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      Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform

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      International Organization
      Cambridge University Press (CUP)

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          Abstract

          Current international relations theory struggles to explain both the autonomy and transformation of international organizations (IOs). Previous theories either fail to account for any IO behavior that deviates from the interests of member states, or neglect the role of member states in reforming IO institutions and behavior. We propose an agency theory of IOs that can fill these gaps while also addressing two persistent problems in the study of IOs: common agency and long delegation chains. Our model explains slippage between member states' interests and IO behavior, but also suggests institutional mechanisms—staff selection, monitoring, procedural checks, and contracts—through which states can rein in errant IOs. We evaluate this argument by examining multiple institutional reforms and lending patterns at the World Bank from 1980 to 2000.

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          Most cited references28

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          The operated Markov´s chains in economy (discrete chains of Markov with the income)

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            War and Change in World Politics

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              The False Promise of International Institutions

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                Author and article information

                Journal
                International Organization
                Int Org
                Cambridge University Press (CUP)
                0020-8183
                1531-5088
                2003
                April 15 2003
                2003
                : 57
                : 2
                : 241-276
                Article
                10.1017/S0020818303572010
                fe7f89fd-a424-4dff-b3a4-38daac61945d
                © 2003

                https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms

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