

THE DYNAMICS OF THE AMAL MOVEMENT IN LEBANON 1975-90

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Introduction

Social and political movements both transformed Shi'ite Lebanon and placed them at the heart of Lebanese politics. But this socio-political "Shi'i transformation" did not start until the 1960s, for the following reasons: primarily, the geographical distance that separates the two main Shi'ite areas in Lebanon (Jabal Amil in Southern Lebanon and the Beqa), was considered an obstacle to combining the Shi'i community of Lebanon into an integral political entity; and secondly, the effect and the power of the Shi'i traditional leadership, *al-za'ama al-taklidiya al-Shi'iy'a*, which maintained its hegemony over the mass population of the Shi'i community.¹ One example presented by Odeh on the Shi'ite *zuama* is about Ahmad al-As'ad (a Shi'ite Za'im) who "was the most powerful landlord in the south of Lebanon. He, in fact, controlled the south and wielded more political power than anyone else in the regime."² Parallel to this "unstable" socio-political environment, the Shi'ites were kept outside the political formation of the Lebanese state in 1943. This kept the Shi'ites in Lebanon, marginalized and deprived of their social and political rights.³ The Shi'ites had not been able to play a momentous role in drawing the path of the Lebanese political system during the National Pact 1943 period and this explains their instability in their political power as well as their unremitting search for various incongruous political forms.⁴ Beydoun argues that the reason why the Shi'ites were not able to play any significant role during that time was because they were not able to achieve a real form of religious entity (i.e. a Shi'i entity) during the mandate period, like the Sunnis and the Maronites, and thus they came to the independence in 1943 and they were separated and not united in so far as they had various leaderships (*zuama*) who were busy struggling with one another.⁵ However, the need for a social and political change was given expression during the late 1950s and in the 1960s when the Shi'ites emerged as an important force in the Lebanese political arena. It was at this time that the Shi'ites became more attracted to Nasserism and to Arab Nationalism and to a variety of political movements and organizations, which included Palestinian movements.

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The Shi'ites underwent social and political change from the 1960s onward. This change transformed the Shi'ites' position from marginal into a significant socio-political power inside Lebanese politics. However, the socio-political and economic conditions affecting the Shi'ites in their rural areas, forced many of them to leave their rural areas of the Beqa and the South and to begin a "forced migration" towards the capital Beirut. This migration increased as a result of the Lebanese government's neglect of the rural areas of Lebanon (such as the Beqa, Northern and Southern Lebanon) and because of the instabilities of Southern Lebanon. Even in Beirut, the Shi'ites lived in miserable social circumstances in the "Belts of Misery" surrounding the capital and its "urban" population. Moreover, the uneven development of the Lebanese economy, and the rapid growth of Beirut on behalf of the other rural areas of Lebanon centralized the economic power within Beirut and this was one of the major elements in the Shi'ite migration towards the Lebanese capital. Furthermore, the Shi'ite presence was an advantage for the primary residents of Beirut, mainly the upper-class community, who benefited from the Shi'ites' presence. The Shi'i community who migrated to Beirut bestowed a major benefit to expand many businesses. Beirut became more advanced, and it became dependent on poor Shi'ite inhabitants. Simply, the Shi'ites played the key role in improving the Lebanese economy, which was disturbed rapidly and continuously because of the non-stop Israeli aggressions and incursions against the agricultural areas, mainly the South. On the other hand, the Shi'ites' presence in Beirut played the main role in introducing the Shi'ites to a new circle of social and political movements, mainly the left-wing movements and the Palestinian organizations. The rise of the radical and left-wing parties during that time gave a new prospect to the Shi'ites who joined these parties vigorously and actively. It is also important to note that the social circumstances, poverty, and misery affecting the Shi'i community influenced many Shi'ites to join these social and political movements. Moreover, the absence of the social and political movements and parties within the Shi'i community formed another dynamic explaining how and why the Shi'ites became active inside these social and political organizations and movements. The Shi'ites' socio-political revival, and transformation, intersected with the emergence of the Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon and the Shi'ites were drawn to join the Palestinian militant groups and to experience the practicality of these Palestinian movements.

The "presence" of Israel also laid its effect on the Shi'ite community, who began (after 1948) to suffer from its continuous aggressions. Israel was and still is the main threat to Lebanon. Internally, the potential threat was coming from the right-wing parties supported and backed by Israel, whose objective was to break down the Palestinian resistance, to eradicate its presence and power in Lebanon, and to put an end to the left-wing bloc.⁶ These factors inspired the Shi'ites to begin a new journey, searching for their missing political identity. This search continued until

the arrival of Imam Musa al-Sadr in 1959. The latter's presence in Lebanon was considered a turning point that marked the Shi'ites' revival and hastened the change that led to the emergence of the Shi'ite political entity. It is essential to note that there were two important aspects in the Shi'ites' political mobilization and the rise of the Musa al-Sadr movement: The first aspect was the political nature of Lebanon which affected the Musa al-Sadr social movement in the 1960s. The second aspect is the Lebanese Civil War which fragmented the structure of Amal and its political path.

The Significance of Musa al-Sadr on Shi'ite Lebanon

The Shi'ite political identity began to emerge shortly after the arrival of Imam Musa al-Sadr in late 1959. Musa al-Sadr was born in Qom, Iran, on March 15, 1928. His family originated from Lebanon, with branches divided between Lebanon, Iraq and Iran. The family was targeted and persecuted by al-Jazzar⁷ during the latter's campaigns against Jabal Amil in the late eighteenth century at the time when most of the prominent *Ulama* of Jabal Amil left the area to settle in Iran and Iraq. The life of Musa al-Sadr was scattered between Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. Musa al-Sadr moved to Najaf in Iraq in 1954 and this came shortly after the death of his father in late December 1953; however, in 1955 he visited Lebanon for the first time where he met his relative, Sayyid Abed al-Hussein Sharafeddine.⁸ "In the spring of 1955 Musa Sadr returned to Iran, but in the autumn of 1956 he returned to Najaf."⁹ Musa al-Sadr's years in Najaf were associated with a lack of financial support, mainly after the death of his father, and these financial problems influenced his decision to move to Lebanon.¹⁰ Moreover, the death of Sayyid Abed al-Hussein Sharafeddine in December 1957 left a huge vacuum within the Shi'i community in Lebanon and that void could not be filled by anybody other than Musa al-Sadr.

Shortly before his arrival to Lebanon, "in 1958 a *coup d'état* overthrew the monarchy in Iraq and Musa Sadr had to leave. He returned to Iran in the summer of 1958, disappointed by the conservatism he encountered at the *hawza* in Najaf."¹¹ He did not stay for long in Iran, and thus in November 1959 Musa al-Sadr went back to Najaf, "and it was there that Ayatollah Muhsein al-Hakim, who wielded great influence in Lebanon (one of his wives was Lebanese), urged him to accept the standing invitation to go to Tyre."¹² In Lebanon, he "found himself in a land that was becoming a favourite battleground for Arab Nationalist movements of all types. Nasserists, Ba'thists, Marxists, and all hues of radical nationalism were represented in Lebanon."¹³ His presence in Lebanon shaped the Shi'i community in a new political formula that introduced a new orientation to the Shi'ite political identity. By this, he brought an end to the *status quo* of the Shi'ites' neglect.

