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      Cues to intention bias action perception toward the most efficient trajectory

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      1 , , 1 , 2 , 1
      Scientific Reports
      Nature Publishing Group UK
      Perception, Human behaviour

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          Abstract

          Humans interpret others’ behaviour as intentional and expect them to take the most energy-efficient path to achieve their goals. Recent studies show that these expectations of efficient action take the form of a prediction of an ideal “reference” trajectory, against which observed actions are evaluated, distorting their perceptual representation towards this expected path. Here we tested whether these predictions depend upon the implied intentionality of the stimulus. Participants saw videos of an actor reaching either efficiently (straight towards an object or arched over an obstacle) or inefficiently (straight towards obstacle or arched over empty space). The hand disappeared mid-trajectory and participants reported the last seen position on a touch-screen. As in prior research, judgments of inefficient actions were biased toward efficiency expectations (straight trajectories upwards to avoid obstacles, arched trajectories downward towards goals). In two further experimental groups, intentionality cues were removed by replacing the hand with a non-agentive ball (group 2), and by removing the action’s biological motion profile (group 3). Removing these cues substantially reduced perceptual biases. Our results therefore confirm that the perception of others’ actions is guided by expectations of efficient actions, which are triggered by the perception of semantic and motion cues to intentionality.

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          Predictive coding: an account of the mirror neuron system.

          Is it possible to understand the intentions of other people by simply observing their actions? Many believe that this ability is made possible by the brain's mirror neuron system through its direct link between action and observation. However, precisely how intentions can be inferred through action observation has provoked much debate. Here we suggest that the function of the mirror system can be understood within a predictive coding framework that appeals to the statistical approach known as empirical Bayes. Within this scheme the most likely cause of an observed action can be inferred by minimizing the prediction error at all levels of the cortical hierarchy that are engaged during action observation. This account identifies a precise role for the mirror system in our ability to infer intentions from actions and provides the outline of the underlying computational mechanisms.
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            The Predictive Mind

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              Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for 'top-down' effects.

              What determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional "modular" understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level cognition, a tidal wave of recent research alleges that states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, intentions, and linguistic representations exert direct top-down influences on what we see. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the distinction between perception and cognition may itself be unsustainable. We argue otherwise: none of these hundreds of studies - either individually or collectively - provide compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception, or "cognitive penetrability". In particular, and despite their variety, we suggest that these studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls. And whereas abstract theoretical challenges have failed to resolve this debate in the past, our presentation of these pitfalls is empirically anchored: in each case, we show not only how certain studies could be susceptible to the pitfall (in principle), but how several alleged top-down effects actually are explained by the pitfall (in practice). Moreover, these pitfalls are perfectly general, with each applying to dozens of other top-down effects. We conclude by extracting the lessons provided by these pitfalls into a checklist that future work could use to convincingly demonstrate top-down effects on visual perception. The discovery of substantive top-down effects of cognition on perception would revolutionize our understanding of how the mind is organized; but without addressing these pitfalls, no such empirical report will license such exciting conclusions.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                katrina.mcdonough@plymouth.ac.uk
                Journal
                Sci Rep
                Sci Rep
                Scientific Reports
                Nature Publishing Group UK (London )
                2045-2322
                18 April 2019
                18 April 2019
                2019
                : 9
                : 6472
                Affiliations
                [1 ]ISNI 0000 0001 2219 0747, GRID grid.11201.33, University of Plymouth, School of Psychology, ; Plymouth, PL48AA UK
                [2 ]ISNI 0000 0001 0043 9775, GRID grid.462662.2, School of Business, National College of Ireland, Mayor Street, ; Dublin 1, Ireland
                Author information
                http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7599-8317
                http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1027-2846
                Article
                42204
                10.1038/s41598-019-42204-y
                6470138
                30996227
                ffa7d038-a251-4570-9c78-411929795a20
                © The Author(s) 2019

                Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

                History
                : 2 October 2018
                : 21 March 2019
                Funding
                Funded by: FundRef https://doi.org/10.13039/501100000269, RCUK | Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC);
                Award ID: ES/J019178/1
                Award ID: ES/J019178/1
                Award ID: ES/J019178/1
                Award Recipient :
                Funded by: FundRef https://doi.org/10.13039/501100002286, Plymouth University;
                Categories
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                © The Author(s) 2019

                Uncategorized
                perception,human behaviour
                Uncategorized
                perception, human behaviour

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