Introduction
One well-known challenge of working in multidisciplinary fields (such as global health
and health systems) is finding a language that is understandable, recognisable and
useable by people from varying backgrounds. Without such language, it is difficult
to have discussions that are necessary for multidisciplinary fields to grow and achieve
their purpose. Forging a common language requires deliberate effort. Having a widely
accepted framework can help, especially when accompanied by theories that connect
the categories within the framework.1 Even then, some issues or subfields require
working at a common language more than others — for example, governance, which, as
far as words and concepts go, is remarkably nebulous.2
In this edition of BMJ Global Health, Bigdeli et al
3 offer a promising framework; a ‘triangle of persons’, if you will, to explore hitherto
‘missing links’ in health system governance. Each of the three nodes of this triangle
is occupied by one category of persons, that is, policy-makers, providers and people.
This triangle began its life in the 2004 World Development Report,4 as a map of stakeholders
involved in accountability relations in the health system. It has gone through several
iterations, interpretations and applications.5–7 However, the current ‘triangle of
persons’ is particularly clear, detailed and succinct. It explores what happens between
the nodes. And more than previous iterations, it also explores what happens within
each node.
In an accompanying paper, Meessen celebrates a welcome reboot in the discourse on
and study of health system governance in global health8; a reboot that: (1) de-emphasises
normative preoccupations and instead emphasises empirical explorations of health system
governance; (2) makes governance more concrete by redefining it in terms of ‘making,
changing, monitoring and enforcing the formal and informal rules’2 that govern ‘collective
action and decision making in a system’; and (3) shifts focus from governments as
singular governing entities to a broader conception of who is involved in governance,
by focusing on the rules that determine and emanate from the collective agency of
constituted authorities and informal groups.
In this editorial essay, I will connect both works with a ‘triangle of rules’. I will
then use stylised accounts of experience and evidence to explain this ‘triangle of
rules’, illustrate its application and the complementary advantage of using it alongside
the ‘triangle of persons’. These stylised accounts point at potential middle-range
theories and empirical explorations of even more ‘missing links’ in health system
governance.
The triangle of persons
It is likely that the expression ‘triangle of persons’ was first used in 19799 by
Malan, who put together two triangles (figure 1) to provide a simple, universal framework
for psychoanalytic (or psychodynamic) psychotherapy. One of them, the ‘triangle of
persons’, depicts relationships between a patient and three sets of persons—the past
‘significant persons’ (eg, parents), the therapist and the current ‘significant persons’
(eg, spouse). The next is the ‘triangle of conflicts’. The ‘triangle of conflicts’
is less tangible, but it is no less consequential. It depicts what animates relationships
among persons: defences (eg, changing and minimising the subject), anxieties (eg,
worry and panic) and feelings (eg, anger and grief). The ‘triangle of conflicts’ shows
how defences and anxieties can block the expression of feelings. The ‘triangle of
persons’ shows how these patterns of behaviour began with past significant persons,
are maintained with current significant persons and get played out with the therapist.9
Each node of one triangle is linked to the corresponding node on the other triangle.
Figure 1
The two triangles to represent what happens in psychoanalytic (or psychodynamic) psychotherapy:
defences and anxieties can block the expression of true feelings; and these patterns
began with past persons, are maintained with current persons and are often enacted
with the therapist.
Frameworks aim to simplify, to clarify. Malan’s triangles are no exception. Each triangle
was not originally developed by Malan. But by putting them together, Malan achieved
a framework with an explanatory power that far surpasses that of each triangle, when
used separately.10 The triangles continue to be used today.11 12 They may be criticised
for their tendency to oversimplify. But what having two triangles in the framework
demonstrates is that there are limits to simplification. One triangle was too simple
to capture the necessary complexity involved in psychotherapy. This is also the case
with the ‘triangle of persons’ put forward by Bigdeli et al. Like Malan’s triangles,
the health system governance ‘triangle of persons’ requires a second, complementary
triangle. Alone, its explanatory power to reveal the missing links and capture the
complexity of health system governance will likely remain limited. Indeed, there is
much more to health system governance than can be revealed or captured in one triangle—perhaps
not even two.
The triangle of rules
The distinction between the ‘triangle of persons’ and the ‘triangle of rules’ is subtle.