Musa al-Sadr's success in mobilizing the Shi'i community was achieved very quickly. He re-organized the local benevolent society (*Jamiyat al-Bir wa al-Ihsan*)

in Tyre, which was founded in 1948 by his relative, Sayyid Abed al-Hussein Sharafeddine. Moreover, he formed many social organizations and established youth clubs that helped the poor and strengthened their stay in their villages and towns, with an effort to reduce and eliminate migration towards the capital Beirut, and his notable works included those carried out with the Greek Catholic Bishop, Gregoire Haddad.

Political Shi'ism was steadily growing stronger in Lebanon at that time. Musa al-Sadr's triumph was the establishment of an independent Shi'i Council—the Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council (SISC)—in 1967, where he served as its first president until his disappearance in August 1978. This was followed by the foundation of the “Movement of the Deprived” (*Harakat al-Mahroumin*) in 1974, and it was capped through the emergence of Amal in 1975. Through the Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council and *Harakat al-Mahroumin*, al-Sadr succeeded in amalgamating and bringing together Shi'ite Lebanon—the Shi'ites of Jabal Amil and the Shi'ites of the Beqa. However, al-Sadr's relation with the Palestinians was more problematic and his worries regarding Southern Lebanon became true in March 1978 when Israel invaded Southern Lebanon.

The Emergence and Rise of Amal 1975-78

Even though Amal was not connected to the Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council, its roots go back to the early days of the SISC when Musa al-Sadr showed an interest in establishing a militant group “to defend the Shi'i community from both government neglect and deprivation, and from the Israeli aggressions against the South.”¹⁴ For instance, on January 20, 1975, al-Sadr called on the Lebanese to form a Lebanese resistance to protect the South from the continuous Israeli aggressions. He stated that the defense of the nation is not only the duty of the government, and if the government fails to fulfill this obligation, this should not stop the people (community) from holding the arms and defending their nation.¹⁵ Amal's military activities remained muted until July 6, 1975. Amal was officially presented by al-Sadr to the public as a militia on July 6, 1975, and this came shortly after an explosion at the Fateh camp training session in Ain al-Binya village in the Beqa, in which forty members from Amal were reported dead and around one hundred were injured.¹⁶ Amal fighters were described by al-Sadr during his press conference on July 6 as “the red bouquet of youth and redemption flowers who are the vanguard of Amal, who answered a call of the wounded nation which Israel continue to assault from every side and by every means.”¹⁷ Al-Sadr continued: “Here I am at this moment; I declare the birth of this noble National Movement [Amal Movement], which took on itself the responsibility to provide what it could to protect the nation's dignity and to stop the Israeli assaults, there was a desire from its members to

postpone the announcement of this movement (Amal) but sadly the incident forced our fighters to ask me to announce this to the public..."¹⁸

It is important to note that the emergence of Amal weakened the power of the Shi'ite *zuama* and led to the significant decline of their influence within the Shi'i community. This was the case with Kamel al-As'ad, who was opposed to Musa al-Sadr. Through these political spheres, Amal entered the second phase of its political transformation, which was accomplished through the foundation of its military wing, *Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya*, the Lebanese Resistance Detachments. The materialization of Amal militia emerged shortly after the start of the Lebanese Civil War and its role was demonstrated through Musa al-Sadr's political orientation. Salibi demonstrates that the Christian militias were not convinced that Musa al-Sadr's intention was to defend South Lebanon; rather, they saw the militant presence of Amal as part of the coming round of the Lebanese Civil War.¹⁹ Further, "the revelation of Amal's existence aroused Christian apprehension about active Shi'i involvement, not in defending the South but rather in the next round of the civil strife."²⁰ The Shi'ites saw this accusation from the Maronites as a cover for their war crimes against the Shi'ites and the Palestinians and to prepare the public for another cycle of violence.

In theoretical terms, the establishment of Amal goes back to the Palestinian *fida'i* presence in Southern Lebanon during the late 1960s and early 1970s. This also explains how the Shi'ites were fascinated by and attracted to the Palestinian *fida'iyin* during their presence in Lebanon, as well as to the left-wing parties because the Shi'ites felt the Palestinian struggle and they shared the same social conditions and the suffering of the Palestinian people in their Diaspora. This defines the concept of the high number of Shi'ites who joined the Palestinian militant groups and organizations. But beyond this, "the Shiites were also fascinated by the armed struggle practiced by the Palestinian resistance movement, specially in heavily-Shiite populated southern Lebanon."²¹

In practical terms, the Lebanese Civil War and the sectarian divisions within the various religious and communal groups altered the dynamics of Amal. Thus, the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War led to a new re-orientation of Musa al-Sadr's movement. Shanahan states that the emergence of Amal "also quickly spelt the end of the widespread Shi'a support for, and membership of, the Palestinian cause; somewhat ironic given that the PLO's Fateh faction had trained the nascent Amal militia in the mid 1970s."²² In 1975, Amal consisted of no more than 800 mainly unpaid or poorly paid volunteers.²³

The relations between the Shi'ites and the Palestinians were reflected through the cooperation between Fateh and Amal. Fateh took the responsibility to train and arm Musa al-Sadr's militia. Much like Fateh, "the political programme of Amal was relatively outspoken and pragmatic."²⁴ Both Amal and Fateh were looking for

alliances at that time. Amal was simply looking for a sponsor to promote its interests; thus, by allying itself with Fateh, Amal found this a good opportunity to increase its military capabilities on the ground. This was also seen as a tricky attempt by Amal to take over some of the Shi'ite areas in Southern Lebanon that had been dominated and enjoyed by the Palestinian groups since the late 1960s.

Amal's role grew faster in the wake of the Litani operation of 1978 and hence "the re-emergence of Amal was spurred by Israel's 1978 invasion."²⁵ But there was a major shift in Amal politics. It was at that time when the real politicization and polarization of the Shi'ites began to appear and to take different dimensions. The Litani operation also constituted an advantage for Amal to reinforce its presence in Southern Lebanon after 1978. At the same time, this Israeli invasion and occupation of Southern Lebanon created a new dilemma for the Palestinian organizations because it restricted the freedom of the Palestinian *fida'iyin* to operate widely on the ground. Moreover, the Israeli incursions that were focused on the Shi'ite agricultural areas and villages in Southern Lebanon began to attain success by turning the Shi'ite villagers against the Palestinian *fida'iyin* after 1978, and this led many Shi'ites to break away from the Palestinian organizations to join Amal. On the other hand, the increasing numbers of Shi'ites who joined Amal after its emergence were also verified by the notion that the Shi'ites were looking for a militia or an organization to protect them after the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had failed to do so; "those needs were met by the formation under the supervision of Amal, of rudimentary village-based self-defence militias. Not unexpectedly, tensions arose as pro-Amal villages barred the re-entry of PLO fighters in the wake of the withdrawal of Israeli troops."²⁶

The Disappearance of Musa al-Sadr and its Impact on Amal

The outcomes of the 1978 invasion of South Lebanon were catastrophic. There was massive devastation of homes, villages, and towns. There was also direct Israeli occupation. Musa al-Sadr began a journey through the Arab countries to discuss the Lebanese situation with the hope of ending the Israeli occupation, and to request an urgent meeting from the Arab League. Al-Sadr's last stop on his trip was Algeria, during which he was urged by President Hawari Boumedienne to visit Libya, as Colonel Muammar Qadafi had his influence on the ongoing political and military situation in Lebanon.²⁷ Norton argues that "according to the former associate, it was the Syrians, and particularly Foreign Minister Khaddam, who urged al-Sadr to accept the Libyan invitation."²⁸ By the end of August 1978 al-Sadr and two of his associates had disappeared. Since then, relations between Lebanon—mainly the Shi'ites—and Libya deteriorated. This had a direct effect on the Shi'ites' relations

with the Palestinians and mainly with the Palestinian organizations that were funded and supported by the Libyan regime.

