

THE PACIFICATION OF PERU AND THE PRODUCTION OF A NEOLIBERAL POPULIST ORDER

Maritza Felices Luna

Abstract: This article analyses the security, governance and economic reforms carried out by Fujimori in the 1990s as strategies of pacification seeking to restore a capitalist social order disturbed by the economic and social turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s. First, I show how different forms of state violence were intrinsically connected to the pacification process. Then, I argue that the social order produced resulted from the articulation of populism and authoritarianism with neoliberalism. Subsequently, I contend that crimes, harms and violence continue within the current democratic configuration precisely because pacification is an ongoing process seeking to maintain an order which is intrinsically exploitative, creates favourable conditions for economic crimes and corruption and resorts to repressive violence when challenged. I conclude by suggesting that the social, political and economic landscapes that provided the impetus for pacification have been transformed through the new social order, further weakening already frail democratic institutions.

Keywords: authoritarianism; Fujimori; moral economy; neoliberalism; pacification; populism

Introduction

Alberto Fujimori was elected in 1990 by a country in complete disarray: the economy was on the brink of collapsing and the insurgency appeared to be winning the internal war. During the eleven years of his regime, Fujimori deployed a series of reforms that significantly transformed the social, political and economic landscape of Peru. This article begins with a brief presentation of the social, political and economic context that led to the election of Alberto Fujimori in 1990. In the following section, I argue that the security, economic and governance reforms implemented by Fujimori were pacification strategies geared towards setting up a social order auspicious of capitalist interest. I then suggest that the particular shape that this social order took resulted from the articulation of authoritarian practices and populist politics with neoliberal ideals, policies and values. I contend that

Maritza Felices Luna, Associate Professor, Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa, Canada.

the pacification process was successful and for that reason remains an ongoing process: the harms caused by the neoliberal order produce challenges to that order and those challenges then need to be pacified. I conclude by suggesting that the pacification impetus of the 1990s was propelled by the economic, political and social landscape of the 1970s and 1980s which facilitated the production of a social order which transformed these landscapes and further wakened a frail democracy.

A Country of Two Crises: The Internal Armed Conflict and the Debacle of the Economy

The crisis that led to the pacification of Peru and the production of a neoliberal populist order is in fact a compounded crisis resulting from two factors: three decades of ongoing social turmoil which culminated in an internal armed conflict and the almost complete collapse of the economy following two decades of pro-capital and anti-capital reforms.

From the protests of the 1950s to the internal war of the 1980s: 30 years of social upheaval

Peru's history has been characterized by multiple social movements (workers, peasants, students or indigenous) demanding social justice as well as economic and political reform with limited results (Degregori 2010). These movements were particularly active in the 1950s and 1960s through protests, strikes, marches, sit-ins and occupying agricultural lands as well as factories (Bejar 1969). Concurrently, the two existing left-wing political parties APRA (American revolutionary popular Alliance) and PCP (Communist Party of Peru) gained popularity within disadvantaged sectors of the urban milieu by denouncing the social and economic inequalities produced by capitalism and the semi-feudal structure of the rural areas (Lora Cam 2001). The effervescence of the anti-capitalist discourses of the 1960s resulted in many breakaway political organizations which advocated for the armed struggle as the only means to seizing power and transforming society (Felices-Luna 2013). Between 1963 and 1965, three of these organizations followed through and rose against the state but were quickly defeated by the military due to their small numbers and lack of popular support (Lora Cam 2001). Although the insurgent organizations were crushed, social turmoil and political instability continued until 1968 when the military, led by General Velasco, deposed the democratically elected president and put in place a left-wing nationalist military government. Velasco justified the coup d'état by arguing that the country was heading towards complete chaos given that politicians were incapable of making the necessary transformations to

ensure social justice and to protect the interests of the majority (Velasco 1973). Velasco conducted numerous significant reforms (agrarian, industrial, educational, etc.) and renationalized the exploitation of natural resources (Krujit and del Pilar Tello 2003). This appeased the left but generated economic instability, pressure from those negatively affected by the reforms and internal discontent from opposing high-ranking members of the military. As a result, in 1975 Velasco was replaced by General Morales Bermudez who reversed certain reforms and organized democratic elections (Pásara 1980). The political left was at a crossroads; it needed to decide whether to participate in the 1980 elections or take up arms against the state.

Although the majority of the political organizations participated in the democratic elections, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso¹ launched the armed struggle on election day. Four years into the internal armed conflict, the MRTA² became the second insurgent organization to use military strategies as means of seizing power. Aside from attacking infrastructures, symbols and representatives of the state, both organizations systematically and continually targeted national and international capital. The conflict killed approximately 70,000³ Peruvians in a span of 20 years (Comisión de la verdad y reconciliación [CVR] 2003). The internal armed conflict can be seen, therefore, as the culminating point of 30 years of social protest demanding equality and social justice. Notwithstanding the initial support garnered by both insurgent organizations, by the late 1980s the political left, social movements, popular organizations and, most significantly, the urban and rural poor had turned their back on them (Escárzaga 2001).

From anti-capital to pro-capital reforms: 20 years of economic unpredictability and instability

The economic history of Peru is one of a country rich in natural resources plundered first by the Spanish colonial power followed by a semi-colonial relationship with British and, subsequently, the United States' extractive capital, all of whom imposed restrictions on the development of national industries (Lora Cam 2001). In such a context, the agrarian and industrial reforms as well as the nationalization of the exploitation of natural resources (particularly oil and minerals) struck at the core of capital's interests and had a significant negative impact in the economy (Escárzaga 2001). Despite playing a significant role in reassuring national and international capital, the counter reforms of Morales Bermudez furthered economic instability with inflation skyrocketing from 5.7% in 1969 to 73.9% in 1978 (Lora Cam 2001). The 1970s would accelerate a pre-existing pattern of pro-capital and anti-capital reforms which, coupled with the global economic recession, resulted in the implementation of a series of erratic and disjointed policies that brought the economy to the brink of collapse.

