Double-Shuffle
Richard Horton, The Lancet’s1 editor-in-chief, has delivered a swift response to Covid-19.
Mid-pandemic, the world is suffering post-traumatic stress disorder as leaders and
medical experts appear incoherent and disorganized. Academics also scramble to respond
and are producing manifold coronavirus publications. Horton’s The Covid-19 Catastrophe:
What’s Gone Wrong and How to Stop it Happening Again (2020) has managed to stand out
for its sharp polemic (Knight 2020). Horton denounces Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw
funding from the World Health Organization (WHO) as a crime against humanity and accuses
Boris Johnson of misconduct in public office. But while being critical of governments
for failing their nations, his rebuttal, in my opinion, could have gone further in
exposing the rotten nexus of techno-capitalism, the medical industry, and politics
at the core of the health crisis. Horton has authority, acumen and social conscience.
But his reluctance to strike out more explicitly against the marketisation of national
health provision is what sociologist Stuart Hall (2003) might have called a ‘double-shuffle.’
At the time of writing this review, the coronavirus has caused over 549,749 deaths
and reached 12 million cases globally (BBC News 2020). It has battered economies,
public and private sectors. Covid-19 demonstrates the need for health services to
care for the many rather than the few. But there are few signs that this pandemic
will lead to increased spending on public healthcare, as Trump presses ahead with
‘terminating’ the Affordable Care Act (Woodward 2020). Britain’s National Health Service
(NHS) was irreversibly reduced by Thatcherism in the 1980s and undone further by backdoor
privatisation throughout the 2000s (Hall 2011). During the current coronavirus crisis,
key workers, doctors and nurses are applauded as heroes. This is poignant and well-deserved
but negates from the behind-the-scenes’ trashing of public funding for health services,
medical science and academic research. Rather than the Covid-19 emergency strengthening
of national health services, we are more likely to end up with the reverse. Simultaneously,
the WHO’s, doctors’ and scientists’ ability to speak effectively on the issues continues
to be undermined and effectively muzzled. Horton conveys that the current pandemic
is also a discursive crisis.
Philosophy of Fear
Horton points out that Covid-19 is triggering a domino fall of experts’ reputations,
officials shirking responsibilities, and politicians pivoting. Trump has blamed China
and the WHO. Horton blames Trump, the British government and ineffectual leaders,
incensed by the nonsense shouted and tweeted by Trump, Johnson, and Jair Bolsonaro
in Brazil. But their voters, who are also experiencing intense economic, social and
health insecurity, evidently crave solutions, digestible promises and easy to blame
targets in this undeniable emergency. Therefore, to understand the extent to which
the Covid-19 pandemic is also a political crisis, we need to reflect more critically
on why millions of people, suffering economic hardships, health dangers and environmental
catastrophe, vote for parties who capitalise on hyper-inequalities and divisive individualism.
Horton understands that human beings can be driven by anxiety, as he quotes Lars Svendsen’s
A Philosophy of Fear (2008) and returns to him in the final chapter. He also realises
that crisis plays an instrumental role in global history. Yet, the discursive emergency
is not only top-down. What Horton underestimates, in my view, is the professional
classes’ acquiescence of the brazen neoliberal cruelty in marketising human life,
health and the attack on the state sector. Henry Giroux (2011), amongst other critical
pedagogues, has written about the strategic undermining of state education. He suggests
neoliberalism, or the logic of marketisation; chips away at investments into the physical
buildings, playing fields and precious physical resources; and also erodes the frameworks
and vocabularies for thinking and talking about education (Giroux in Jandrić 2017).
Insights from Giroux, concerning neoliberalism’s cultural apparatus for dismantling
material and discursive infrastructure, indicate that the Covid-19 emergency is therefore,
in part, the result of the loss of state funding for health services as well as the
wearing away of collective thinking about health planning and reactions to pandemics.
Throughout the book’s seven chapters, Horton articulates some of these issues around
the interconnections of state, health, politics and economics. There are sprinklings
of political theory: Benthamite history; Foucauldian philosophy of surveillance culture;
Didier Fassin’s (2018) public-health anthropology, addressing the racialised and discriminatory
biopolitics of life and otherness; and reference to Slavoj Žižek’s (2020) musings
on the Covid-19 pandemic. Horton’s style is accessible as he maps some of the political,
social and medical practices that enmesh the world in crisis. He provides a listing
of who has done what, has not done anything or has been misrepresented during the
pandemic, while hinting at controversies surrounding The Lancet’s slow response and
lack of fact checking (Wilson 2020). His ambitious spread of information is delivered
to readers as heated rhetoric. While this position of anger is no doubt justifiable,
considering governments’ mismanagement of the health crisis, it is also (ironically)
indicative of the current Zeitgeist of Trumpian hot retort.
Horton’s coverage is fast and furious, ranging from the pandemic’s emergence in China’s
Wuhan province, the slow international response to the warnings, the paradox of science’s
success and failure, key workers on the frontline, politics of Covid-19, the continuing
risk of pandemics and preparing for futures public health emergencies. He defends
Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the WHO’s director-general, since Dr. Tedros (along
with China) has been branded by Trump as the pandemic’s fall guy. Trump is a leading
figure in Horton’s book as lengthy Trump quotes fill the pages. While these ill-formed
and often downright offensive responses to the pandemic are certainly bizarre, many
readers will be already aware of such ‘Trumpisms.’ Arguably, Trump’s scapegoating
of China is a shrewd move (from his camp’s perspective) in detracting from American
domestic policy. It is a nasty cocktail of latent cold-war tensions and Sinophobia,
the anti-Chinese feeling in Europe, USA and other white settler societies that peaked
in the nineteenth century (Frayling 2014). Furthermore, we know Trump is not speaking
to Democrat voters and/or those on the left, and we urgently require deeper theorising
of why Trumpian register resonates, the tacit reasoning and ideology of his discursive
moves.