Like Malan’s triangles, one is of persons, and the other is about what governs their
actions, decisions and relations (figure 2). The ‘triangle of rules’ is about the
rules that persons make, change, monitor and enforce; the rules that govern their
actions, decisions and relations; and the rules that emanate from those actions, relations
and decisions. I have used this ‘triangle of rules’, often implicitly, in my own work
and also in reinterpreting others’ work. The ‘triangle of rules’ was inspired by the
Institutional Analysis and Development framework, which was developed by Elinor Ostrom
and colleagues,13 14 even though they did not conceive of any aspect of their framework
as a triangle, but as ‘three worlds of action’15 or ‘three levels of rules’.11 Before
sharing how one may use the ‘triangle of rules’ and illustrate its potential, I will
first describe what occupies its three nodes (operational, collective and constitutional
rules) and what happens in the spaces between them (figure 3).
Figure 2
The two triangles represent what happens in health system governance: policy-makers,
people and provider make, change, monitor and enforce (formal and informal) rules,
which may be constitutional, collective and operational rules, and these rules in
turn influence their actions, decisions and relations.
Figure 3
The ‘triangle of rules’ showing bi-directional relationships between each of the nodes
of the triangle with the other two nodes, using the example of rules that govern service
delivery within a community.
Operational rules
emerge from individual choices and the market forces of demand and supply. They determine
how individual health system actors implement practical day-to-day decisions; how,
for example, market rules (in the form of prices), informal rules (eg, social norms)
and formal rules (eg, government regulations) determine how people in a community
seek, use (ie, demand) and provide (ie, supply) health and social services. Operational
rules are influenced by collective rules and constitutional rules. Constitutional
rules may directly influence operational rules. Constitutional rules may also influence
operational rules indirectly through their influence on collective rules.14–18
Collective rules
are typically made by ‘close-to-ground’ governing entities, which may be informal
or formally constituted. Collective rules influence day-to-day operational activities
on the demand and supply side. On the demand side, ‘close-to-ground’ governing entities
include community groups or representatives, such as community health committees,
religious groups or women’s groups. On the supply side, ‘close-to-ground’ governing
entities may include locally based professional groups, for example, of midwives or
traditional birth attendants. They may also include close-to-ground governments, for
example, a district government or local council (when operating at a small scale).
Of note, how collective rules are made, changed, monitored and enforced is often determined
(especially when they are formal rules) by another category of rules—constitutional
rules. In addition, to reach the operational level, constitutional rules may pass
through and be modified by collective governance actors.14–18
Constitutional rules
are made, typically at a distance, by governments and government-like entities such
as large and influential non-governmental organisations or religious organisations
with national (or large scale) jurisdiction and reach. Constitutional rules can determine
who has the power to make operational rules and on what terms such persons make operational
rules. They can also determine who has the power to make collective rules and on what
terms. Constitutional rules can also determine how rules at the collective and operational
nodes (or levels) are made, changed, monitored and enforced.14–18
The rules-in-use (de facto rules) at the operational level may diverge significantly
from rules-in-form (de jure rules) at the constitutional level. An important mediator
of that gap is actors at the collective level.14 17 For example, consider the operational
rule that determines the opening hours for outpatient services in a public sector
health facility. Constitutional rule-making entities (say, policy-makers at the capital
city) may decide that the operational rule should be 09:00 to 17:00. Or they may decide
that such a rule should be made at the collective level, say by the council of chiefs
(or by the governing board of each health facility or by the health committee in each
community). And the council of chiefs may, in turn, decide that such a rule should
instead be made by operational level actors; say the manager or health worker in charge
of the facility.
In a scenario in which such a rule is only made, changed, monitored and enforced at
the constitutional level, two problems may arise. First, constitutional actors are
distant from this health facility and may not be able to monitor and enforce this
09:00 to 17:00 rule. Second, distant constitutional level actors may also be unable
to use information and feedback from the community to make and change rules in a way
that is responsive to the needs and preferences of people in the community. Women
in the community may be dissatisfied with the 09:00 to 17:00 rule, perhaps because
on market days, they are unable to take their children for immunisation during those
hours. So, on those days, they want the health facility to open earlier, at say 07:00,
so that they can visit the immunisation clinic before heading to the market.
If constitutional actors are distant and ineffective, collective-level actors may
play the role of changing this rule whether or not they have a constitutional mandate
to do so. But what if collective actors are also absent or too disengaged; say, a
council of chiefs that does not care? What you then have is a situation in which the
de facto rules (rules-in-use) that govern opening hours may depend only on relationships
between demand and supply operational actors. Health workers may do what the women
want because their income, sense of fulfilment or social standing depends on it; because
it is convenient for them to open early and close early on market days, so they too
can shop at the market, or in exchange for a bribe or informal charges.
