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      Does regulation increase the rate at which doctors leave practice? Analysis of routine hospital data in the English NHS following the introduction of medical revalidation

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          Abstract

          Background

          In 2012, the UK introduced medical revalidation, whereby to retain their licence all doctors are required to show periodically that they are up to date and fit to practise medicine. Early reports suggested that some doctors found the process overly onerous and chose to leave practice. This study investigates the effect of medical revalidation on the rate at which consultants (senior hospital doctors) leave NHS practice, and assesses any differences between the performance of consultants who left or remained in practice before and after the introduction of revalidation.

          Methods

          We used a retrospective cohort of administrative data from the Hospital Episode Statistics database on all consultants who were working in English NHS hospitals between April 2008 and March 2009 ( n = 19,334), followed to March 2015. Proportional hazard models were used to identify the effect of medical revalidation on the time to exit from the NHS workforce, as implied by ceasing NHS clinical activity. The main exposure variable was consultants’ time-varying revalidation status, which differentiates between periods when consultants were (a) not subject to revalidation—before the policy was introduced, (b) awaiting a revalidation recommendation and (c) had received a positive recommendation to be revalidated. Difference-in-differences analysis was used to compare the performance of those who left practice with those who remained in practice before and after the introduction of revalidation, as proxied by case-mix-adjusted 30-day mortality rates.

          Results

          After 2012, consultants who had not yet revalidated were at an increased hazard of ceasing NHS clinical practice (HR 2.33, 95% CI 2.12 to 2.57) compared with pre-policy levels. This higher risk remained after a positive recommendation (HR 1.85, 95% CI 1.65 to 2.06) but was statistically significantly reduced ( p < 0.001). We found no statistically significant differences in mortality rates between those consultants who ceased practice and those who remained, after adjustment for multiple testing.

          Conclusion

          Revalidation appears to have led to greater numbers of doctors ceasing clinical practice, over and above other contemporaneous influences. Those ceasing clinical practice do not appear to have provided lower quality care, as approximated by mortality rates, when compared with those remaining in practice.

          Electronic supplementary material

          The online version of this article (10.1186/s12916-019-1270-4) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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          Most cited references8

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          Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments.

          People tend to hold overly favorable views of their abilities in many social and intellectual domains. The authors suggest that this overestimation occurs, in part, because people who are unskilled in these domains suffer a dual burden: Not only do these people reach erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate choices, but their incompetence robs them of the metacognitive ability to realize it. Across 4 studies, the authors found that participants scoring in the bottom quartile on tests of humor, grammar, and logic grossly overestimated their test performance and ability. Although their test scores put them in the 12th percentile, they estimated themselves to be in the 62nd. Several analyses linked this miscalibration to deficits in metacognitive skill, or the capacity to distinguish accuracy from error. Paradoxically, improving the skills of participants, and thus increasing their metacognitive competence, helped them recognize the limitations of their abilities.
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            Why is U.K. medicine no longer a self-regulating profession? The role of scandals involving "bad apple" doctors.

            This article identifies the role played by a series of medical scandals in the U.K., occurring from the mid-1990s onwards, in ending a collegial model of self-regulation of the medical profession that had endured for 150 years. The state's original motive in endorsing professional self-regulation was to resolve the principal-agent problem inherent in the doctor-patient relationship. The profession, in return for its self-regulating privileges, undertook to act as a reliable guarantor for the competence and conduct of each of its members. Though sufficient to ensure that most doctors were "good", the collegial model adopted by the profession left it fatally vulnerable to the problem of "bad apples": those unwilling, incapable or indifferent to delivering on their professional commitments and who betrayed the trust of both patients and peers. Weak administrative systems in the NHS failed to compensate for the defects of the collegium in controlling these individuals. The scandals both provoked and legitimised erosion of the profession's self-regulatory power. Though its vulnerability to bad apples had been present since the founding of the 19th century profession, it was the convergence of social and political conditions at a particular historical moment that transformed the scandals into an unstoppable imperative for reform. Huge public anger, the voice permitted to a coalition of critics, shifts in social attitudes, the opportunity presented for imposing standards for accountability, and the increasing ascendancy of pro-interventionist managerialist and political agendas from the early 1990s onwards were all implicated in the response made to scandals and the shape the reforms took. Scandals need to be understood not as simple determinants of change, but as one performative element in a constellation of socially contingent forces and contexts. The new rebalancing of the "countervailing powers" has dislodged the profession as the senior partner in the regulation of doctors, but may introduce new risks. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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              Changing Medical Organization and the Erosion of Trust

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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                nils.gutacker@york.ac.uk
                Journal
                BMC Med
                BMC Med
                BMC Medicine
                BioMed Central (London )
                1741-7015
                11 February 2019
                11 February 2019
                2019
                : 17
                : 33
                Affiliations
                [1 ]ISNI 0000 0004 1936 9668, GRID grid.5685.e, Centre for Health Economics, , University of York, ; York, UK
                [2 ]ISNI 0000 0004 1936 9668, GRID grid.5685.e, Department of Health Sciences, , University of York, ; York, UK
                [3 ]ISNI 0000 0004 1936 8403, GRID grid.9909.9, Leeds Institute of Health Sciences, Faculty of Medicine and Health, , University of Leeds, ; Leeds, UK
                [4 ]ISNI 0000 0001 2219 0747, GRID grid.11201.33, Collaboration for the Advancement of Medical Education Research Assessment, , University of Plymouth, ; Plymouth, UK
                [5 ]ISNI 0000000121662407, GRID grid.5379.8, Alliance Manchester Business School, , University of Manchester, ; Manchester, UK
                Author information
                http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2833-0621
                Article
                1270
                10.1186/s12916-019-1270-4
                6371486
                30744639
                f072db2e-db76-4670-8b22-dc285ca97398
                © The Author(s). 2019

                Open AccessThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver ( http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.

                History
                : 2 August 2018
                : 22 January 2019
                Funding
                Funded by: Department of Health Policy Research Programme
                Award ID: PR-R9-0114-11002
                Award Recipient :
                Categories
                Research Article
                Custom metadata
                © The Author(s) 2019

                Medicine
                medical revalidation,regulation,medical workforce,policy evaluation,retention
                Medicine
                medical revalidation, regulation, medical workforce, policy evaluation, retention

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