1
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
0 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: found
      • Article: found
      Is Open Access

      Distract yourself: prediction of salient distractors by own actions and external cues

      research-article

      Read this article at

      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Abstract

          Distracting sensory events can capture attention, interfering with the performance of the task at hand. We asked: is our attention captured by such events if we cause them ourselves? To examine this, we employed a visual search task with an additional salient singleton distractor, where the distractor was predictable either by the participant’s own (motor) action or by an endogenous cue; accordingly, the task was designed to isolate the influence of motor and non-motor predictive processes. We found both types of prediction, cue- and action-based, to attenuate the interference of the distractor—which is at odds with the “attentional white bear” hypothesis, which states that prediction of distracting stimuli mandatorily directs attention towards them. Further, there was no difference between the two types of prediction. We suggest this pattern of results may be better explained by theories postulating general predictive mechanisms, such as the framework of predictive processing, as compared to accounts proposing a special role of action–effect prediction, such as theories based on optimal motor control. However, rather than permitting a definitive decision between competing theories, our study highlights a number of open questions, to be answered by these theories, with regard to how exogenous attention is influenced by predictions deriving from the environment versus our own actions.

          Related collections

          Most cited references50

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: not found
          • Article: not found

          Confidence Intervals from Normalized Data: A correction to Cousineau (2005)

            Bookmark
            • Record: found
            • Abstract: found
            • Article: not found

            Top-down and bottom-up control of visual selection.

            The present paper argues for the notion that when attention is spread across the visual field in the first sweep of information through the brain visual selection is completely stimulus-driven. Only later in time, through recurrent feedback processing, volitional control based on expectancy and goal set will bias visual selection in a top-down manner. Here we review behavioral evidence as well as evidence from ERP, fMRI, TMS and single cell recording consistent with stimulus-driven selection. Alternative viewpoints that assume a large role for top-down processing are discussed. It is argued that in most cases evidence supporting top-down control on visual selection in fact demonstrates top-down control on processes occurring later in time, following initial selection. We conclude that top-down knowledge regarding non-spatial features of the objects cannot alter the initial selection priority. Only by adjusting the size of the attentional window, the initial sweep of information through the brain may be altered in a top-down way. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
              Bookmark
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: found
              • Article: not found

              Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions

              Active inference provides a simple and neurobiologically plausible account of how action and perception are coupled in producing (Bayes) optimal behaviour. This can be seen most easily as minimising prediction error: we can either change our predictions to explain sensory input through perception. Alternatively, we can actively change sensory input to fulfil our predictions. In active inference, this action is mediated by classical reflex arcs that minimise proprioceptive prediction error created by descending proprioceptive predictions. However, this creates a conflict between action and perception; in that, self-generated movements require predictions to override the sensory evidence that one is not actually moving. However, ignoring sensory evidence means that externally generated sensations will not be perceived. Conversely, attending to (proprioceptive and somatosensory) sensations enables the detection of externally generated events but precludes generation of actions. This conflict can be resolved by attenuating the precision of sensory evidence during movement or, equivalently, attending away from the consequences of self-made acts. We propose that this Bayes optimal withdrawal of precise sensory evidence during movement is the cause of psychophysical sensory attenuation. Furthermore, it explains the force-matching illusion and reproduces empirical results almost exactly. Finally, if attenuation is removed, the force-matching illusion disappears and false (delusional) inferences about agency emerge. This is important, given the negative correlation between sensory attenuation and delusional beliefs in normal subjects—and the reduction in the magnitude of the illusion in schizophrenia. Active inference therefore links the neuromodulatory optimisation of precision to sensory attenuation and illusory phenomena during the attribution of agency in normal subjects. It also provides a functional account of deficits in syndromes characterised by false inference and impaired movement—like schizophrenia and Parkinsonism—syndromes that implicate abnormal modulatory neurotransmission.
                Bookmark

                Author and article information

                Contributors
                +420737338809 , ohavlicek@gmail.com
                Journal
                Psychol Res
                Psychol Res
                Psychological Research
                Springer Berlin Heidelberg (Berlin/Heidelberg )
                0340-0727
                1430-2772
                26 December 2018
                26 December 2018
                2019
                : 83
                : 1
                : 159-174
                Affiliations
                [1 ]ISNI 0000 0004 1936 973X, GRID grid.5252.0, Department of Psychology, General and Experimental Psychology Unit, , Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, ; Leopoldstr. 13, 80802 Munich, Germany
                [2 ]ISNI 0000 0001 0041 5028, GRID grid.419524.f, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, ; Stephanstraße 1a, 04303 Leipzig, Germany
                [3 ]ISNI 0000 0004 1936 973X, GRID grid.5252.0, Graduate School of Systemic Neurosciences, , Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, ; Großhaderner Str. 2, 82152 Planegg-Martinsried, Germany
                [4 ]ISNI 0000 0001 2161 2573, GRID grid.4464.2, Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College, , University of London, ; Malet Street, WC1E 7HX London, UK
                [5 ]ISNI 0000 0004 1764 2907, GRID grid.25786.3e, Research line “Social Cognition in Human-Robot Interaction”, , Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia, ; Via Morego, 30, 16163 Genova, Italy
                Author information
                http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3533-8557
                Article
                1129
                10.1007/s00426-018-1129-x
                6373372
                30588545
                ea0dd4e8-9dd6-45c5-8274-86098586ed53
                © The Author(s) 2018

                Open AccessThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

                History
                : 3 October 2017
                : 7 December 2018
                Funding
                Funded by: FundRef http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100001659, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft;
                Award ID: MU-773/14-1
                Award ID: WY-122/1-1
                Award Recipient :
                Funded by: FundRef http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000781, European Research Council;
                Award ID: 715058
                Award Recipient :
                Categories
                Original Article
                Custom metadata
                © Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

                Clinical Psychology & Psychiatry
                Clinical Psychology & Psychiatry

                Comments

                Comment on this article