The two democratic governments of the 1980s approached the economy in opposing ways. Whereas Belaunde's centre-right government enacted pro-capital reforms, accepted the adjustment programme imposed by the IMF and significantly reduced governmental spending and social programmes, García's left-wing government opted for anti-capital reforms by limiting international debt payments to 10% of national exports, increasing salaries, controlling prices of basic products, artificially setting the US dollar exchange rate and, in 1987, announcing the nationalization of all banking institutions (Crabtree 1992; Roberts 1995). Both economic strategies failed and led to the second worst inflation (7,650%) in Latin America's history (Kenney 2004). According to Crabtree (1992), under Belaunde's government per capita income dropped from \$1,232 in 1980 to \$1,050 in 1985 and inversions dropped from 21.2% of the gross national product in 1982 to 12.2% in 1985. Under García, Peru was virtually excluded from the international financial community. As the crisis deepened, the government opted in 1988 to de-regularize most products that had been previously controlled and devalue the currency. These measures resulted in a significant recession⁴ and hyperinflation⁵ (Crabtree 1992).

The electoral campaign of 1990 was fraught with fears over a collapsing economy and an internal war which the state seemed to be on the verge of losing. However, the electoral programmes and the ensuing debates focused almost exclusively on how to save the economy from a complete breakdown. Vargas Llosa⁶ campaigned on the need to implement drastic economic reforms in line with neoliberal ideas, while Fujimori – an unknown independent with no previous experience in politics and no political connections – won the election by promising to salvage the economy without the ominous reforms announced by Vargas Llosa.

Pacification and the Production of a Neoliberal Social Order

Pacification is the introduction of a new social order structured around capitalism and ensuring peace and security within it (Neocleous 2014). The social order is maintained and protected through a reordering of the social world (Neocleous 2006) and the production of responsible, peaceful and disciplined subjects whose approach to politics and activism is non-disruptive (Jackson 2013). This is achieved either by shaping the behaviours of individuals, groups and classes or by crushing any actual opposition to it (Neocleous 2014). The introduction and maintenance of a capitalist social order therefore necessitates a rhetoric of security interconnecting the economy, politics and society to ensure nothing is left out of its purview, as well as a practice of security that neutralizes any potential challenge to it (Neocleous 2008). To this effect, emergency powers have been essential to the consolidation of capitalist modernity; it allows temporary measures to be imposed which are then quickly swept into regular law, thus permanently and

legitimately altering the fabric of social order (Neocleous 2008). In fact, to be legitimate, the new social order needs to be enshrined in law and particularly the constitution (Neocleous 2007). The changes in the law tend to include the conditions for the construction of a free market, the means to discipline and indoctrinate the population as well as the power to surveil and coerce those representing a threat to the new social order (Neocleous 2014).

The anti-capital reforms, the economic crisis and the internal war had hurt investments and created an environment uncondusive to capital's interests. Upon coming to power, Fujimori embarked on a pacification project using emergency legislation to enact security, economic and governance reforms. To achieve this, one of his first actions as the newly elected president was to ask Congress the authorization to rule by decree on economic and national security matters.⁷ These reforms produced a social order favourable to capital's interests and created the proper conditions for violence, crimes and harms to be committed by state security agents and government officials.

Security reform

Upon commencing his mandate, Fujimori was weary of a potential coup d'état given that the armed forces had backed Vargas Llosa during the campaign (Bowen and Holligan 2003). Before being able to initiate any pacification project, Fujimori needed to ensure control over the armed forces and the intelligence services. He proceeded then to change the rules and regulations of the military, law enforcement agencies and the intelligence services. For instance, the new Law on the National Defence System positioned the National Intelligence Service (SIN) as an autonomous entity under the direct command of the president and unobstructed by any civilian, judicial or military authority (Degregori 1994). This allowed Fujimori to place his main ally, Vladimiro Montesinos,⁸ as the de facto chief of the SIN throughout the duration of the regime despite being appointed as a consultant. The Law on the National Defence System also granted the Executive the power to name the General Commander of the Armed Forces and to allow him to remain in place as long as the president deemed it advisable, even past his official date of retirement and despite the existence of a rule limiting it to a one year mandate (Degregori 1994). Thus, General Hermoza Ríos remained in an unprecedented eight years as General Commander of the Armed Forces. The restructuring of the security apparatus gave Fujimori control over promotions and placements inside each of its institutions forcing his adversaries into retirement and putting his supporters in key positions (Kenney 2004).

Once Fujimori had ensured control over these institutions, he embarked on an all-out war against Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA implementing further security reforms. Fujimori began by conferring more power and prerogatives (such as

the right to intervene in universities and prisons) to the military and the police; broadening the mandate of the SIN; and expanding the authority of military commanders in conflict areas (Schulte-Bockholt 2013). Furthermore, an array of emergency legislation, antiterrorism laws and other security decrees were adopted between 1991 and 1995 which would later be condemned by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and declared un-constitutional by the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees. The new laws criminalized non-violent activities as well as, to a certain degree, freedom of expression; labelled certain criminal acts as acts of “treason” to be judged by military courts; designated harsher sentences for all crimes linked to “terrorism” or “treason”; and changed the minimum age for criminal responsibility for terrorist activities from 18 to 15. Furthermore, the legislation allowed armed forces to confiscate property, restrict access to journalists, as well as detain civilians and maintain them incommunicado for long periods of time (Mauceri 1996).

Fujimori’s reforms also significantly changed judicial procedure: the right to habeas corpus was declared unavailable for those accused of terrorism and treason; suspected terrorists could be accused, tried and sentenced in absentia; lawyers were not allowed during interrogation and could not represent more than one client a year for terrorism or treason cases (Americas Watch 1993). The right to be defended was also severely restricted: some accused were refused access to a lawyer; lawyers were prohibited from cross-examining witnesses and, for reasons of national security, had no access to the evidence against their clients. Furthermore, defence attorneys were sometimes charged for terrorism after a case was tried. These judicial practices led to an outstanding conviction rate of 97% with trials by anonymous judges lasting only a few minutes (Mauceri 2006).

