.7 TCID50 per milliliter after 72 hours on plastic and from 103.6 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter after 48 hours on stainless steel). On copper, no viable SARS-CoV-2 was measured after 4 hours and no viable SARS-CoV-1 was measured after 8 hours. On cardboard, no viable SARS-CoV-2 was measured after 24 hours and no viable SARS-CoV-1 was measured after 8 hours (Figure 1A). Both viruses had an exponential decay in virus titer across all experimental conditions, as indicated by a linear decrease in the log10TCID50 per liter of air or milliliter of medium over time (Figure 1B). The half-lives of SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1 were similar in aerosols, with median estimates of approximately 1.1 to 1.2 hours and 95% credible intervals of 0.64 to 2.64 for SARS-CoV-2 and 0.78 to 2.43 for SARS-CoV-1 (Figure 1C, and Table S1 in the Supplementary Appendix). The half-lives of the two viruses were also similar on copper. On cardboard, the half-life of SARS-CoV-2 was longer than that of SARS-CoV-1. The longest viability of both viruses was on stainless steel and plastic; the estimated median half-life of SARS-CoV-2 was approximately 5.6 hours on stainless steel and 6.8 hours on plastic (Figure 1C). Estimated differences in the half-lives of the two viruses were small except for those on cardboard (Figure 1C). Individual replicate data were noticeably “noisier” (i.e., there was more variation in the experiment, resulting in a larger standard error) for cardboard than for other surfaces (Fig. S1 through S5), so we advise caution in interpreting this result. We found that the stability of SARS-CoV-2 was similar to that of SARS-CoV-1 under the experimental circumstances tested. This indicates that differences in the epidemiologic characteristics of these viruses probably arise from other factors, including high viral loads in the upper respiratory tract and the potential for persons infected with SARS-CoV-2 to shed and transmit the virus while asymptomatic. 3,4 Our results indicate that aerosol and fomite transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is plausible, since the virus can remain viable and infectious in aerosols for hours and on surfaces up to days (depending on the inoculum shed). These findings echo those with SARS-CoV-1, in which these forms of transmission were associated with nosocomial spread and super-spreading events, 5 and they provide information for pandemic mitigation efforts.
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            Minimally Invasive Surgery and the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak: Lessons Learned in China and Italy

            As elective operations are being cancelled, and surgeons are called upon to perform only emergency or carcinological surgery, the precautions to take when operating on patients who are potentially or proven COVID-19 positive are of utmost importance. The novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) outbreak hit China in the beginning of December 2019, and ignited the headlines a few days later. Unexpected, unprecedented, and radical modifications have profoundly shaken the world since then. The economic shutdown in China cleared the map of China viewed from the sky, the halt in travel, counseled first within the country, then internationally, was too late to stop the diffusion outside of China, and meanwhile has destroyed enterprises such as Flybe, while changing the economy of airlines and airports the world over. Hospitals and medical structures, in China, then Korea, and now Italy and France, abound with people either infected, or afraid of being so. The stock of respiratory machines has never been used so prominently, while facial masks, visors of all sorts and handkerchiefs, wipes and tissues have never been expended more often, and are even depleted in certain regions. First in China, then in Europe, and in particular, in Italy, the sudden and rapidly exponential afflux of patients in need of management, simple or intensive care, or simply advice to stay where they were, became the omnipresent and urgent preoccupation of health care workers, essentially those based in hospitals. In China, make-shift neo-hospitals were built in unparalleled record-braking time spans, and in Europe, external triage tents, internal reshuffling of beds and usage radically modified the architecture of existing health facilities. Surgery has also evolved and changed radically, but over a 30-year span. How has the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) outbreak affected surgery in China and Italy and will affect the future of surgery tomorrow is the question of today. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recently published recommendations that were upgraded by the American College of Surgeons. 1 Both recommended to stop elective surgery and to take general precautions, but there was little on the pragmatic aspects of surgery. In laparoscopic surgery, an essential part of the technique is the establishment and maintenance of an artificial pneumoperitoneum; with this comes the risk of aerosol exposure for the operation team. Ultrasonic scalpels or electrical equipment commonly used in laparoscopic surgery can easily produce large amounts of surgical smoke, and in particular, the low-temperature aerosol from ultrasonic scalpels cannot effectively deactivate the cellular components of virus in patients. In previous studies, activated corynebacterium, papillomavirus, and HIV have been detected in surgical smoke 2–4 and several doctors contracted a rare papillomavirus 5 suspected to be connected to surgical smoke exposure. The risk of 2019-ncov infection aerosol should not be any exception. One study found that after using electrical or ultrasonic equipment for 10 minutes, the particle concentration of the smoke in laparoscopic surgery was significantly higher than that in traditional open surgery. 