Using the triangle of rules
In my experience, four attributes of rules are worth bearing in mind when using the
‘triangle of rules’ to analyse and explain the impacts of governance on health system
performance: (1) rules are best analysed from the bottom up, beginning with operational
rules; (2) as health systems are complex and adaptive, rules at different levels function
in dynamic balance with one another; (3) rules are mediated by distance and scale;
and (4) the power to make, change, monitor and enforce rules may be concentrated or
disperse.
1. Rules are analysed from the bottom up
The inquiry begins from the operational level. It is where individuals make choices
and where rules-in-form transform into rules-in-use. Seeing clearly what shapes and
determines rules-in-use from the bottom up can make alternative approaches to addressing
governance problems more visible. The question that animates such an inquiry is—what
are the rules-in-use at the operational level? Are they rules from the operational
arena (eg, the interplay of demand and supply)? Are they rules from the constitutional
level? Are they from the collective arena? Or did they result from a combination of
processes at two or all three levels? The exploration shines a light on informality;
on how rules-in-use diverge from rules-in-form. The question may be why are people
in a community seeking care from inappropriate healthcare providers (eg, unlicensed
drug sellers, traditional birth attendants, healers or bonesetters) so much that they
ignore or take too long to make their way to appropriate providers?19–22
Notably, the answer may be found among three sets of contextual factors (see the matrix
in figure 4): socioeconomic context (eg, inability to afford formal providers means
that people would rather ‘shop around’ at informal providers); geographical context
(eg, the large size of the village means there are many informal providers, and for
many in the community, it is difficult to physically access a single formal provider);
and institutional (ie, rules-in-use) context of the local healthcare market (eg, the
constitutional rules to regulate informal providers are neither monitored nor enforced).14–17
23 Interacting with one another, all these contextual factors combine to promote or
inhibit the emergence of trust, power and accountability relations, which also strongly
influence the choice of provider. When constitutional rules are not monitored and
enforced, the rules of the marketplace may dominate at the operational level. Or collective
rules may dominate. The collective rules may be a ‘professional code’ among informal
providers such that, even if constitutional rules are neither monitored nor enforced,
they may continue to refer to formal providers as appropriate.
Figure 4
The ‘matrix’ showing ‘rules-in-use’ as one of three categories of context: rules-in-use
are influenced by the three categories of rules, all of which together influence (are,
in turn, influenced by) the three categories of context. The three categories of rules
influence the three categories of context through how they influence the provision
of public goods, the definition and protection of rights, and the facilitation of
social exchange.
A strategy to address the problem may be to change existing rules that govern informal
providers so that they refer their clients to formal providers or work alongside formal
providers. Another may be to spread information about the costs of inappropriate care
in the community so people can change their care-seeking behaviours. But these strategies
require changing local norms (ie, informal rules), which can take decades to change.20
22 A third strategy is to change constitutional rules to enable the supply of more
formal providers or reduce out-of-pocket costs of care at formal providers. But these
require political engagement strong enough to alter those constitutional rules. A
fourth strategy is to improve the monitoring and enforcement of the constitutional
rules that limit informal providers. But entrenched local norms and informal practices
are hard to regulate at a distance.21 22 With a large distance between the constitutional
and operational levels, it may be more effective to strengthen collective actors to
make new rules or change existing ones in ways they can monitor and enforce.
2. Rules function in a dynamic balance
In health systems, rules help to achieve three purposes2 23 24: (a) to provide public
goods, for example, rules on using taxes and other collective resources to provide
a social safety net and health infrastructures, such as health workers, health facilities
and access roads; (b) to define and protect rights, for example, rules that define
and protect the rights and conditions under which individuals and communities benefit
from a resource, including the right to access, use and manage public goods such as
health facilities and services; and (c) to facilitate social exchange, for example,
rules to maximise the benefits from resources and relations, including rules to ensure
that information, regulation and coordination work to align demand with supply and
vice versa.