The disappearance of Musa al-Sadr shocked the Shi'i community in Lebanon, particularly those who were supportive of the Imam and his politics. His disappearance left a vacuum that was not filled by any of his followers, even those who were very popular and powerful in the Shi'ite arena in Lebanon, like Nabih Berri. Through the loss of al-Sadr, the Shi'ites had lost power of their social, political and religious institutions and this created a wide void, which seemed to be restored through the Iranian Revolution. On the other hand, his disappearance "turned him into a national hero for Lebanon's Shi'ites and a symbol for their suffering and martyrdom."²⁹ However, al-Sadr's disappearance led to an increase in the division and dispute between the Shi'ites and the Palestinians. Faisal asserts that relations between Amal and the Palestinians entered a new phase of mistrust during that time. He adds:

Amal's relations deteriorated with some Palestinian organizations, particularly with those who were affiliated to the Arab regimes and were in a close relationship with Libya. The reason behind this is that Amal attributed responsibility to the Libyan regime for the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr. This was one of the most important factors in the deterioration of the relationship between Amal and the Palestinians, and specifically in the shifting of Shi'ites' political views with the Palestinians.³⁰

However, Salah identifies the problem by saying that there was a different leadership of Amal after Musa al-Sadr, and this new leadership did not react in the same positive way to the Palestinian issue. In fact, it acted unconstructively, which led to the Shi'ite-Palestinian dispute.³¹ As a result, confrontations occurred between the Shi'ites and the Palestinians. Goksil observes that the dispute between Amal and Palestinians evolved strongly after the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, he notes:

the whole relationship between Amal and the Palestinians began to deteriorate after 1978, so definitely the turning point was 1978. The true politicization of the Shi'ites in the South was the disappearance of the Imam Musa al-Sadr. The disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr made Amal more local and more radical. That is because the 1978 invasion cost the people of the South very expensively for the war they did not start and because when the Israelis attacked Southern Lebanon, they [the Israelis] did not attack the Palestinian camps rather than they attacked Southern Lebanese villages and that was the major turning point.³²

From here, it is important to note that the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr left a huge vacuum inside the Shi'i community, one that was hard to fill. Relations between Amal and the other rivalries, particularly with the Palestinians, began to suffer deeply.

Amal's Position after the Iranian Revolution of 1979

In February 1979, an Islamic revolution terminated the Shah's rule and Iran became an Islamic state. The Shah of Iran had been renowned for his corruption and his ties with the West and Israel. The Iranian Revolution was also viewed as a major success for the Shi'ites of the Arab world, including Lebanon. Amal supported the Iranian Revolution, and Amal members viewed Ayatollah Khomeini as their soul and religious leader; and because Amal was formed to fight the deprivation and the injustice, as well as Israel, therefore it was important for Amal to reinforce its connections with Khomeini (who retrieved Iran from the hands of imperialism and Israel). However, Amal chose to be a political-oriented Lebanese movement and not a religious one, in other words a Lebanese political party, and this political orientation posed a real dilemma in Amal circles between those who supported the Iranian Revolution and others who aimed to apply the "Iranian Model" to Amal and Lebanon.³³

On the political level, the Iranian Revolution had a direct impact on the political path of Amal. According to Sankari, "while the revolutionary ferment emanating from Iran inspired many disaffected and underprivileged Shi'is of Lebanon with the sense of identity and power, the implications for Amal were mixed."³⁴ Smit adds, "the Iranian revolution influenced the situation in Lebanon in that the Islamic state sought to export its Shi'ite revolution abroad and Lebanon with its large Shi'ite community seemed a logical target."³⁵ In practice, Iran had its impact on Lebanon even before the Islamic Revolution. There were deep historical relations between Shi'ite Lebanon and Iran, the latter of which had been the major supporter of Shi'ite Lebanon, since most of the Shi'ite clerics were trained and educated in Iran, and Qom was as important to them as al-Najaf in Iraq. It is also important to note that the relations between Shi'ite Lebanon and Iran developed further during and after Musa al-Sadr's presence in Lebanon. Musa al-Sadr himself was of Iranian origin, as also was Mustafa Shumran, who was one of Musa al-Sadr's closest associates. Shumran was one of the Shah's opponents. He first arrived in Lebanon in 1970; his arrival had a significant impact on the Shi'i community of Lebanon.³⁶ Shumran played a dominant role in Amal and he became the head of the technical school in Burj al-Shimali near Tyre in Southern Lebanon. Soon after the Iranian Revolution took place, Shumran became the head of the Supreme Council of Defense in the new Islamic Republic until his death in a plane crash on the Iranian-Iraqi border in 1981.³⁷

The Iranian Revolution restored the political life to Amal. It also created a new dynamic (of change) within Amal; which began to surface later on. It seems clear that the Iranian Revolution inspired the Shi'ites of Lebanon deeply; this inspiration influenced many Shi'ites in Lebanon who in late 1978 "began to set up committees in mosques and *husayniyyas* in support of the Iranian revolution."³⁸ Amal members

were taking the lead in this matter to the point that “in early 1979, despite the pressure they were under, 500 Amal militiamen volunteered to go to Iran and fight for the revolution.”³⁹ In short, the Iranian Revolution became the main sponsor of the Shi’ites in Lebanon, mainly for those who were affiliated to Amal, and it served as a major connection between the Lebanese Shi’ites and those of Iran after 1979.

The Friction between Amal and the Palestinian Organizations

The rising tensions between Amal and the Palestinians was associated with various events on the ground. These events established a new *status quo* of power-struggle between Amal and the various existing powers in Southern Lebanon—amongst them the Palestinians and their Lebanese alliances, and behind them the parties who were affiliated in particular to both Iraq and Libya. The main reason behind these clashes was that Amal became very close to Iran after the Islamic Revolution and closer to the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war. Moreover, the PLO in general and Yassir Arafat in particular supported Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war and this played a major role in increasing the tension between Amal and the Palestinians. At the same time, the Iran-Iraq war created more divisions within the Shi’i community in Lebanon because there were various Shi’ite circles who were affiliated to Iran and other Shi’ite circles that were related to Iraq. According to Brynen, Amal’s tension with Fateh and the Palestinians was more related to the Syrians, who were trying to expand their hegemony via Amal towards the PLO and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) areas in Southern Lebanon. He states, “Fateh responded with increasingly heavy military force against Amal and pro-Amal Shi’i villages in the South, a move that further exacerbated tensions. By 1981-82 clashes between the two sides were commonplace.”⁴⁰ However, the escalation of friction between Amal and the Palestinians, started a trend for Shi’ite fighters (who were loyal to the *fidaiyin*) to break away from the Palestinian organizations and join Amal, showing their anger against the Palestinians and their military presence.