6 The reason may be that due to the low gas mobility in the pneumoperitoneum, the aerosol formed during the operation tends to concentrate in the abdominal cavity. Sudden release of trocar valves, non-air-tight exchange of instruments, or even small abdominal extraction incisions can potentially expose the health care team to the pneumoperitoneum aerosol; the risk is definitely higher in laparoscopic than in traditional open surgery. This outbreak thus poses a great challenge to the clinical work of surgeons who practice MIS. As the epidemic spreads and pandemics, we surgeons have the responsibility of raising the level of awareness, prevention, and control of transmission, not only for the current epidemic, but also, in general, as a principal for all surgeries. 7 Even if all elective surgery has been curtailed if not stopped in countries of the current pandemic, the risk is present for patients who require emergency surgery or operations for malignancy, and above all, for the surgeons and operating room staff who undertake these operations. We would like to share the following, based on our recent experience in Shanghai and Milan. 1) General protection: all surgery patients must complete preoperative health screening, whether they are symptomatic or not. As operating staffs might become infected, and therefore reduced in number, all medical personnel have to comply with the tertiary protection regulations. 8,9 2) Prevention and management of aerosol dispersal: during operations, whether laparoscopic or via laparotomy, instruments should be kept clean of blood and other body fluids. Special attention should be paid to the establishment of pneumoperitoneum, hemostasis, and cleaning at trocar sites or incisions to prevent any gush of body fluid caused by air leakage or uncontained laparotomy incisions. Liberal use of suction devices to remove smoke and aerosol during operations, and especially, before converting from laparoscopy to open surgery or any extra-peritoneal maneuver. Avoid using 2-way pneumoperitoneum insufflators to prevent pathogens colonization of circulating aerosol in pneumoperitoneum circuit or the insufflator. 3) Management of artificial pneumoperitoneum: keep intraoperative pneumoperitoneum pressure and CO2 ventilation at the lowest possible levels without compromising the surgical field exposure. Reduce the Trendelenburg position time as much as possible. This minimizes the effect of pneumoperitoneum on lung function and circulation, in an effort to reduce pathogen susceptibility. 4) Operation techniques: The power settings of electrocautery should be as low as possible. Avoid long dissecting times on the same spot by electrocautery or ultrasonic scalpels to reduce the surgical smoke. Special attention is warranted to avoid sharp injury or damage of protective equipment, in particular gloves and body protection. 5) Postoperative operating room and equipment management: all protocols involving postoperative cleaning and disinfection should comply with governmental and learned society instructions. 1,8,9 Devices used on infection-suspected or proven patients should undergo separate disinfection followed by proper labeling. It is mandatory to specifically label and dispose clinical wastes separately. 6) Ideally, hospitals should be immediately divided into 2 main categories: dedicated hubs for positive COVID-19 patients (with limited surgical staff and ORs, for those infected patients requiring surgery) and other both for emergency surgery and urgent oncological procedures in negative COVID 19 patients. Health authorities should allow surgical teams to move from one hospital to another. 7) Teaching and future recommendations: strengthen the awareness on the hazards caused by surgical smoke and the management of intraoperative aerosol. Strict protocols must be established for the creation and maintenance of laparoscopic pneumoperitoneum to reduce the occupation hazard caused by aerosol exposure. 8) Operating staff protection: efforts must be made to raise awareness of the occupation protection on operating staffs, including surgeons, anesthetists, and nurses and all possible transiting persons in the OR. Correct 2-way protective apparel (goggles, visor, mask, and body protective garb) should be routine. When engaging a suspected or diagnosed patient, tertiary dress code should be applied according to the protocols which also include strengthening OR ventilation and installing air purification equipment. 9) Preoperative health screening: to effectively battle against the possibility of prolonged 2019-nCOV outbreak, it is imperative to establish new standards of practice for admitting patients in the future. This should range from preoperative health screening to final differential diagnosis, including epidemiology investigation and adequate imaging. This outbreak not only raises challenges to MIS in terms of disease control today but also should remind surgeons that we need stronger occupational protection in the future. We must raise the level of awareness and protection measures for the risk of occupational exposure in laparoscopic but also traditional open surgery. There is an urgent need of a strict protocol to accurately manage the artificial pneumoperitoneum and the hazards of aerosol diffusion for surgeons.
