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      Incentivizing Spectrum Sharing via Subsidy Regulations

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          Abstract

          Traditional regulatory methods for spectrum licensing have been recently identified as one of the causes for the under-utilization of the valuable radio spectrum. Governmental agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) are seeking ways to remove stringent regulatory barriers and facilitate broader access to the spectrum resources. The goal is to allow for an improved and ubiquitous sharing of the precious radio spectrum between commercial service providers. In this paper, we propose a novel noncooperative game theoretic approach, to show how to foster more sharing of the radio spectrum via the use of regulatory power. We define a two stage game in which the government regulators move first, followed by the providers. The providers are incentivized by lower spectrum allocation fees from the regulators in return for proof-of-sharing. The providers are offered discounted spectrum bands, potentially at different locations, but will be asked to provide coverage to users that are not subscribed to them so as to maintain their subsidy incentives from the government. In a simplification of the model, analytical expressions for the providers' perfect equilibrium strategies are derived, and we argue for the existence of the government's part of a perfect equilibrium. Our analysis shows that through subsidization, the government can provide small service providers a fair chance to compete with the large providers, thereby avoiding monopolization in the market.

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          Most cited references 5

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          An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games

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            Harmful Interference and Its Role in Spectrum Policy

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              On the nature of revenue-sharing contracts to incentivize spectrum-sharing

               R BERRY,  M. HONIG,  T. NGUYEN (2013)
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                2014-11-19
                2014-11-24
                Article
                1411.5302

                http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/

                Custom metadata
                Technical report
                cs.NI cs.GT

                Theoretical computer science, Networking & Internet architecture

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