During the 10 years of Fujimori’s regime, human rights violations of different sorts were committed in view of social policies,⁹ national security or the continuation of the regime. Human rights violations such as disappearances and extrajudicial executions¹⁰ were tactical, deliberate, premeditated, methodical and many of them ordered by the regime (CVR 2003; Jara 2003). Fujimori’s regime also relied on systematic torture to gather information and obtain confessions, thus improving the flow of the justice system (CVR 2003). To this effect, Fujimori announced during his address to the nation on 28 July 1993, that between 1981 and 1991 only 575 people accused of terrorism had been convicted compared with 589 in the 13 months since shutting down parliament (Americas Watch 1993). Finally, the regime relied on extensive use of imprisonment to deal with political opposition (CVR 2003). Youngers (2006) argues that during Fujimori’s regime, 22,000 people out of a population estimated at 27 million were unjustly detained or imprisoned. The highest numbers of detainees under suspicion of terrorism were in 1993 with 4,085 and in 1994 with 4,948 detainees (CVR 2003). Those

detainees were imprisoned for months without charges ever being laid and generally consisted of human rights workers, community leaders, journalists and members of the civilian population with no connection to subversive organizations (Americas Watch 1993).¹¹ Finally, children's rights were also violated as minors served their sentences in maximum security prisons in the same units as adults (Congreso de la República 2003).

Once the internal war was won, Fujimori maintained and expanded the state of emergency as means of ensuring continued electoral success and political control (CVR 2003). In 1991, at the height of the armed conflict, 48.7% of the population lived in areas declared as emergency zones compared with 57% in 1995 when the insurgent groups had been neutralized (Borja 1996). Aside from detaining those who spoke against the regime, the regime used a wide array of strategies to ensure compliance and cooperation from all sectors of the population. Through the SIN, Montesinos was able to manipulate promotions and placements of regime supporters in key police, military and intelligence positions; conduct espionage;¹² and induce a climate of paranoia by offering incentives for informing on others (Rospigliosi 1994). In fact, the SIN routinely collected any sort of information that could be used to blackmail or discredit anyone who opposed the regime or who did not follow orders (Conaghan 2005). To this effect, Montesinos put in place a broad and multi-level network of corruption that included government officials, judges, prosecutors, congressmen, businessmen, owners of newspapers, radio and TV, bankers, CEOs of financial institutions, renown journalists as well as TV and radio personalities and videotaped his exchanges for leverage (Jochamowitz 2002).¹³ When the regime was not able to influence or corrupt someone, they would be transferred, blackmailed or threatened and, in extreme cases, tortured or killed (CVR 2003).

Governance reform

Once he ensured control over the military, the police and the intelligence services, Fujimori announced that the government as well as the judicial system needed restructuring. He claimed Congress was hampering his ability to pass necessary legislation to win the internal war (Mauceri 2006). After months of tension and conflict between the Executive and the Legislative, Fujimori created a civilian dictatorship by suspending the constitution and closing down Congress on 5 April 1992. During his announcement, he declared that Congress was being temporarily closed until the approval of a new organic structure of the Legislature and that there would be a complete overhaul of the Judiciary, National Magistrates Council, Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees, the Attorney General's office as well as the General Comptroller of the Republic's office (Kenney 2004).

Between April and December 1992, hundreds of decrees were passed reorganizing public administration and the judiciary. These decrees legalized mass firings in

the public sector and disallowed any appeal of the dismissals. Forty-seven out of the first 72 decrees regarded the firing of public ministry personnel, the central reserve bank and the national comptroller's office (Conaghan 2005). The public sector was then reorganized by personally appointing key positions; dissolving institutions, boards and committees; creating new institutions under his direct control such as the Ministry of the Presidency; and reducing long-held prerogatives of municipal governments (Mauceri 2006). Governance reforms concentrated power in the hands of the Executive, and this trend was institutionalized within the new Constitution.

On December 1992, a Constitutional Congress was elected and Fujimori's party obtained a clear majority. Under the new Constitution, Congress was reduced in size and saw its power to control the Executive significantly curtailed (Mauceri 2006). For instance, the President no longer required Congress approval for signing international treaties. Furthermore, Congress became more vulnerable to the threat of dissolution by the president as it only required for Congress to veto two Ministers or Cabinets before allowing the President to call for new legislative elections and rule by decree in the interim. The new Constitution also created "urgent" decrees¹⁴ which could be put into place without authorization from Congress; it also allowed for new items to be added for immediate congressional deliberation if the majority present voted in favour (Conaghan 2005). As a result, whereas prior to 1992 most bills were introduced by Congress, after 1993 most were introduced by the regime (Schulte-Bockholt 2013).

The new Constitution created new oversight mechanisms and institutions that gave the Executive *de facto* control over the Legislative and Judicial powers (Conaghan 2005). These powers were no longer able to hold the Executive accountable and instead become accountable to it. After the new Constitution was introduced, Congress no longer used its prerogative to form multiparty investigative commissions when serious accusations against the Executive surfaced (Mauceri 2006). Congress also literally gave a blank check to the Executive as it adopted budgets with no detailed information on how the ministries would be spending the money (Apoyo 2001). In the same vein, decrees authorizing budgetary transfers and expenditures were never made public (Conaghan 2005).

