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      Industrial Food Animal Production and Global Health Risks: Exploring the Ecosystems and Economics of Avian Influenza

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          Abstract

          Many emerging infectious diseases in human populations are associated with zoonotic origins. Attention has often focused on wild animal reservoirs, but most zoonotic pathogens of recent concern to human health either originate in, or are transferred to, human populations from domesticated animals raised for human consumption. Thus, the ecological context of emerging infectious disease comprises two overlapping ecosystems: the natural habitats and populations of wild animals, and the anthropogenically controlled habitats and populations of domesticated species. Intensive food animal production systems and their associated value chains dominate in developed countries and are increasingly important in developing countries. These systems are characterized by large numbers of animals being raised in confinement with high throughput and rapid turnover. Although not typically recognized as such, industrial food animal production generates unique ecosystems—environments that may facilitate the evolution of zoonotic pathogens and their transmission to human populations. It is often assumed that confined food animal production reduces risks of emerging zoonotic diseases. This article provides evidence suggesting that these industrial systems may increase animal and public health risks unless there is recognition of the specific biosecurity and biocontainment challenges of the industrial model. Moreover, the economic drivers and constraints faced by the industry and its participants must be fully understood in order to inform preventative policy. In order to more effectively reduce zoonotic disease risk from industrial food animal production, private incentives for the implementation of biosecurity must align with public health interests.

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          Most cited references46

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          Transmission of H7N7 avian influenza A virus to human beings during a large outbreak in commercial poultry farms in the Netherlands.

          An outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus subtype H7N7 started at the end of February, 2003, in commercial poultry farms in the Netherlands. Although the risk of transmission of these viruses to humans was initially thought to be low, an outbreak investigation was launched to assess the extent of transmission of influenza A virus subtype H7N7 from chickens to humans. All workers in poultry farms, poultry farmers, and their families were asked to report signs of conjunctivitis or influenza-like illness. People with complaints were tested for influenza virus type A subtype H7 (A/H7) infection and completed a health questionnaire about type of symptoms, duration of illness, and possible exposures to infected poultry. 453 people had health complaints--349 reported conjunctivitis, 90 had influenza-like illness, and 67 had other complaints. We detected A/H7 in conjunctival samples from 78 (26.4%) people with conjunctivitis only, in five (9.4%) with influenza-like illness and conjunctivitis, in two (5.4%) with influenza-like illness only, and in four (6%) who reported other symptoms. Most positive samples had been collected within 5 days of symptom onset. A/H7 infection was confirmed in three contacts (of 83 tested), one of whom developed influenza-like illness. Six people had influenza A/H3N2 infection. After 19 people had been diagnosed with the infection, all workers received mandatory influenza virus vaccination and prophylactic treatment with oseltamivir. More than half (56%) of A/H7 infections reported here arose before the vaccination and treatment programme. We noted an unexpectedly high number of transmissions of avian influenza A virus subtype H7N7 to people directly involved in handling infected poultry, and we noted evidence for person-to-person transmission. Our data emphasise the importance of adequate surveillance, outbreak preparedness, and pandemic planning.
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            Industrial food animal production, antimicrobial resistance, and human health.

            Antimicrobial resistance is a major public health crisis, eroding the discovery of antimicrobials and their application to clinical medicine. There is a general lack of knowledge of the importance of agricultural antimicrobial use as a factor in antimicrobial resistance even among experts in medicine and public health. This review focuses on agricultural antimicrobial drug use as a major driver of antimicrobial resistance worldwide for four reasons: It is the largest use of antimicrobials worldwide; much of the use of antimicrobials in agriculture results in subtherapeutic exposures of bacteria; drugs of every important clinical class are utilized in agriculture; and human populations are exposed to antimicrobial-resistant pathogens via consumption of animal products as well as through widespread release into the environment.
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              Predicting the global spread of H5N1 avian influenza.

              The spread of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza into Asia, Europe, and Africa has resulted in enormous impacts on the poultry industry and presents an important threat to human health. The pathways by which the virus has and will spread between countries have been debated extensively, but have yet to be analyzed comprehensively and quantitatively. We integrated data on phylogenetic relationships of virus isolates, migratory bird movements, and trade in poultry and wild birds to determine the pathway for 52 individual introduction events into countries and predict future spread. We show that 9 of 21 of H5N1 introductions to countries in Asia were most likely through poultry, and 3 of 21 were most likely through migrating birds. In contrast, spread to most (20/23) countries in Europe was most likely through migratory birds. Spread in Africa was likely partly by poultry (2/8 introductions) and partly by migrating birds (3/8). Our analyses predict that H5N1 is more likely to be introduced into the Western Hemisphere through infected poultry and into the mainland United States by subsequent movement of migrating birds from neighboring countries, rather than from eastern Siberia. These results highlight the potential synergism between trade and wild animal movement in the emergence and pandemic spread of pathogens and demonstrate the value of predictive models for disease control.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                jleibler@jhsph.edu
                Journal
                Ecohealth
                Ecohealth
                Ecohealth
                Springer-Verlag (New York )
                1612-9202
                1612-9210
                13 May 2009
                2009
                : 6
                : 1
                : 58-70
                Affiliations
                [1 ]GRID grid.21107.35, ISNI 0000000121719311, Department of Environmental Health Sciences, , Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, ; Baltimore, MD USA
                [2 ]GRID grid.420153.1, ISNI 0000000419370300, Animal Production and Health Division, , Food and Agriculture Organization, ; Rome, Italy
                [3 ]GRID grid.47840.3f, ISNI 0000000121817878, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, , University of California, ; Berkeley, CA USA
                [4 ]GRID grid.4464.2, ISNI 0000000121612573, Royal Veterinary College, , University of London, ; London, UK
                [5 ]GRID grid.1003.2, ISNI 0000000093207537, School of Population Health, University of Queensland, ; Brisbane, Australia
                [6 ]GRID grid.420285.9, ISNI 0000000119550561, U.S. Agency for International Development, ; Washington, DC USA
                Article
                226
                10.1007/s10393-009-0226-0
                7087879
                19437076
                e6ac927e-4283-49ef-87d5-059dee97f748
                © International Association for Ecology and Health 2009

                This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted research re-use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for the duration of the World Health Organization (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic.

                History
                : 28 October 2008
                : 27 January 2009
                : 2 February 2009
                Categories
                Original Contribution
                Custom metadata
                © International Association for Ecology and Health 2009

                Public health
                influenza a virus,avian,poultry,zoonoses,agriculture,biosecurity
                Public health
                influenza a virus, avian, poultry, zoonoses, agriculture, biosecurity

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