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              Risk of acquiring human papillomavirus from the plume produced by the carbon dioxide laser in the treatment of warts.

              The documented presence of human papillomavirus DNA in the plume after carbon dioxide laser treatment of warts has raised questions about the risk of transmission of human papillomavirus to laser surgeons. We sought to define more clearly the risks to surgeons of acquiring warts from the CO2 laser plume. A comparative study was conducted between CO2 laser surgeons and two large groups of population-based control subjects (patients with warts in Olmsted County and at the Mayo Clinic from 1988 to 1992). Conclusions were drawn about the risks to surgeons of acquiring warts from the CO2 laser plume. There was no significant difference (p = 0.569) between the incidence of CO2 laser surgeons with warts (5.4%) and patients with warts in Olmsted County from 1988 to 1992 (4.9%). There was a significant difference between the incidence of plantar (p = 0.004), nasopharyngeal (p = 0.001), and genital and perianal warts (p = 0.004) in the study group and in patients with warts treated at the Mayo Clinic from 1988 to 1992. No significant difference was found between physicians who had acquired warts and those who were wart free, on the basis of the failure to use gloves (p = 0.418), standard surgical masks (p = 0.748), laser masks (p = 0.418), smoke evacuators (p = 0.564), eye protection (p = 0.196), or full surgical gowns (p = 0.216). Finally, the incidence rates of surgeons with warts per 1000 person-years did not increase significantly (p = 0.951) as the length of time that the CO2 laser was used to treat warts increased. When warts are grouped together without specification of anatomic site, CO2 laser surgeons are no more likely to acquire warts than a person in the general population. However, human papillomavirus types that cause genital warts seem to have a predilection for infecting the upper airway mucosa, and laser plume containing these viruses may represent more of a hazard to the surgeon.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                ANZ J Surg
                ANZ J Surg
                10.1111/(ISSN)1445-2197
                ANS
                Anz Journal of Surgery
                John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd (Melbourne )
                1445-1433
                1445-2197
                15 April 2020
                May 2020
                : 90
                : 5 ( doiID: 10.1111/ans.v90.5 )
                : 663-665
                Affiliations
                [ 1 ] RPA Institute of Academic Surgery Royal Prince Alfred Hospital and the University of Sydney Sydney New South Wales Australia
                [ 2 ] Surgical Outcomes Research Centre Sydney New South Wales Australia
                [ 3 ] Department of Colorectal Surgery Royal Prince Alfred Hospital Sydney New South Wales Australia
                [ 4 ] Department of Upper Gastrointestinal and Hepatobiliary Surgery Royal Prince Alfred Hospital Sydney New South Wales Australia
                [ 5 ] Faculty of Medicine and Health University of Sydney Sydney New South Wales Australia
                Author information
                https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4898-7230
                https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9715-860X
                https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2547-0204
                Article
                ANS15900
                10.1111/ans.15900
                7262155
                32259337
                dffc370c-bf26-4aae-9498-52f59db4b716
                © 2020 Royal Australasian College of Surgeons

                This article is being made freely available through PubMed Central as part of the COVID-19 public health emergency response. It can be used for unrestricted research re-use and analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source, for the duration of the public health emergency.

                History
                : 29 March 2020
                : 30 March 2020
                Page count
                Figures: 0, Tables: 0, Pages: 3, Words: 2246
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                May 2020
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