The Judiciary was also rendered incapable of and unwilling to control the Executive. Upon shutting down Congress, Fujimori dismissed 13 magistrates from the Supreme Court and 89 judges from across the country, replacing them with provisional judges at the mercy of the Executive (Human Rights Watch 2005). The only bodies that could keep the Executive in check (the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Tribunal and the General Council of Magistrates) were dismantled and the new members were appointed by institutions under the control of the Executive (Mauceri 2006). Furthermore, laws were used to limit the reach of the Judiciary. For instance, the law decree 26479 of 14 June 1995 (voted at

three in the morning) absolved from criminal responsibility and from all forms of accountability all military, police and civilian agents of the state who were accused, investigated, charged, processed or convicted for common and military crimes caused by the “war against terrorism” from May 1980 until June 1995 (Conaghan 2005). This law represented a blanket amnesty and was heavily criticized by human rights agencies and NGOs as well as the international community. When administration officials were accused of corruption or human rights abuses, judges and prosecutors were pressured to end investigations and many were dismissed when they did not (Mauceri 2006).

The reforms transformed the Judiciary into a tool of violence: it was used by the Executive to persecute the opposition and to pardon crimes and human rights violations from sympathizers or allies (Apoyo 2001). The control the Executive had over the Legislative and Judiciary power was so extensive that even though accusations begun to appear, as early as 1993, against Montesinos and Fujimori for corruption, fraud, embezzlement, racketeering, illegal wiretapping, human rights violations as well as arms and drug trafficking, no heed was paid.¹⁵ Furthermore, the Legislative and the Judiciary acted in unison to support the will of the Executive. For instance in 1997, Congress removed three judges from the Constitutional Tribunal out of the four who had vetoed Congress’ interpretation of the Constitution allowing Fujimori to run for a third term in office (McClintock 2006). The Judiciary named replacements that immediately went on to support Congress’ interpretation and admit him as a presidential candidate. In this way, through governance reform Fujimori created a network of corruption and impeded free, competitive elections.

Economic reform

Immediately after coming into office and going against his electoral promises, Fujimori conducted a wide range of economic reforms that resulted in Peru being readmitted to the international financial community (Kenney 2004). Fujimori’s economic policy started with renewing payments to the external debt followed by the introduction of two sets of major reforms (Roberts 1995). The first wave of reforms was geared towards stabilizing the economy by cutting price subsidies, social spending and employment in the public sector; increasing interest rates and taxes; as well as unifying exchange rates. The second wave of reforms deregulated financial and labour markets, reduced and unified tariffs and privatized public enterprises¹⁶ (Roberts 1995: 92).

The reforms eliminated many fundamental individual and collective workers’ rights.¹⁷ Employment stability was annihilated through legislative decree 728 which allowed employers to fire without cause¹⁸ and expanded the conditions permitting the use of temporary contracts and outsourcing (Loayza 2011). Working

conditions were also negatively affected by the new Constitution which limited the right to collective negotiation and the right to strike while decreasing the state's responsibility towards workers (Fernández-Maldonado 2011). Furthermore, stability agreements with transnational corporations were signed which implemented accelerated depreciation; allowed for investments in public infrastructure as well as for the cost of research and mining exploration to be deducted from tax payments due; and exonerated tax payments until the initial investment was recuperated or until production was increased more than 10% by reinvesting income already generated (Campodónico Sanchez 1999). These agreements were safeguarded by the 1993 constitution which prohibited changing any laws protecting the interests of transnational extractive capital (Lust 2016).

Fujimori's regime successfully implemented a neoliberal market-based ideology by rendering the market the organizing principle of the economy, the state and society as a whole. The economic reform adopted by Fujimori went above and beyond what was being advocated by financial institutions at that time (Vergara and Encinas 2016). Although these reforms resulted in significant gains for capital, they did not benefit the majority of the population. Unemployment levels did not change and purchasing power levels remained the same to those of the hyperinflation period of 1988–1989 (Fernández-Maldonado 2011). Moreover, Fujimori's regime used the economic reforms for personal gain and to ensure the continuation of the regime. In fact, the regime promoted a culture of corruption where laws and rules were continuously broken (CVR 2003). Although the level of corruption between 1990 and 2001 was unprecedented, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of the economic crimes committed between 1990 and 2001 (Escárzaga 2001). Nonetheless, it is estimated that economic crimes and corruption during this time cost the Peruvian economy between 1.5 and 4 billion USD (Quiroz 2008).

Money was embezzled not only from the sale of hundreds of state owned enterprises¹⁹ but also from contracts being awarded,²⁰ development or aid programmes and the national budget. However, money was not only syphoned out for personal gains but also to ensure the continuity of the regime (CVR 2003). For instance, money was redirected to the SIN for use in the election campaigns of Fujimori and his allies (Conaghan 2005). The money was also used to pay major TV and radio stations in order to have control over the news programming (Conaghan 2005). The regime payed off news media outlets to ensure a positive portrayal of Fujimori and his actions, distract the population from information the regime did not want to discuss, fabricate information when needed as well as denounce and discredit the opposition (Schulte-Bockholt 2013).

The neoliberal economic reforms implemented by Fujimori created ideal conditions for corruption, fraud and other forms of economic crimes to be committed. However, this is far from an abnormality; fraud and corruption are encouraged by

a moral culture present in contemporary capitalist societies (Whyte and Wiegatz 2016). Neoliberalism advances values that foster routine fraud and corruption and reinforce these types of practices (Wiegatz 2010). The cultural norms and values that guide economic practices and encourage corruption are not contained within an elite subculture but are widespread throughout society (Whyte and Wiegatz 2016).

Articulation of Authoritarianism, Populism With Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is a loose and contradiction-laden ideological framework (Clarke 2008) consisting of practices that are sometimes complex, incoherent, unstable and even contradictory (Shamir 2008). Precisely because there is no universal neoliberal core or essence, it is important to understand neoliberalism in its specific forms and formations (Ong 2006) by looking at processes of contextual assemblages, articulations and translations (Clarke 2008). Fujimori was successful in implementing a neoliberal social order because, aside from providing a quick, effective and resolute solution to the economic crisis and the internal war, he was effective in articulating neoliberal principles with the “end of politics”, the rise of populism and an authoritarian tradition.