The polarization that occurred between the Shi’ites and the Palestinians at that time increased the divisions between Amal and Fateh and led to a series of physical conflicts between the two sides. Smit indicates that the first series of these fights between Amal and the Palestinians broke out in Beirut. He states: “the first fights between Amal and the Palestinian forces took place in the Beirut suburb of Shiyah in beginning of November 1979, causing eight deaths and over 30 wounded.”⁴¹ Another round of clashes between the two sides broke out on March 12, 1980 in the southern suburbs of Beirut, but this was quickly contained.⁴² Smit adds that the rounds of battles in the southern suburbs of Beirut at this time were related to the growth of anti-Iraqi feeling amongst the Shi’ites mainly after the killing of Ayatollah Muhammed Baqer al-Sadr in April 1980. Amal was in conflict with the Iraqi Ba’th

party and the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front.⁴³ The Ba'th party (of Lebanon) and the ALF were both part of the LNM. In Southern Lebanon, the conflict arose between Amal and the Palestinians when Fateh felt that it had lost its domination in Southern Lebanon. According to Abu-Khalil: "Once Fath perceived the growth of Amal movement, it tried to crack down on its bases through military force. Fierce battles were fought between Fath and Amal between 1980 and 1982. Fath employed brutal military force in some of these battles, indiscriminately bombarding entire villages. The village of Hanawayya, east of Tyre, was almost destroyed by Fath bombardment."⁴⁴ At the battle of Hanawayya in January 1982, indeed, Amal fought with the Palestinians who used heavy artillery against the village, leading to heavy destruction and casualties on both sides. Goksil confirms this:

At Hanawayya, the Palestinians had a base there and they had a clash with Amal and several Palestinians were killed in that clash and thus it spread, and became a very serious problem. It was the Democratic Front (DFLP) and Amal; Fateh tried to stay out of this battle, saying they were neutral, but nobody believed that. So, the UNIFIL had to separate the two sides by UNIFIL soldiers, otherwise it would have become a very serious problem between the two sides.⁴⁵

As mentioned earlier, the quarrel between Amal and the Palestinians turned more serious after the 1978 Israeli invasion. The villages of South Lebanon witnessed a series of battles between Amal and Fateh; this happened continuously through 1979, 1980 and 1981. The most dangerous battles were those fought in early 1982 and which continued frequently until the eve of the 1982 Israeli invasion. Norton notes that the fighting continued between Amal and Fateh in Beirut as well as in sixteen Shi'ite villages in Southern Lebanon in April 1982, the cruelest of these attacks taking place at the village of Burj al-Shimali, where Fateh bombarded the Technical Institute. The bombardment of the Amal Institute continued for ten hours.⁴⁶ On the other hand, "the fighting between Amal and the Iraqi Ba'th and Communists was to continue right up to the same day Israel invaded Lebanon."⁴⁷ It was clear that these fights went beyond control and it was hard to restore the "lousy" relations between Amal and the Palestinians after the eruption of these serious clashes.

Fragmentation of the Amal Movement and the Emergence of Islamic-Amal

The 1982 invasion constituted a turning point in the radicalization of the Lebanese Shi'ite political movements (mainly the Amal movement), giving rise to new fundamentalist movements within the Shi'i community in Lebanon such as Islamic-Amal under Sayyid Hussein Musawi. Abu-Khalil described Musawi as "a former schoolteacher whom [Musa] al-Sadr expelled from Amal in the mid-seventies

because of his insistence on establishing an Islamic republic in Lebanon.”⁴⁸ But Musawi remained in Amal until 1982, in the summer of which he was expelled once again. However, the seeds of the division inside Amal were laid during the fourth congress, also known as the Mustafa Shumran Congress (which took place between late March and early April 1982 in the Burj al-Barajina district of Beirut); it was attended by 400 delegates from Amal.⁴⁹ Through this, it was clear that the political struggle that emerged between Nabih Berri and his deputy Sayyid Hussein Musawi increased further and developed into a crisis. Musawi claimed that Amal was connected “directly” to Khomeini’s movement, thus making Amal part and parcel of the Islamic Revolution in Iran; Musawi’s commitment to obeying Iran laid its effect on the disputes inside Amal. On the other hand, “Nabih Berri’s rejection of the Islamic national module espoused by pro-Iranian Shi’a and his continuing support for the integrity of the multi-confessional Lebanese state, had alienated certain elements in the movement.”⁵⁰ The development of these two contradictory views inside Amal created an endless debate regarding Amal’s identity. Amal was living in a real dilemma during that time, which was the dilemma to re-define its identity; so the concept of deprivation, one of the key elements of al-Sadr’s movement, through the Movement of the Deprived seemed to be insufficient and invalid to re-define Amal’s political identity.⁵¹ The result was two identities struggling within Amal, one was Lebanese identity with an Arab orientation and the other was Islamic identity with an Iranian dimension.

Thus, if the fourth congress of Amal was a start point regarding the division of Amal, then the Israeli invasion in 1982 led to the major disintegration and fragmentation of Amal. By its indirect approval of the Israeli occupation of 1982, the Amal leadership placed itself in a critical position. The main challenge occurred when Berri approved and joined the National Salvation Committee, which was established and headed by the Lebanese President Elias Sarkis in June 1982. By approving and joining the National Salvation Committee, Berri placed himself in a questionable position, and this led to the withdrawal of the radical group from Amal. The dispute soon began to surface and it “aggravated a growing schism within Amal’s ranks between the secular-oriented leadership like Berri, and those, such as co-founder Hussein Mussawi, who sought to Islamicize the (Amal) movement.”⁵² In the light of these events and “with the active encouragement of Iran, al-Musawi, together with his 500 followers in Amal, withdrew to the ancient eastern city of Baalback, from which Islamic Revolutionary Guards had recently been deployed.”⁵³ Shortly after his break from Amal, Musawi announced the establishment of Islamic-Amal. Musawi settled in the Baalback region, where his followers received help and training from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards who were deployed in the Beqa. There were about 1,500 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards based at Baalback, whose “mission was to embark on the indoctrination of young members

of the Shi'i community of Lebanon's Bekaa valley, as well as providing them with irregular military training."⁵⁴ Even though the Iranian Revolutionary Guards were based in the Baalback region, another group did not hesitate to deploy in the Chouf mountains and take combat positions in the region, thereby demonstrating their support of the Palestinian *fida'iyin*, the left-wing militiamen, and the Syrians.⁵⁵ Simply, the presence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon played a key function in the formation of a radical Shi'ite movement in Lebanon that became known later as Hizballah or the "Party of God." On the other hand, it seemed clear that Islamic-Amal limited itself to the Baalback-Hermel region. Thus, the motives of Musawi for establishing an Islamic State in Lebanon were not able to spread as it was beyond what could be achieved in Lebanon. Finally, as early as October 1983, al-Musawi stated that his movement was part of [the Iranian] Hizballah, although not necessarily in organizational terms, "since every believer who fights Israel in the South or is prepared to defend honor of the Muslims in Beirut or the Beqaa is [a member of] Hizballah."⁵⁶

