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      Evolution Game and Simulation Analysis of Disturbance Emergency Disposal of In-Flight Cabin: China Civil Aviation Security Strategy Study

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      Sustainability
      MDPI AG

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          Abstract

          The disturbance of disruptive passengers in the cabin seriously affects aviation security in China. Reducing the occurrence of disturbances in the cabin is an inevitable choice to strengthen the security of civil aviation in China and improve the emergency disposal of airlines. Therefore, this paper investigates the strength of government support, the benefits of cooperation and the punishment of disposers, and uses the event tree method to analyze the relevant subjects affecting the consequences of cabin disruptions. To this end, a cabin disturbance emergency management game model comprised of regulatory authority, airline security and disruptive passengers was then established. The results of the game playing and simulation highlight the inherent relationships in emergency management in China’s civil aviation. First, the choice of behavior of the regulatory authority and disruptive passengers are mainly influenced by the strategy of airline security. Second, the strength of support from the regulatory authority determines whether the airline security can dispose of the passengers successfully. Third, the disruptive inclination of disruptive passengers is directly influenced by the intensity of punishment by airport police. Finally, an empirical analysis and simulation is conducted with the example of using an open flame or smoking in the cabin. This study provides new ideas for enhancing aviation security and improving emergency management.

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          Most cited references36

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          Evolutionary Games in Economics

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            Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions

            Significance Evolving populations are constantly subjected to changing environmental conditions. The environment can determine how the expression of traits affects the individuals possessing them. Just as important, however, is the fact that the expression of traits can also alter the environment. We model this phenomenon by introducing game transitions into classical models of evolutionary dynamics. Interacting individuals receive payoffs from the games that they play, and these games can change based on past actions. We find that game transitions can significantly reduce the critical benefit-to-cost threshold for cooperation to evolve in social dilemmas. This result improves our understanding of when cooperators can thrive in nature, even when classical results predict a high critical threshold.
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              Evolutionary dynamics of complex multiple games

              Evolutionary game theory has been successful in describing phenomena from bacterial population dynamics to the evolution of social behaviour. However, it has typically focused on a single game describing the interactions between individuals. Organisms are simultaneously involved in many intraspecies and interspecies interactions. Therefore, there is a need to move from single games to multiple games. However, these interactions in nature involve many players. Shifting from 2-player games to multiple multiplayer games yield richer dynamics closer to natural settings. Such a complete picture of multiple game dynamics (MGD), where multiple players are involved, was lacking. For multiple multiplayer games—where each game could have an arbitrary finite number of players and strategies, we provide a replicator equation for MGD having many players and strategies. We show that if the individual games involved have more than two strategies, then the combined dynamics cannot be understood by looking only at individual games. Expected dynamics from single games is no longer valid, and trajectories can possess different limiting behaviour. In the case of finite populations, we formulate and calculate an essential and useful stochastic property, fixation probability. Our results highlight that studying a set of interactions defined by a single game can be misleading if we do not take the broader setting of the interactions into account. Through our results and analysis, we thus discuss and advocate the development of evolutionary game(s) theory, which will help us disentangle the complexity of multiple interactions.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                SUSTDE
                Sustainability
                Sustainability
                MDPI AG
                2071-1050
                June 2023
                June 02 2023
                : 15
                : 11
                : 9029
                Article
                10.3390/su15119029
                e2f69b65-fb13-4743-a45b-a07f7a157dbb
                © 2023

                https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

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