The Peruvian pacification process took place in an international context characterized by the “end of politics” as there no longer seem to be a legitimate political battle between well-founded economic models. In this regard, the fall of the communist countries represented a heavy blow to global challenges to liberal market ideologies resulting in capitalism being heralded as the victorious economic model and the defining feature of the current era (Jackson 2013). In a similar fashion, at the national level, the insurgency served to delegitimize the political challenges to capitalism of the previous 20 years as all anti-capitalist projects were linked to the violence and destruction of the internal war (Felices-Luna 2013). In a context with no apparent credible and viable alternatives to capitalism, Fujimori encountered no actual opposition or significant challenge to his neoliberal ideological push.

The disenchantment with traditional politics was accompanied by a rise of populism: the 1990 elections were disputed between two candidates with no previous political experience and the winner was the one who most successfully pandered to the insecurities of the electorate. In this regard, Fujimori’s only unequivocal statement was that he would not put in place a neoliberal reform. Fujimori was elected by quieting people’s fear but also by presenting the image of the hard working, self-made man, outsider to the political class, who wanted change. His party was Change 90 and his slogan was indeed representative of neoliberal values: “technology, work and progress”. Fujimori’s demeanour was personalistic

and informal, a “man of the people” who used his difference and awkwardness to relate to the electorate. He went on to build a political movement around his persona, creating a new party for each election.

After being elected, Fujimori articulated a technocratic neoliberalism with microlevel populism where material resources were exchanged for political support (Roberts 1995). He was successful in convincing people that their interests, however divergent, were best being served by being loyal to him (Mauceri 2006). Furthermore, Fujimori maintained throughout his regime a populist rhetoric: he attacked the political class and undermined democratic institutions. Fujimori repeatedly stated the need for drastic actions in a time of crisis; the threat represented by the elites in Congress and the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees who were blocking the necessary reforms to protect their self-interests; the possibility of needing to, in spite of himself, act outside the boundaries of the Constitution as a result of the looming crisis and the obstruction represented by political parties; the need for radical reorganization of an inefficient and corrupt Judiciary; and his solid belief that the only person who could lead the country out of this crisis was a civilian with a firm and full control over the armed forces (Kenney 2004). These assertions found echo among very diverse segments of the population who supported Fujimori’s reforms.

Fujimori’s pacification was conditioned by a particular national history characterized by a significant authoritarian tradition.²¹ This tradition comprised, on one hand, a military that believes it is their right and duty to ensure civilian governments govern properly and to interfere when they do not, and, on the other hand, a collective imagery that advocates for democracy in times of prosperity but demands the firm hand of the military to handle crises and problems (Felices-Luna 2013). Fujimori successfully played on this collective imagery when justifying all of his reforms as well as his decision to close down Congress. As a result, by 1995 the country was under a joint armed forces-Fujimori government, its democratic institutions were precarious, and state power was exercised in a coercive, manipulative and arbitrary fashion with no organized opposition (Quijano 1995).

Fujimori’s authoritarian practices were strengthened by his willingness to curtail civil liberties and resort to oppressive measures and human rights violations in order to obtain strict obedience. Furthermore, he successfully rendered a significant portion of the population complicit in downgrading democracy and human rights (Degregori 2001). He justified these actions and measures on the basis of the results obtained. In other words, he legitimated his regime through the rule of outcome and not the rule of law (Sagasti and Hernández 1994). The system of checks and balances did not function because nobody was willing to make them work. Those in charge of monitoring the Executive circumvented constitutional norms and undermined the principle of accountability. It was the people inside the

democratic institutions who, by putting themselves at the service of Fujimori, strengthened the authoritarian regime (Conaghan 2005).

Fujimori's outstanding success came from being able to present himself as the embodiment of what the new social order represented. Fujimori perfected the art of balancing authority with self-mockery, ruthlessness with charisma and industriousness with light-heartedness. It was through this public image, his victory over the internal war and his success at stabilizing the economy that Fujimori managed to maintain an unprecedented level of public support throughout his regime. Aside from the period 1992–1995 when the regime was a civilian dictatorship, Fujimori was democratically elected three times. His approval rating tended to be around 54.3% (Barr 2003) and never dropped below 40% (Carrión 2006). Soon after the self-coup and the arrest of the leaders of the two insurgent organizations, Fujimori's approval rating went from 53% to 81% (Carrión 2006). Moreover, between 1993 and 1994 at the height of his controversial reforms, his approval rating was between 60 and 70% (Conaghan 2005) and during his polemic third re-election his popularity averaged 45% (Carrión 2006).

Democratic Neoliberal Populism

The anti-institutionalization practices of neoliberal populist leaders pave the way for the continuation of neoliberal populism after the end of their regime (Weyland 2006). As a result, the downfall of Fujimori represented the end of an authoritarian regime but not the end of neoliberal populism. Since 2001, the three democratically elected presidents have continued (in a more or less successful way) to engage in neoliberal populist politics in such a way that populist politics has become the norm.²² Toledo used his ethnicity and personal success story²³ during his campaign to draw support from the disenfranchised and promised to follow market economics with a human face (Barr 2003). García was re-elected in 2006 using the slogan “you know how I work!” Given the debacle of his previous government, this was a bold move that demonstrates the sway of a charismatic leader. Finally, Humala aligned himself with Morales and Chavez and articulated a neo-developmental economic programme (Burton 2011). Humala's campaign deployed a bellicose rhetoric against neoliberalism announcing that his programme “the great transformation” would return to the 1979 Constitution and put an end to neoliberal policies (Vergara and Encinas 2016). Despite having campaigned on promises and platforms that would challenge in one way or another Fujimori's neoliberalism, nothing changed: Toledo continued with Fujimori's neoliberal policies while attempting to put in place social programmes and increasing social expenditure without success (Burton 2011; Lust 2016); García became a “born again neoliberal” and deepened the economic liberalisation policies and market

reforms put in place by Fujimori (Gordon and Webber 2016); and Humala did a face about turn and embraced neoliberalism and extractive capital (Lust 2016).