The Impact of the February 1984 Uprising on Amal

Events of the Lebanese Civil War escalated continuously starting from early 1984 onwards. Amin Gemayel sent orders for his army to resume an offensive against the southern suburbs of Beirut, namely Dahiy'ya, in the first week of February 1984. Within days, the army's operations, supported by the Lebanese Forces right-wing militias, expanded to the other areas and reached parts of West Beirut. Soon after, "on February 5, 1984, following three days of heavy fighting between Amal and the Army, the Army's 6th Brigade, commanded and manned by Shi'is answered Nabih Berri's call to stay in their barracks rather than attack his positions in West Beirut."⁵⁷ The assault against the Shi'ite-inhabited areas forced the Lebanese Prime Minister Chafik al-Wazzan to resign on February 5, 1984; his resignation was followed by a demand from both Nabih Berri (Amal) and Walid Jumblat (Progressive Socialist Party) for the resignation of Amin Gemayel.⁵⁸ However, Gemayel remained in power. It is essential to note that the February 1984 events brought the Shi'ite members of the (Lebanese) army to fight under Amal, which was "when Berri persuaded Shi'ite members of the Lebanese Army to defect to Amal, which proceeded to take control over West Beirut."⁵⁹ In respect to the Palestinians, Berri announced his "security plan" on February 24, 1984, which was the bombardment of the three Palestinian refugee camps of Beirut, Sabra, Shateila and Burj al-Barajina, and soon after that, Berri sent orders to his militiamen to surround the Palestinian camps.⁶⁰ The following day, Amal alongside the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) and the *Morabitoun*, were able to spread their control over parts of West Beirut.⁶¹ But that did not stay for long as in April 1985 Amal changed actors, allied

itself with the PSP and crushed the *Morabitoun* and eliminated their power in West Beirut. It is important to note that the *Morabitoun* were very close to Fatch-Arafat. Ahmed Jibril notes that his movement, PFLP-GC, provided massive amounts of weapons and support for Berri (Amal) during the 1984 uprising and these weapons came from Libya to the PFLP-GC before the 1982 invasion and were given to Berri while he was short of weapons.⁶²

Soon after the events of February 1984 had come to an end, the Lebanese political powers participated in the Lausanne Conference, which took place between 12 and 20 March 1984. By the end of April 1984, Rashid Karami established a “national unity” government and Berri became the Minister of State for the South and Reconstruction Affairs. Karami’s government was considered “a government of paralysis, practically irrelevant to the economic and social crises gripping the country, and this has made Birri vulnerable to challenges inside and outside Amal.”⁶³ In short, the 1984 events gave further power to Amal to spread over West Beirut. Parallel to this, the Multinational Forces (MNF) withdrew from Lebanon in February 1984, and this was followed on March 5 by the aborting of the May 17, 1983 Accord. On the other hand, between February and April 1984 the southern suburbs of Beirut witnessed the killing of around 192 inhabitants and the injury of 709 others, and a massive destruction of 4,571 houses in addition to the other 2,000 houses that were located at the front lines.⁶⁴

Amal and the Palestinians: The “War of the Camps” 1985-87

Soon after the Israelis had partly withdrawn from the Nabatiyeh and Tyre districts of Southern Lebanon in 1985, Amal seized control in the liberated areas. Amal militiamen began to appear at checkpoints in the liberated “Shi’ite” areas of Southern Lebanon. Another dimension that should be considered is the rise of the radical movement within the Shi’i community. The arrival of Hizballah automatically challenged the Amal presence post-1985.⁶⁵ Hizballah challenged Amal through its opposition to what was known as the “Battle of the Camps” or Amal’s war against the Palestinians. Yet Amal lost further credibility from the Shi’i community. Fayyad notes that the “Battle of the Camps” had a complicated regional dimension but that part of this war was linked to the Syrian-Palestinian dimension and because Amal “feared” the Palestinian military redeployment in Lebanon, which may have led to another cycle of violence.⁶⁶ Illustrating Hizballah’s view towards the “Battle of the Camps,” Fayyad continues: “Hizballah stood strongly against this unjust war and played the role of mediator between the two sides. Even on some occasions Hizballah intervened militarily [to end the conflict between Amal and the Palestinians], as in the Battle of Maghdouche.”⁶⁷ On the other hand, Beydoun claims that the “Battle of the Camps” was part of the “Palestinian military return to Lebanon,” and more

specifically the “return of Arafat” to Lebanon. He adds that “the Palestinians attempted to takeover Beirut with the help of Walid Jumblat (PSP), and from here the conflict emerged between Amal and the Palestinians.”⁶⁸ It is important to note that when the Palestinians fought in 1985, they fought to defend their refugee camps from this unjust war and their Palestinian identity from dissolution. From here, it is vital to note that the Shi’ite religious leaders issued *fatwas* prohibiting fights between the Shi’ites and the Palestinians. For example, Sayyid Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, who is considered the spiritual leader of Hizballah, stood strongly against this war and against the fights between the two sides, Amal and the Palestinians. In addition, Hassan Nasrallah⁶⁹ shares the views of Fadlallah. He describes the situation that occurred between Amal and the Palestinians:

The wound of the camps is still open, but joint efforts are underway by the Amal Movement and the Palestinians to heal it. They themselves admit, through self-criticism, that what took place was not right from the start, and should therefore be brought to an end. I do not know if the [players in the] political game in the region would want the matter to be reopened or remained closed, but it will probably come to an end. The future will witness a large-scale return by Arafat to West Beirut; it might not involve Arafat in person, but rather a heavy presence of individuals from the second and third tiers. This issue, however, should be solved within the context of an agreement between Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian leaders.⁷⁰

Amal’s war against the Palestinians “officially” started on May 12, 1985 when “Dawud publicly pledged not to allow the return of Palestinian fighters to Lebanon. He said: ‘We want their return, but only to punish them.’”⁷¹ On May 19, 1985, which coincided with the beginning of the month of Ramadan, Amal began its war against the Palestinian camps located in West Beirut. Sayigh notes that according to the official spokesman of Amal the story began when a Jeep fired at the area of Da’ouq, considered an unofficial camp within Sabra, and the incident led to the killing and wounding of several people.⁷² Amal immediately accused the dissidents of Arafat as being behind this incident. Sayigh adds that: “Some Palestinians said that Amal militiamen had followed a young man into Da’ouq to disarm him and that a quarrel had broken out during which shots were fired; others said that Amal demanded the handing over of a number of young men.”⁷³ Whichever element was of most importance, however, it seemed clear that Amal was looking for a suitable reason to attack the Palestinian refugee camps and thus the Da’ouq incident came “just on time” for Amal. Amal began a massive deployment of its artillery and heavy weapons and began shelling the Da’ouq area as well as the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra, Shateila and Burj al-Barajina. The fights engaged about 1,000 Palestinian fighters against 3,000 Amal fighters who were supported from the Lebanese Army’s 6th Brigade, mainly Shi’ite soldiers, as well as some Christian

soldiers from the Lebanese Army's 8th Brigade.⁷⁴ The situation deteriorated further, the Da'ouq district of Sabra camp collapsed on May 30, 1985, while the siege continued against Shateila and Burj al-Barajina camps as well as the Fakhani district of West Beirut. Upon these unpleasant events, the ministers of the Arab League called for a meeting to discuss the crises. Amal reaction arose very quickly, as was demonstrated when its militiamen hijacked a Jordanian plane and diverted its path to Beirut airport. Soon after they released its passengers and crew, the Amal militiamen blew up the plane on June 9, 1985.⁷⁵ Another hijacking incident took place on June 19, 1985 when an American TWA plane was hijacked by an Amal group and was diverted to Beirut. After releasing more than a hundred of its passengers, the hijackers took 39 Americans and the crew to the southern suburbs of Beirut where Amal's political and military power is based, and assassinated the pilot; they then disappeared. Stork notes that "After several flights between Beirut and Algiers, the Amal organization under Nabih Birri seems to be in control of the plane and the passengers, and has adopted the main demand of the hijackers for the release of more than 700 Lebanese men taken hostage by Israel to a prison near Haifa."⁷⁶