Triumph of Ignorance
But if this is also a crisis of words, arguably then, it is not enough for Horton
to rage against Trump. Trump, Johnson and other inadequate leaders are doing a great
job of emphasising their own inadequacies. Instead, we need to reflect more deeply
and critically on the Trumpian political and discursive brand in order to reveal the
latent, compressed and historical significance of the values that it embodies. Trumpism
is the triumph of ignorance over not only science but also professionalism, academic
research and social collegiality. In its contemporary form, the Trumpian crisis has
descended into a circus of tweets, broad generalisations over fact-checking, bullying
rather than compassion, empty gesturing and heckling as opposed to dialogue and debate.
But to understand the callousness of the political discursive crisis, we should interrogate
its discursive appeal, as a form of negative freedom, to the growing number of anti-vaxxers,
libertarians, patriots and the alt-right. Being free from state control could mean,
for some, freedom not to wear a mask, impunity from being tested and/or freefall from
social responsibility or any social contract altogether. Trumpism fuels these ideologies
while, conveniently, freeing state responsibility.
Horton has been in a hurry to address some of these issues and could be commended
for writing this short book so quickly during lockdown but, in his haste, some points
are repetitive despite the text being only 133 pages long. Although referring to important
issues, including how the health pandemic is being experienced differently by varying
countries, ethnic minorities, the working class and women, he does not drill deeply
into any particular issue as he jumps from history to medicine, science and political
theory. As The Lancet’s editor-in-chief, an experienced medical practitioner and doctor,
Horton is in a key position to consider the perspectives of care providers, doctors
and nurses on the frontline. This book also provides an important opportunity to give
voice to those bearing the brunt of the underfunding and mismanagement of the health
crisis.
Horton does include several pages of quotes from different health professionals, whose
sense of incredulity, fear and desperation are apparent. From an ethnographic perspective,
I wanted to hear more about these frontline workers’ stories, opinions and divergent
perspectives since their accounts of the crisis, as it unfolds, are essential testimonies.
At a macro level, Horton importantly calls for an international inquiry into the global
mishandling of the health crisis since a post-pandemic reckoning will be necessary.
But the international community’s more unified responses to injustice historically,
for example the Nuremberg Trials held by the Allies after World War II, or the global
support for South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1996, are almost
unimaginable on today’s fractured world stage. In the midst of the current Covid-19
pandemic and escalating political crisis, it is not clear who will be willing or able
to speak for those without a privileged platform. Conversely, Horton (2020: 126) tells
us: ‘Capitalism has many virtues. But the intense version of capitalism that has emerged
over the past forty-years has weakened something essential in the social fabric of
our societies. Those weaknesses contributed to the tragic toll of deaths.’
Circling Sharks
However, considering the scale of the pandemic, governments’ global rivalries and
policies of competition that Horton signals throughout the book, it is difficult to
realise the ‘virtues’ of capitalism that he refers to in the final chapter. Firstly,
capitalism’s deep roots go back much further than forty years. Secondly, Horton’s
phrase ‘intense version of capitalism,’ insufficiently calls out neoliberalism’s contribution
to the crisis. Thirdly, the ‘something,’ that Horton appears reluctant to name are
state sector services, operating at the material, ethical and discursive levels. Stuart
Hall (2011) addressed neoliberalism’s unhealthy bite into the state sector. He explained
that the privatisation in the UK, by the early 2000s, was already playing a massive,
profit-making role in healthcare through the privatisation of hospitals, care homes
and clinics. The conservative government’s top-down reorganisation of the NHS, grouped
practitioners (GPs) into private consortia, part of whose profits they retained. Since
few GPs had the know-how or time to run complex budgets assigned; they turned to the
private health companies who were, according to Hall (2011: 720), ‘circling the NHS
like sharks waiting to feed.’
Britain’s once admirable NHS has been unable to provide enough protective personal
equipment or Covid-19 tests for its frontline workers. Horton warns us that the pandemic
is far from over, due to the crisis of leadership, and there will likely be other
health emergencies from which we may not recover. That is a terrifying prospect and
the theme of fear runs throughout Horton’s book. Yet, we also need to develop brave
responses to Covid-19 and to mitigate against the closing-in of capitalism’s circling
sharks. As the global health fiasco continues, we should acknowledge that the world
leaders are not the only ones running the show and figures like Bill Gates are instrumental
in bringing platform capitalism, politics and medicine closer together.
Simultaneously, the problem with neoliberalism’s erosion of the state, in the Covid-19
moment and beyond, is that private venture capitalists, according to the forward-thinking
economist Mariana Mazzucato (2018), rarely venture much at all. For example, after
the SARS outbreak in 2002–2003, private investors were not willing to invest in coronavirus
research while publicly funded research continued, and the US government contributed
$700 million. Tech giants like Apple, Google and Elon Musk’s companies have also profited
from substantial government funding (Bregman 2020). Horton must realise that, while
we wait for breakthrough vaccines, they are more likely to come through publicly funded
initiatives. Theorising of the Covid-19 crisis could therefore draw strength from
an informed axiology, or study of values, to realise the importance of the state,
collective and global solutions. An aspect of this involves developing braver critical
tools to explore tech-politics, social and medical practices at discursive levels.