Although the extent of human rights violations, economic crimes and corruption appear to have significantly lessened since the end of Fujimori's regime, they continue to take place.²⁴ Serious harms are also caused by neoliberal populist policies and practices which expropriate indigenous communities' land,²⁵ force the relocation or displacement of communities and populations, cause environmental pollution and degradation, criminalize social protest, generate unstable and dangerous working conditions and facilitate the predatory extraction of natural resources.²⁶ This predatory extractive model relies on accumulation by dispossession and results in new forms of dependency toward multinational capital (Gordon and Webber 2016). The harms and crimes resulting from extractive neoliberalism have given way to social protest and unrest. Toledo's strategy was to weaken the protestors through mechanisms of concertation that yielded no actual results. García relied on criminalization and repression: on 5 June 5 2009 during the height of mobilisations against the Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) which made possible to sell 64% of Peruvian forests to transnational corporations, 33 people were killed (Burrton 2011). Humala continued this approach; in the first 23 months of his government, 19 people were killed during state repression of protestors (Lust 2016). The security reforms implemented during the internal war hardened the security apparatus (police were given more power, the military was granted the right to intervene in domestic social conflict and the legal system imposed tight restrictions on individual and collective democratic rights and liberties), and this was used to discipline challenges to the neoliberal social order (Gordon and Webber 2016).

The three democratically elected presidents pursued the pacification project initiated by Fujimori. Continued pacification is necessary because it ensures the secured foundation for practices of capital accumulation (Neocleous 2013) but, most importantly, because the neoliberal economic system put in place creates harms²⁷ which then produce social unrest. In this regard, pacification secures the insecurity caused by capitalist accumulation (Neocleous 2011a). Resistance, no matter how embryonic, must be pacified to produce the docile subjects needed by neoliberal social order (Neocleous 2011b). Furthermore, the narrow definition of politics and of rightful political action produced by neoliberal order neutralizes legitimate politics as a source of social change while criminalizing alternative forms of politics; in this way, depoliticization is pacification (Jackson 2013).

Conclusion

Fujimori's pacification process significantly transformed the political, economic and social landscape of the country. Prior to pacification, political parties represented

the interests of the oligarchy and were constantly challenged by social movements and political parties advocating for social, political and economic transformations. After pacification was initiated, the “end of politics” was declared and populism enshrined. This delegitimated any political opposition and allowed technocrats to govern in the interest of capital through the implementation of neoliberal values. The economic landscape went from a burgeoning industrialization process somewhat safeguarded with protectionist policies to a return to predatory extraction of natural resources by multinational capital. Finally, the social landscape was significantly transformed. The collective values that were prevalent and legitimate prior to the 1990s became outdated and even dangerous under the new neoliberal values. Consequently, social movements advocating for social transformation lost traction and were replaced by grassroots organizations within specific communities protecting/defending local interests but without being able or willing to organize and act collectively at the national level. In other words, whereas some of these groups might be able to impose limitations to mining concessions, these limitations only benefit their specific locale and do not challenge the predatory exploitation of natural resources.

Pacification was possible through the articulation of neoliberal ideas and values with authoritarian legacies and populist politics. Through Fujimori’s reforms, authoritarian practices and neoliberal principles were incorporated into regular law thus significantly transforming social order and protecting it from any changes once democracy was reinstated. Consequently, the current democratic form has at its core neoliberal and authoritarian values and principles. The real success of the pacification project in Peru lies in having successfully depoliticized democracy.

Notes

1. Sendero Luminoso is a Maoist organization founded in the late 1960s by Abimael Guzmán Reynoso. It was considered to be the largest and strongest of the insurgent organizations. The leadership was arrested in 1992 and in 1993 admitted defeat, called for a cease fire and requested peace talks. Although Sendero Luminoso remains active today, by 1994 it had no longer any significant military power or popular support (CVR 2003).
2. MRTA (Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) was born from the merger of a few leftist organizations (mainly of a Guevarist tradition). The leadership was arrested on 9 June 1992. The few remaining active members of the organization were killed in 1997 when the military entered the Japanese embassy to liberate the 72 hostages held by the MRTA for over four months.
3. Estimates range between 61,007 and 77,552 deaths (CVR 2003).
4. The economy shrank 25% between 1988 and 1990 (Roberts 1995).
5. 1,722% in 1988 and 2,775% in 1989 (Kenny 2004)
6. Vargas Llosa’s political involvement started as a response to García’s nationalization of banking institutions. Centre and centre-right political parties with the support of the economic, social and