On June 9, 1985 Amal continued its attacks by targeting the Mar Elias camp; this was followed six days later by massive "human wave" assaults on Shateila.⁷⁷ The result of the first round led to a heavy destruction of the Palestinian camps located in West Beirut. Statistical reports show that, "in Shateila alone, it had been reported that 278 homes were destroyed partly or fully from the total of 406 homes during that phase of the war of the camps; at Sabra, the number of the destroyed homes reached 95 percent from the total property that forms Sabra refugee camp."⁷⁸ Moreover, most of the homes were looted, robbed, burned and bulldozed in the Da'ouq area.⁷⁹ However, the heavy cost of these battles led to the death of more than 600 people and the wounding of more than 2,000 others, and soon a ceasefire agreement was conducted in Damascus on June 17, 1985.⁸⁰

The Damascus Agreement was signed between Amal and the Palestinian representatives. Both sides agreed that the security of the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut was part and parcel of the security of Beirut; that the Internal Security Forces (ISF) would be responsible for the camps' security; and, last but not least, that police stations would be opened inside the refugee camps.⁸¹ The plan started with a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Amal fighters and the army's 6th Brigade from the Palestinian refugee camps; this had to be associated with the removal of the heavy and medium size weapons from the Palestinian camps.⁸² It was clear that Fateh-Arafat was going to oppose this agreement mainly because it meant that Fateh-Arafat was not able to return "militarily" to Lebanon and take political and military "revenge" on its opponents there.⁸³ The agreement authorized the ISF to take back responsibility of the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut; however, this brought back bad memories for the Palestinian inhabitants when their refugee camps

were policed and controlled by the Lebanese security (Deuxième Bureau) before the 1969 Cairo Agreement period. However, the Damascus Agreement did not end the war of the camps, but it determined the end of the first round of the battles. Moreover, Amal and its 6th Brigade received a supply of T-54 tanks from Syria in July 1985. The Syrian supply of weapons to Amal meant that hostilities were going to be resumed. Indeed, low-level clashes between Amal and the Palestinians continued until mid-May 1986.

Another round of battles broke out between Amal and the Palestinians on May 19, 1986. This new round lasted until the end of June 1986. Brynen adds that "The fighting finally died down with the deployment of Lebanese Army units and Syrian military observers around the Beirut camps on June 24 (1986)."⁸⁴ Sayigh notes that "The number of people detained by Amal during the second siege is said to have been 121, of whom all but 10 had been released by 8 July. At least 60 men missing since 1985 were never found. The Movement had three major prisons: in Bir Hassan, Harat Hreik and Murr Tower."⁸⁵

However, the third round was the most severe and cruel round of the war of the camps. It began on September 29, 1986, when a group of Palestinians fired on an Amal patrol at Rashidiyah. The incident against Amal led to the immediate surrounding of Rashidiyah where Amal asked the Palestinians to give up their arms; but the Palestinians refused to do so and thus hostilities began, and by October 1986 the fighting had spread to the Palestinian refugee camps of Sidon and Beirut.⁸⁶ The siege of Rashidiyah camp was considered the harshest, leading even to the intervention of the Iranians in an effort to alleviate the situation. Moreover, the Iranians went into the camp and after they had failed to end the siege they commenced a hunger strike, but that did not improve the situation.

The escalation of events continued until October 27, 1986, when Amal widely attacked Rashidiyah. In return, "a joint Fateh-DFLP force of some 800 guerrillas seized seven suburbs and villages around Ayn al-Hilwa in the next 24 hours."⁸⁷ By mid-November, Amal launched another attack against Burj al-Barajina camp and on November 21, 1986, Amal was able to occupy the town of Maghdouche in East Sidon which was viewed by the Palestinians as a major threat to their refugee camps, particularly Ain al-Hilwa. The importance of Maghdouche is its location on a hill above Ain al-Hilwa. "Three days later (24 November 1986) Fateh and the DFLP seized most of Maghdusha and nearby Zughdrayya in a surprise attack, at the cost of only three dead and seven wounded."⁸⁸ It was a successful attempt by the Palestinians to eliminate Amal power in Sidon, and after that the Palestinians were able to expand more and take over Amal's positions located in East Sidon; this was considered a major threat for Amal and its military presence there. Moreover, "Amal retaliated for its setbacks by burning hundreds of houses in the Abu-al-Aswad and Jmayjim refugee camps near Tyre expelling 7000 inhabitants on 27 November,

and by evicting hundreds of Palestinians from Fakhani and Bir Hasan in Beirut.”⁸⁹ It is important to note that the Palestinians were not going to give up the positions they had captured in East Sidon and Maghdouche before Amal ended its war and siege of the Palestinian refugee camps at Beirut and Tyre. Many attempts to end the conflict failed, especially on December 9, 1986 when Hizballah attempted to replace the Palestinians. After a hard negotiation process, the PLO was finally forced to surrender Maghdouche by the end of February 1987; in return, Hizballah and the Popular Nasserite Organization (PNO) took over the evacuated Palestinian positions, and these were soon given to Amal. Finally, “on 21 February (1987), 7,000 Syrian soldiers deployed in west Beirut, closing down 70 offices belonging to various militias and banning them from carrying arms in public.”⁹⁰ Strategically, the war concluded with the end of the battle of Maghdouche in April 1987, and was associated with the Syrians’ deployment at West Beirut. However, the Syrian deployment did not end Amal’s siege of the camps, which continued until April 7, 1987; it was on this day that the Syrians deployed around Shateila and Burj al-Barajina camps. The Syrian deployment allowed food access for the Palestinian refugees after 163 days of blockade. In April 1987, the war between Amal and the Palestinians was over; the cost of the war was the death of 452 Palestinians, another 861 wounded and the displacement of between 32,000 and 144,000 Palestinians.⁹¹ It is important to note that the end of the war of the camps terminated the Palestinian military presence in Lebanon, except for the PFLP-GC. In May 1987, the Lebanese parliament aborted the Cairo Agreement of 1969 from one side, thus retrieving the pre-1969 status towards the Palestinians.

The reflection of the “Battle of the Camps” and the increase of polarization within Amal brought another internal conflict for the movement. Picard asserts that “In 1987, for example, conflicts erupted between various local chiefs of the movement—Dawud Dawud, Mahmud Faqi, Hasan Hashim, Aql Hamiya, and Mustapha Dirani—provoking a series of attacks and ambushes and costing the movement tens of members.”⁹² Minor clashes evolved inside the Shi’ite villages, mainly in Southern Lebanon between Amal and Hizballah, for influence on power. This was exhibited rapidly later on and reached a climax by the end of 1987.