Notably, each set of rules may originate from any of the three levels of governance
(figure 4)17 24 functioning in a dynamic balance to achieve these three sets of goals.17
23 The rules for facilitating transactions, and thus promoting the use of formal providers
could be made at any or a combination of the three levels of governance. However,
when rules are effectively made, changed, monitored and enforced from the constitutional
level, there is less role for collective rules, and so constitutional rules would
often obtain at the operational level.17 18 23 But the weaker the constitutional level,
the more the roles for collective and operational levels. In some instances, this
may occur by default. And in others, constitutional actors may deliberately configure
the rules such that some are made, changed, monitored and enforced at the collective
level, and others at the operational level.
Let us consider another example. Health worker absenteeism. One set of rules determines
how many health workers are available in a health system or within a country—that
is, rules that provide public goods. Another set of rules determines who has access
to those health workers (eg, rules that define the access of rural communities to
health workers; say, the rules governing the posting and transfer of health workers
to rural communities)—that is, rules that define and protect rights. And yet, another
set of rules determine how, once in a community, people access the services which
are provided by the health workers—are people aware that health workers are available,
what time of day they are available, are they available when the community is able
to access them, do they provide high-quality services and are they responsive to the
people—that is, rules that facilitate social exchange.19 20 23 25
To understand high levels of rural health worker absenteeism, the analyst asks: Are
there no rules governing operating hours? (unlikely) Are the constitutional rules
not monitored or enforced? (more likely) Are there collective rules that govern operating
hours which then allow health workers to be present only when the community needs
them most? Are they absent because rules protecting the rights of rural communities
to the health workers are inadequate? Are they left to sort out their accommodation
when transferred to rural communities? Are they without a travel allowance? Is the
collective level of governance absent such that health workers at the operational
level make their own rules?20 25–29 The ‘triangle of rules’ helps to explore how absenteeism
(as are other governance issues) is a complex and adaptive phenomenon. When one level
of governance fails, the extent of effects of the failure can be assuaged or compensated
for by governance at another level.17 18
3. Rules have a distance and scale effect
In complex and adaptive systems, rules (or institutions) have epistemic properties.
In other words, the ways in which rules relate with one another within health systems
(ie, institutional arrangements or rule configurations); have different capacities
to generate the knowledge and feedback necessary to make, change, monitor and enforce
rules effectively, equitably and responsively.17 30 31 Of note is the distance that
may exist between constitutional or collective level and the operational level, and
the scale or number of operational units which are the subject of rules. Distance
and scale, mediated by power and resources, influence how governance actors use local
knowledge and feedback to make, change, monitor and enforce rules.
Take two related scenarios. In the first, the governance of hospitals in a country
was decentralised from a national ministry of health to subnational governments.32
Predecentralisation, there were, say, 50 hospitals, all run from the ‘distant’ national
ministry of health, that is, with rules from the constitutional level of governance.
But each hospital had a governing board, that is, the collective level of governance.
Prior to decentralisation, the ‘proximate’ boards exercised power and discretion in
the operational rules governing the day-to-day activities of each hospital. This was
in part because the centre was far away from most of the 50 hospitals, thus diminishing
the ability of the national ministry of health to make, change, monitor and enforce
rules for all 50 hospitals. By design or default, much responsibility to make, change,
monitor and enforce rules fell to the boards. But with decentralisation, constitutional
governance shifted to 50 locations across the country, which are now ‘proximate’ to
each hospital. Previously influential, each of the 50 hospital boards (collective
level) then becomes much less powerful, as the operational day-to-day rules are made,
changed, monitored and enforced more directly at (newly decentralised) constitutional
levels, that is, by subnational governments, leading to ‘re-centralisation’ and poorer
hospital performance.17 32 33
Now, consider an alternative, almost opposite scenario, in which the governance of
primary healthcare facilities was decentralised from an existing subnational government
to community health committees.34 35 Predecentralisation, the day-to-day operational
decisions were determined by the constitutional rules made by the subnational ministry
of health for, say, the 50 primary healthcare facilities within the subnational jurisdiction.
There was little or no role for collective governance by community health committees.