- political elite created an alliance FREDEMO (Democratic Front) in 1988 and put him forth as their candidate.
7. In 1991, Fujimori decreed 120 new laws targeting the economy and national security (Mauceri 1996).
 8. Montesinos is an ex-army captain dishonourably discharged for drug trafficking and selling state secrets to the United States. Prior to becoming Fujimori's advisor, Montesinos was a lawyer specialized in defending drug traffickers and police officers charged with corruption and human rights violations (Jara 2003).
 9. Between 1990 and 2000, a minimum 272,028 women and 22,004 men (mostly poor indigenous and living in rural areas) were forcibly sterilized or sterilized without their knowledge as part of a population growth control policy.
 10. According to Congreso de la República (2003), there were 586 registered disappearances between July 1990 and April 1993 compared with 283 during the 5 years of García's administration.
 11. As Neocleous (2008) points out emergency powers tend to be turned against oppositional labour movements and radical political organizations.
 12. Montesinos put in place a vast surveillance operation targeting political opponents and government employees (Congreso de la República 2003).
 13. Over 3,000 videos have been found (Cameron 2006).
 14. Between 1993 and 2000, 1,003 urgent decrees were passed (Schulte-Bockholt 2013).
 15. Since then, Montesinos, Fujimori and General Hermoza have been found guilty of economic crimes and human rights violations.
 16. Fujimori privatized almost 90% of over 300 state-owned companies from strategic sectors such as mining, oil, electricity and telecommunication (Duvillier 2016).
 17. Union membership dropped from 20% to between 3% and 4% (Loayza 2011).
 18. Almost 1.2 million employees in the public and private sector were either fired or forced to quit (Duvillier 2016).
 19. The sale of state-owned enterprises generated 9.221 billion USD but only 6.993 billion entered the public treasury (Schulte-Bockholt 2013).
 20. 1.8 billion dollars were awarded to an arms contractor for weapons that malfunctioned or didn't work at all.
 21. Of 102 heads of state since 1821, 56 were military (Krujit and del Pilar Tello 2003)
 22. Following Fujimori's model, political parties or alliances are created or renamed for each new election. Those elected tend not to have any prior political experience: neither Toledo (2001–2006) nor Humala (2011–2016) had held office before being elected President and only 12% of the 2016 Congress were incumbents (Vergara and Encinas 2016).
 23. Toledo is also symbolic of the neoliberal "self-made man". He started off as a shoeshine boy and ended up with a PhD in economics from Stanford and professional connections to Harvard and the World Bank.
 24. An arrest warrant has been issued against Toledo for corruption. García and Humala are also being investigated for corruption and economic crimes.
 25. While in 2004 13% of indigenous communities' territory was given in concession to gas and petroleum companies, by the end of 2008, it had been increased to 70% (Pinto 2009)
 26. Mining investment went from 200 million in 1993 to 1.5 billion in 200 and 5 billion in 2010 (Gordon and Webber 2016).
 27. Violence, fraud and predation are ongoing, continuous and persistent predatory practices of capital (Harvey 2004).

References

- Americas Watch (1993) *Human Rights in Peru: One Year after Fujimori's Coup*. Lima, Peru: Americas Watch.
- Apoyo (2001) *Diagnóstico de la Corrupción en el Perú: Reporte narrativo*. Lima, Peru: Transparency International.
- Barr, R. (2003) "The Persistence of Neopopulism in Peru? From Fujimori to Toledo", *Third World Quarterly* 24(6):1161–1178.
- Bejar, H. (1969) *Les guerrillas péruviennes de 1965*. Paris: François Maspero.
- Borja, L.A. (1996) "Informe completo sobre la Guerra civil en el Perú: El Abismo de Fujimori", *El Diario Internacional* 27(January): 3–4.
- Bowen, S. and Holligan, J. (2003) *El espía imperfecto: La telaraña siniestra de Vladimiro Montesinos*. Lima, Peru: Peisa.
- Burron, N. (2011) "Curbing 'Anti-Systemic' Tendencies in Peru: Democracy Promotion and the US Contribution to Producing Neoliberal Hegemony", *Third World Quarterly* 32(9): 1655–1672.
- Cameron, M. (2006) "Endogenous Regime Breakdown: The Vladivideo and the Fall of Peru's Fujimori", in J. Carrión, ed., *The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press
- Campodónico Sanchez, H. (1999) "Las reformas estructurales en el sector minero peruano y las características de la inversión 1992-2008". *Serie Reformas Económicas*. No 24. Santiago de Chile: Naciones Unidas y Cepal.
- Carrión, J. (2006). "Public Opinion, Market Reforms, and Democracy in Peru", in Carrión, J., ed. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University: 126–149.
- Clarke, J. (2008) "Living With/in Without Neo-Liberalism". *Focaal – European Journal of Anthropology* 51:135–147
- Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (2003) *Informe Final*. Lima, Peru: Gobierno del Perú.
- Congreso de la República (2003) *Informe final de la comisión investigadora encargada de cumplir las conclusiones y recomendaciones a las que arribaron las cinco comisiones investigadoras del período legislativo 2001-2002*. Lima, Peru: Congreso de la República.
- Crabtree, J. (1992) *Peru under Garcia: A Lost Opportunity*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dargen Bocanegra, E. (2006) "Judicial Reform in Peru (1990-2005)", in J. Crabtree, ed., Degregori, C.I. (1994) "Shining Path and Counterinsurgency Strategy since the Arrest of Abimael Guzmán", in J. Tulchin and G. Bland, eds, *Peru in Crisis: Dictatorship or Democracy*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Degregori, C.I. (2001) *La década de la antipolítica*. Lima, Peru: Instituto de estudios peruanos.
- Degregori, C.I. (2010) *El surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso*. Lima, Peru: Instituto de estudios peruanos.
- Duvillier, L. (2016) "Los estragos de la flexibilización", *La Insignia*, 27 March. Available online at http://www.lainsignia.org/2006/marzo/econ_005.htm (accessed 13 May 2017).
- Escárcaga, F. (2001) "Auge y caída de Sendero Luminoso". *Bajo el Volcán* 2(3): 75–97.
- Felices-Luna, M. (2013) "L'imaginaire collectif et les pratiques de la violence politique au Pérou de 1950 à 2000", in I. Carel, J.P. Warren and R. Comeau, Dir., *La violence politique*. Montréal, QC, Canada: Lux éditeur, 163–178.
- Fernández-Maldonado, E. (2011) "Fujimori y los trabajadores peruanos", *La República*, 30 May. Available online at <http://larepublica.pe/columnistas/memorias/fujimori-y-los-trabajadores-peruanos-30-05-2011> (accessed 13 May 2017).
- Gordon, T. and Webber, J.R. (2016) *Blood of Extraction: Canadian Imperialism in Latin America*. Halifax, NS, Canada: Fernwood Publishing.