Rivalries in Conflict: Amal and Hizballah War of 1988-90

The cost of the “Battle of the Camps” was very heavy for Amal. Amal became the symbol of corruption and most of its district leaders began their “small wars” at various places in Beirut and Southern Lebanon. Amal was facing a real dilemma during that time. It had become less credible to its own people, and for the Shi’ites; many Amal members who disagreed on the “Battle of the Camps” disengaged from Amal and moved towards Hizballah. Goksil notes that,

Since 1985, Hizballah started to share Amal's domination of the Shi'i community. Initially Amal did not care too much, as it was confident that it was untouchable. Amal did not pay a lot of attention to Hizballah as it did not think Hizballah was going to be well organized, active and a serious challenger. By the time Amal realized this, their relationship with Hizballah had become misplaced.⁹³

On the other hand, Amal became more reliant on the Syrian agenda and that was sustained clearly through the "Battle of the Camps," whereas Hizballah was receptive towards Iran. "Thus Amal-Hizballah rivalries came to reflect, among other things, a degree of Syrian-Iranian rivalry even as the two countries shared common anti-Israeli policy and supported one another for common tactical goals."⁹⁴ According to the local observers in Beirut, the reasons behind the struggle between Amal and Hizballah were based on the deterioration of Amal relations with Iran, and Hizballah relations with Syria, and this deterioration led to the outbreak of the conflict between the two Shi'ite rivalries.⁹⁵ Fuller and Francke add that "The personal, ideological, organizational and international rivalries led Amal and Hizballah to confrontation during most of the 1980s, and the two militias fought a particularly bloody conflict from 1988 to 1990, in which allegedly more people were killed than in any inter-sectarian fighting."⁹⁶

The rounds between Amal and Hizballah began in West Beirut and the Shi'ite district of the Dahiy'ya in February 1988; "Ultimately, *Hizballah* succeeded in unifying the southern Shi'i suburbs of Beirut by defeating militarily Haret al-Hreik and other *Amal* strongholds."⁹⁷ The "defeat" of Amal in its war with Hizballah at Dahiy'ya pushed the Amal movement out of that district of Beirut for Hizballah, but the fighting between the two Shi'ite militias did not stop until several hundred people had been killed; by then, Berri proclaimed the defeat of Amal and this terminated their presence in Dahiy'ya in June 1988.⁹⁸ However, the fighting resumed at the Dahiy'ya once again on the last day of December 1988. Both Amal and Hizballah exchanged accusations claiming that the reasons behind these clashes were personal, but it seemed that the real aspects were far beyond that. The fighting was transferred on January 2, 1989, to Iqlim al-Toufah and Iqlim al-Kharoub in Southern Lebanon.⁹⁹ In just ten days, the Amal-Hizballah clashes led to the death of 88 people and the injury of 138.¹⁰⁰ Further to that, the Lebanese pro-Syrian parties, as well as some Palestinian militias (PFLP-GC), supported Amal in its war against Hizballah. Conversely, the Lebanese Communist Party refused to join this war against Hizballah which was considered as the "party of resistance."¹⁰¹

The Iqlim al-Toufah war between Amal and Hizballah left massive devastation. The resistance suffered from attrition between Amal and Hizballah. "At that time (1989), many Amal militants... chose to give up the armed struggle, even against Israel, and accepted the demobilization set out in the Taif Accord."¹⁰² The fighting

between the two Shi'i rivalries concluded "in 1990 after Syria and Iran negotiated a truce between the two movements and as the various sects of Lebanon sought national reconciliation."¹⁰³

Conclusion

This article concludes that the emergence of Amal was essential for Shi'ite Lebanon. The evolution of Amal went through a set of changes and transformations; this started with Musa al-Sadr social mobilization and continued through *Harakat al-Mahroumin* until the emergence of Amal in 1975. The presence of Musa al-Sadr was essential to the mobilization of Amal and the Shi'i community of Lebanon; however, his disappearance diverted Amal political direction and thus a new dynamic emerged post-1978. Disputes between Amal and its Palestinian rivalries began to surface after that, and this was demonstrated significantly in the brutal battles and clashes which caused severe losses and damages on both sides. In the wake of these disputes between Amal and the Palestinians (and the Lebanese left), the Israeli invasion of 1982 took place. The cost of this invasion was very heavy on both the Lebanese and the Palestinian resistance. The 1982 invasion also determined the fragmentations of Amal politics. Conversely, Amal power grew stronger post-1982, benefiting from the reduction of the Palestinian resistance and its military power after that date. A new dynamic arose within the Shi'i community post-1982 and surfaced in 1985; this was the appearance of Hizballah, whose presence increased the frustrations inside Amal. Both Amal and Hizballah struggled continuously from 1985. At that time, Amal was busy taking "revenge" on the Palestinians in the "Battle of the Camps," which continued until the end of 1987. While the "Battle of the Camps" was ending, Amal had begun another war with Hizballah, and the two Shi'ite rivalries fought between 1988 and 1990. After the Amal-Hizballah war, Hizballah became more open towards Syria. Amal in return moved deeper inside Lebanese politics.

Notes

1. With respect to the Shi'i community, their "traditional" leaders (*zuama*) were mainly from the Shi'ite upper-class and wealthy families, like the most of the Lebanese *zuama*. The well-known families inside the Shi'i community are: al-Zein of Nabatiyeh, Osayran of Sidon and al-Khalil of Tyre. The power of those *zuama* appeared mainly in the nineteenth century during the Ottoman rule over the Levant, where other families like the al-As'ad of Taybeh (Taybeh is a village in Southern Lebanon), and the Hamada and al-Husayni of Baalback gained their influence of being represented historically through powerful clans and tribes. For more information see Augustus Richard Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988), p. 15. It is important to note that the elimination and reduction of the above-mentioned feudal families (or *zuama*) within the Shi'i community of Lebanon created new *zuama*;

- those new *zuama* replaced the traditional ones and they have become the new *zuama* (leaders and rulers) of the Shi'ites like Nabih Berri.
2. B. J. Odeh, *Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict* (London: Zed Books, 1985), p. 89. For further information see *ibid.*, pp. 88-91.
 3. It is important to note that modern Lebanon was formed in 1943 as the basis of an unwritten political formula between Riad al-Sulh (the first prime Minister of Lebanon) and Bishara al-Khoury (the first Lebanese President post-independence), namely the National Pact of 1943, *al-Mithaq al-Watani*.
 4. Ali Fayyad, Interview conducted by the author in Arabic. Beirut, July 14, 2005.
 5. Ahmed Beydoun, Interview conducted by the author in Arabic. Beirut, January 9, 2007.
 6. The right-wing parties formed an alliance called *al-Hilf*. *Al-Hilf* was formed from the extremist Maronite Lebanese *zuama* (i.e. Camile Chamoun and his Party of Free Nationalists PFN, Emile Edde and his National Bloc NB, and Pierre Gemayel with his Lebanese *Kataib* Party, LKP). It is also important to note here that the PFN had also some Shi'ite members who mainly had allegiance to the al-Khalil family. The al-Khalil family established its own militia unit after the late 1950s and was involved directly in the 1958 crisis; moreover, when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, members of the al-Khalil family were involved directly in operating with the Israelis. Kazem al-Khalil returned to Tyre soon in July 1982; when he failed to re-establish contacts with Amal, he started operating with the Israelis. For further information see Odeh, *Lebanon*, pp. 108-111. See also Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a*, p. 110.
 7. Al-Jazzar came literally "The Butcher." The name refers to Ahmad Basha, the governor of Acre, who targeted and massacred the Shi'ites of Jabal Amil (in South Lebanon). Al-Jazzar killed and imprisoned the Shi'ite *Ulama* and destroyed their libraries and agricultural stocks through punitive raids in 1771.
 8. Saqir Youssef Saqir, *Al' Al-Sadr wa Usulohom wa A'lamahom*, pp. 10-12. Cited in *The Vanished Imam Musa al-Sadr Encyclopedia*, Volume 1 (Beirut, Lebanon: Editio Creps International, 2007).
 9. H. E. Chehabi and Majid Tafreshi, *Musa Sadr and Iran*, p. 143. Cited in H. E. Chehabi, ed., *Distance Relations: Lebanon and Iran in the Last 500 Years* (New York and London: Centre for Lebanese Studies in association with I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2006).
 10. *Ibid.*, pp. 143-144.
 11. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
 12. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
 13. Vali Nasr, *The Shi'a Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., 2006), pp. 110-111.
 14. This phrase was used regularly by Musa al-Sadr during rallies, speeches and press conferences.
 15. "Al-Sadr Yad'o Ila Insh'a Mouqawama Lubnaniya: Takhazoul al-Sulta fi al-Dif'a La Youlghi Wajib al-Sha'ib," *al-Nahar* newspaper, January 21, 1975.
 16. "Infijar Lojhom fi Markaz Lil Tadreib Kourba Baalback: 40 Qatilan wa Nahwa 100 Jareih," *al-Nahar* newspaper, July 6, 1975. See also Kamal S. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976* (Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1976), p. 119.
 17. "Wiladat Harakat Amal Rasmiyan, Da'wa Ila Ja'il al-Milishiyat Jayshan Radifan (Musa al-Sadr Officially Declares the Emergence of Amal Movement: A Call to Make the Militias the Alternative Army)," *al-Nahar* newspaper, July 7, 1975.
 18. *Ibid.*
 19. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War*, p. 119.
 20. Naomi Joy Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 1975-1976 Civil War* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 157.
 21. As'ad Abu-Khalil, "Druze, Sunni and Shiite Political Leadership in Present-Day Lebanon," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 7:4 (Fall 1985), 46.
 22. Rodger Shanahan, *The Shi'a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics* (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, an imprint of I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2005), p. 107.

