Blog
About

39
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
0 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: found
      • Article: not found

      Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate.

      Read this article at

      ScienceOpenPublisherPubMed
      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Abstract

          Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.

          Related collections

          Author and article information

          Journal
          Perspect Psychol Sci
          Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science
          SAGE Publications
          1745-6916
          1745-6916
          May 2013
          : 8
          : 3
          Affiliations
          [1 ] School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, England j.evans@plymouth.ac.uk.
          [2 ] Department of Applied Psychology and Human Development, University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
          Article
          8/3/223
          10.1177/1745691612460685
          26172965

          Comments

          Comment on this article