With decentralisation, ‘proximate’ community health committees (one for each of the
50 health facilities) make, change, monitor and enforce the rules governing the finances
of their own health facility. As a result, the performance of the health facilities
so governed improves relative to when decisions were predominantly made at the constitutional
level.17 34 35
In both scenarios, what is at play is not just proximity. There is also a scale or
numbers effect. Before decentralisation, the governing entity looked after 50 operational
units, which effectively dilutes its effectiveness to make, change, monitor and enforce
rules. Postdecentralisation, governing entities oversee only one operational unit
each. With decentralisation to subnational governments, stronger constitutional governance
can reduce the responsibility exercised by default or delegation at the collective
level of governance. And with decentralisation to community health committees, stronger
collective governance can promote local community autonomy and health facility performance.17
4. Rules have a concentration effect
The power to make, change, monitor and enforce rules at the operational level can
vary from the concentrated power of a private-sector provider who makes and changes
rules without consulting another authority (eg, where the constitutional level is
weak and there is no governing board of community members), to more diffuse arrangements
where a board of governors or a coalition of users is responsible for collective governance,
but with effective (even if distant) constitutional governance actors.33 The rules
configuration is diffuse when they are made, changed, monitored and enforced at more
than one level rather than only one, and when there is space for contestation among
actors across the three levels of governance.17
Consider a private-sector health facility that is operated without a governing board
of community members in a setting where the government is distant or weak.17 36 37
In such a private facility, there is essentially a collapse (or folding into one)
of rules; a concentration of the power to make, change, monitor and enforce rules.
The operational rules may reflect only whatever the owner decides the constitutional
rules are, especially when it is an ‘on-site’ owner who is also the lead service provider.
When off-site, the gap between constitutional rules (as interpreted by the owner)
and operational rules may depend on the proximity of the owner.17 Or consider a health
facility owned by a religious or ethnic organisation, with a governing board of community
members who are also members of that same religious organisation or ethnicity, with
constitutional rules made by the national leader of the religious organisation or
ethnic group, supported by subnational deputies. Consider also that the health workers
in that facility are also predominantly members of the religion or ethnicity. Here,
although the three levels of government are present, the lack of diversity means that
in effect, the power to make, change, monitor and enforce rules may remain concentrated.17
In such settings of concentrated power, it may be more or less easy for operational
rules to align with local needs and realities, depending on socioeconomic and geographical
factors. For example, our on-site owner of a private health facility may be governed
only by the rules of the marketplace and may prioritise only the segment of the community
that is able to afford high service charges. In contrast, our ethnic or religious
service provider, governed by the predominant social values of one religion or ethnic
group, may be deemed responsive to local needs, but only if the community that relies
on the provider for health services is homogeneous ethnically or in following that
religion. Notably, the presence of collective level actors (eg, on the demand side
in the form of a governing board of community members or as professional, norm-setting
association of health workers) is not enough to guarantee making, changing, monitoring
and enforcing rules. Their management rights need to be well defined and protected.38
39 They need to have the capacity to make, change, monitor and enforce rules, and
the geographical circumstances need to be sufficiently favourable.23 40
Thinking in two triangles
In my experience, there are three sets of potential advantages to using the ‘triangle
of rules’ alongside the ‘triangle of persons’: (1) by focusing on information, it
complements the ‘triangle of persons’ that focuses on accountability; (2) by focusing
on structure, it complements the ‘triangle of persons’ that focuses on agency; and
(3) by focusing on rules, it allows for the same person or groups of persons to take
position at different nodes of the triangle, depending on the rules they influence
and the rules that influence them.
1. Information and accountability
The ‘triangle of rules’ requires that analysts put information (and knowledge and
feedback) on a similar pedestal as accountability.41 42 Due to its origins, the ‘triangle
of persons’ focuses on accountability.4 Rules generate and stem from accountability.
But while information is necessary for accountability, it can also work simply by
actors knowing the right thing to do and how.43 This is a fertile ground for comparative
analyses: for example, what is the optimal strategy to improve governance—focus on
information or accountability, or both? Is the answer different for various settings,
functions or scales? What role can technology play in improving governance, given
its potential to alter the epistemic properties of rule configurations? For example,
technology can change the meaning of proximity if it makes monitoring and enforcement
of rules at a distance less costly,16 36 37 41 which may also lead to less flexibility
and freedom to determine rules-in-use locally.
The ‘triangle of rules’ also has the potential to expose the analyst to their own
limited knowledge, compel (through systems thinking) the analyst to assume the standpoint
of many ‘others’44 and thus enable a richer appreciation of the complex and adaptive
nature of health systems. The positionality (pose) of the analyst matters.45 46 For
example, how well can analysts see the granularity of rules at a distance?1 47 Using
the ‘triangle of rules’ can remind the analyst of the limits to their sight when trying
to see at a distance or with limited information on the granular details of context.