- Harvey, D. (2004) “The ‘New’ Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession”, *Socialist Register* 40: 63–87.
- Human Rights Watch (2005) “Probable Cause”. Available online at <https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/12/21/probable-cause/evidence-implicating-fujimori> (accessed 13 May 2017).
- Jackson, W. (2013) “Securitisation as Depoliticisation: Depoliticisation as Pacification”, *Socialist Studies* 9(2): 146–166.
- Jara, U. (2003) *Ojo por Ojo: La verdadera historia del Grupo Colina*. Lima, Peru: Norma.
- Jochamowitz, L. (2002) *Conversando con el Doctor: Expediente II*. Lima, Peru: El Comercio.
- Kenney, C. (2004) *Fujimori's Coup and the Breakdown of Democracy in Latin America*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Krujtit, D. and del Pilar Tello, M. (2003) “De los reformistas militares a la dictadura civil: la política militar peruana desde los años sesenta hasta el presente”, in K. Koonings and D. Krujtit, eds, *Ejércitos Políticos: Las Fuerzas Armadas y la Construcción de la Nación en la Era de la Democracia*. Lima, Peru: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 70–108.
- Loayza, J. (2011) “El Fujimorismo avasalló los derechos fundamentales de los trabajadores”, *La República*, 19 April. Available online at <http://larepublica.pe/19-04-2011/el-fujimorismo-avasallo-los-derechos-fundamentales-de-los-trabajadores-0> (accessed 13 May 2017).
- Lora Cam, J. (2001) *Los orígenes coloniales de la violencia política en el Perú*. Lima, Peru: Juan Gutenberg.
- Lust, J. (2016) “Social Struggle and the Political Economy of Natural Resource Extraction in Peru”, *Critical Sociology* 42(2): 195–210.
- Mauceri, P. (1996) *State under Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru*. Boulder, CO: HarperCollins.
- Mauceri, P. (2006) “An Authoritarian Presidency: How and Why Did Presidential Power Run Amok in Fujimori's Peru”, in J. Carrión, ed., *The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- McClintock, C. (2006) “Electoral Authoritarian versus Partially Democratic Regimes: The Case of the Fujimori Government and the 2000 Elections”, in J. Carrión, ed., *The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Neocleous, M. (2006) From Social to National Security: On the Fabrication of Economic Order. *Security Dialogue* 37(3): 363–384.
- Neocleous, M. (2007) “Security, Commodity, Fetishism”, *Critique* 35(3): 339–355.
- Neocleous, M. (2008) *Critique of Security*. Montreal, QC, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Neocleous, M. (2011a) “‘A Brighter and Nicer New Life’: Security as Pacification”, *Social & Legal Studies* 20(2): 191–208.
- Neocleous, M. (2011b) “Security as Pacification”, in M. Neocleous and G. Rigakos, eds, *Anti-security*. Ottawa, ON, Canada: Red Quill Books.
- Neocleous, M. (2013) “The Dream of Pacification: Accumulation, Class War and the Hunt”, *Socialist Studies* 9(2): 7–31.
- Neocleous, M. (2014) *War Power, Police Power*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Ong, A. (2006) *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Pásara, L. (1980) “El docenio militar”, in Juan Mejía Baca, ed., *Historia del ñru Vol XII Procesos e instituciones*. Lima, Peru: Juan Mejía Baca, 324–433.
- Pinto, V. (2009) “Reestructuración neoliberal del estado peruano, industrias extractivas y derechos sobre el territorio”, in De Echave J., Hoetmer, R. and Palacios Panéz, M. (eds) *Minería y territorio en el Perú. conflictos, resistencias y propuestas en tiempos de globalización*. Lima: Programa

- Democracia y Transformación Global, Confederación Nacional de Comunidades del Perú Afectadas por la Minería, CooperAcción and Fondo Editorial de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Unidad de Postgrado UNMSM, 85–103.
- Quijano, A. (1995) “Fujimorism and Peru”, *Socialism and Democracy* 9(2): 45–63.
- Quiroz, A. (2008) *Corrupt Circles: A History of Unbound Graft in Peru*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Roberts, K. (1995) “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case”, *World Politics* 48(1): 82–116.
- Rospigliosi, F. (1994) “Democracy’s Bleak Prospects”, in Tulchin, J. and Bland, G., eds, *Peru in Crisis: Dictatorship or Democracy*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Sagasti, F. and Hernández, M. (1994) “The Crisis of Governance”, in J. Tulchin and G. Bland, eds, *Peru in Crisis: Dictatorship or Democracy*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Schulte-Bockholt, A. (2013) *Corruption as Power: Criminal Governance in Peru during the Fujimori Era (1990-2000)*. New York, NY: Peter Lang.
- Shamir, R. (2008) “The Age of Responsibilization: On Market-Embedded Morality”, *Economy and Society* 37(1):1–19.
- Velasco, J. (1973) *La Revolución Peruana*. Lima, Peru: Eudeba.
- Vergara, A. and Encinas, D. (2016) “Continuity by Surprise: Explaining Institutional Stability in Contemporary Peru”, *Latin American Research Review* 51(1): 159–180.
- Weyland, K. (2006) “The Rise and Decline of Fujimori’s Neopopulist Leadership”, in J.F. Carrión, ed., *The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 13–38.
- Whyte, D. and Wiegatz, J. (2016) “Neoliberalism, Moral Economy and Fraud”, in D. Whyte and J. Wiegatz, eds, *Neoliberalism and the Moral Economy of Fraud*. Oxon: Routledge, 1–16.
- Wiegatz, J. (2010) ‘Fake Capitalism? The Dynamics of Neoliberal Moral Restructuring and Pseudo-development: The Case of Uganda’, *Review of African Political Economy* 37 (124): 123–137.
- Youngers, C. (2006). “Promoting Human Rights: NGOs and the State in Peru”, in J. Crabtree, ed., *Making Institutions Work in Peru*. London: Institute for the Study of the Americas.