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      Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence

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      Journal of Political Economy
      University of Chicago Press

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          Journal
          Journal of Political Economy
          Journal of Political Economy
          University of Chicago Press
          0022-3808
          1537-534X
          June 1992
          June 1992
          : 100
          : 3
          : 468-505
          Article
          10.1086/261826
          e343fbed-f813-430d-af72-e6c7ef1ef608
          © 1992
          History

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