2. Structure and agency
The ‘triangle of persons’ focuses on what persons do, that is, agency, whereas the
‘triangle of rules’ focuses on the institutional structures that constrain and enable
such agency. In the eternal debate on the relative importance of structure vs agency,48
49 an analyst may assume that their potential to change peoples’ choices is greater
than their potential to change the rules that constrain or enable those choices. However,
trying to change people without changing rules (eg, by appealing to ‘the better angels
of their nature’) may have less potential to be effective (especially when acting
at a distance) than trying to change structures. Global health typically involves
acting ‘at a distance’,50 often with less than optimal local knowledge or agency or
stake (ie, ‘skin in the game’). Perhaps, what an analyst can best offer at a distance
are design features, based on bottom-up synthesis, and abstraction of learning and
insight from comparative analyses across settings.47 51 52
This tension often goes unacknowledged: What can a distant (or foreign) analyst really
say about governance? What are the limits? The triangle of rules sheds light on potential
strategies to alter structure—for example, on how to decentralise governance in a
way that facilitates community engagement in governance.43 53 But the closer governing
the entities are to the ground, the more prone to, say, nepotism, and the lower the
ability of central governing entities to impose beneficial equalising measures top
down.43 The ‘triangle of rules’ may inform comparative analyses to identify ‘optimal’
points for decentralised governance while minimising negative consequences—a design
feature (ie, structure) that may be understood in the abstract and influenced at a
distance.52
3. Rules and persons
Thinking in two triangles also requires analysts to shift back and forth between persons
and rules. In doing so, rules allow persons to be moved, between nodes, depending
on the rules they influence, the rules that influence them—the governance issue under
consideration.18 The same person may function as a service provider or user (operational),
a community leader (collective) and a legislator (constitutional). Likewise, the same
governing entity may also function at different levels depending on size and distance:
the council of chiefs in a town of 2000 people may function at the collective level
of governance. If the town grows to a population of 200 000 people, the council of
chiefs may then function at the constitutional level of governance. And while two
towns may have similar governing entities by name (eg, each with its own council of
chiefs), the different sizes of each town may mean that each council makes different
kinds of rules.17 In a large town where the council is distant from the operational
level, it may function at the constitutional level, with smaller self-organising community
entities emerging to take on collective governance.
In addition, analysis can be conducted at varying scales, for example, from the governance
of a district health system to a national health system, even the dynamics of global
health governance, for example, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, personal protective
equipment is now governed by global markets (operational level), but also at the collective
level (eg, groups of countries coming together, or not, to govern the market to promote
collective good) and the constitutional level (potentially through the WHO or using
the ‘constitutional’ rules contained in the International Health Regulations).54
Conclusion
What is said of models is true of frameworks; all frameworks are partial, but some
are useful. Together with the ‘triangle of rules’, the health system governance ‘triangle
of persons’ is more useful. The need for such a second triangle is not peculiar, as
in the case of Malan’s two triangles used in psychoanalytic psychotherapy. However,
there is yet another, although less apparent, instance of a two-triangle framework.
One cannot, must not, write about triangles in health systems or global health without
paying much-deserved homage to the most widely used of them all—Walt and Gilson’s
policy analysis triangle,55 which, indeed, also demonstrates the limits of a single
triangle. In addition to the three nodes of the policy analysis triangle—context,
content and process—Walt and Gilson included actors (ie, ‘persons’) in their various
roles as individuals, groups and organisations.56 It could easily have been a ‘triangle
of persons’, thus, making two triangles (figure 5).
Figure 5
The policy analysis triangle(s) showing the multitude of factors (context, content
and process) affecting policy and the relations among these factors, and ‘persons’
interacting as individuals, or as part of groups, and organisations to influence the
policy context, content and process.
One triangle is not enough. The ‘triangle of rules’ highlights often ignored features
of health systems that are worth keeping in mind in efforts to understand and improve
their governance, features that can easily be missing if or when the ‘triangle of
persons’ is used alone. In making the case for this complementary ‘triangle of rules’,
I have pointed at potential middle-range theories, transferable insights and lines
of inquiry, which may animate comparative analyses of health system governance and
also inform efforts to strengthen it.57–59 What I have tried to do in this editorial
essay, as Ronald Coase once said, ‘has been to urge the inclusion in our analysis,
of features of the (health) system so obvious that… they have tended to be overlooked’.60
The language of rules (or institutions) and their configurations (or arrangements),
the middle-range theories they suggest, and the analytical stance they require, may
yet improve our analysis of health system governance.