23. Rosemary Sayigh, *Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon* (London: Zed Books, 1994), p. 171.
24. Ferdinand Smit, *The Battle for South Lebanon: The Radicalisation of Lebanon's Shi'ites 1982-1985* (Amsterdam: Bulaaq, 2000), p. 81.
25. James A. Reilly, "Israel in Lebanon, 1975-1982," MERIP Reports. No. 108/109, The Lebanon War September-October 1982, pp. 14-20.
26. Jamal Sankari, *Fadlallah: The Making of a Radical Shi'ite Leader* (London: Saqi Publications, 2005), p. 168.
27. Soubhi Munzir Yaghi, "Sab'a wa Ishruna Aman Ala Taghyeib al-Imam Musa al-Sadr, Mouasis al-Majlis al-Islami al-Shi'i al-A'la wa Harakat Amal," *al-Nahar* newspaper, August 31, 2005.
28. Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a*, p. 54.
29. Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), p. 22.
30. Ali Faisal, Interview conducted by the author in Arabic, Mar Elias refugee camp. Beirut, April 4, 2006.
31. Salah Salah, Interview conducted by the author in Arabic. Beirut, September 2, 2005.
32. Timor Goksil, Interview conducted by the author in English at AUB. Beirut, January 4, 2007.
33. Tawfiq Al-Madini, *Amal wa Hizbullah: Fi Halabat al-Mojabahat al-Mahaliyya wa al-Iqlimiyya* (Al-Ahali, First edition, 1999, pp. 70-71). See also: *Al-Harakat—Al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan* (Al-Shir'a, 1984, Interview with Aqif Haydar, pp. 85-86).
34. Sankari, *Fadlallah*, p. 173.
35. Smit, *The Battle for South Lebanon*, p. 118.
36. Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, *Shi'ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 92.
37. Rex Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon* (Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 133-134.
38. H. E. Chehabi, *Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade*, p. 203. Cited in Chehabi, ed., *Distance Relations*.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
40. Rex Brynen, "PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and Lessons," *Journal for Palestine Studies* 18:2 (Winter 1989), 48-70, at p. 57.
41. Smit, *The Battle for South Lebanon*, p. 124.
42. Helena Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon* (Hutchinson and Co. Publisher Ltd, 1985), p. 176.
43. Smit, *The Battle for South Lebanon*, p. 125.
44. Abu-Khalil, "Druze, Sunni and Shiite Political Leadership in Present-Day Lebanon," 47.
45. Timor Goksil, Interview conducted by the author in English at AUB. Beirut, January 4, 2007.
46. Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a*, p. 68.
47. Smit, *The Battle for South Lebanon*, p. 126.
48. Abu-Khalil, "Druze, Sunni and Shiite Political Leadership in Present-Day Lebanon," 49.
49. Dr. Khalifa, "Al-Shi'ite fi Lubnan: Thawrat al-Dimographya wa al-Hirman (2) Amal Towajih Marakat Tahdid Hawiyataha; al-Hawiya al-Wataniya aw al-Hawiya al-Radikaliya al-Islamiyya, Tatawor Adad al-Shi'a fi Lubnan bayna 1860-1984," *al-Amal* magazine, April 29, 1984. See also *al-Safir* newspaper, April 5, 1982.
50. Shanahan, *The Shi'a of Lebanon*, p. 112.
51. Dr. Khalifa, "Al-Shi'ite fi Lubnan."
52. Nicholas Blanford, cited in *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah*, Edited by Nicholas Noe with an Introduction by Nicholas Blanford (pp. 1-13), Translated by Ellen Khouri (London and New York: Verso Press, 2007), p. 5.
53. Sankari, *Fadlallah*, p. 197.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

56. Smit, *The Battle for South Lebanon*, p. 210. It is important to note that Musawi was linked to the Iranian Hizballah and not to the Lebanese Hizballah, as the latter remained anonymous during that time and until 1985. According to Mahmoud Soueid the word "Hizballah" (of Lebanon) appeared for the first time on leaflets that were circulated after resistance operations against the Israelis in May 1984. See Mahmoud Soueid, *Al-Janub al-Lubnani fi Muwajahat Israil: 50 Aman Min al-Sumud wa al-Muqawamah* [South Lebanon Confronting Israel: 50 Years of Steadfastness and Resistance] (Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998), p. 39.
57. Clinton Bailey, *Lebanon's Shi'is after the 1982 War*, p. 226. Cited in Martin Kramer, ed., *Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987).
58. Tabitha Petran, *The Struggle over Lebanon* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987), p. 348.
59. William R. Doerner, "Movements within Movements," published by *Washington Times* 125:26 (July 1, 1985).
60. Petran, *The Struggle over Lebanon*, p. 349.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 349.
62. Ghassan Charbel, Interview with Ahmed Jibril, leader of the PFLP-GC, *al-Wasat* magazine, issue 169, April 24, 1995.
63. Joe Stork, "The War of the Camps, The War of the Hostages," MERIP Reports, No. 133. June 1985, pp. 3-7 + 22.
64. See *al-Ahed* newspaper, issue 2, 1984.
65. The emergence of Hizballah in Lebanon was not publicized until February 16, 1985. The day also marked the first anniversary of the assassination of one of its influential leaders, Sheikh Raghib Harb in the Southern village of Jibsheit. The "Party of God" officially announced its existence through an "Open Letter," and effectively the party manifesto, which was presented by Sayyid Ibrahim Ameen al-Sayyid. For further information see the official text of the "Open Letter" addressed by Hizballah on February 16, 1985 to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World. Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a*, p. 167.
66. Ali Fayyad, Interview conducted by the author in Arabic. Beirut, July 14, 2005.
67. *Ibid.*
68. Muhammed Abed al-Hameid Beydoun, Interview conducted by the author in Arabic. Beirut, July 21, 2005.
69. Hassan Nasrallah has been the current Secretary General of Hizballah since 1992. The Nasrallah family originates from Bazourieh (a southern village located in the district of Tyre). His family moved to the Karantina district of East Beirut (one of the poorest areas of Beirut) where he was born in 1960. In 1975, and soon after the breakout of the Lebanese Civil War, he returned with his family to his village in southern Lebanon and soon he was appointed the local leader of Amal for his village, Bazourieh. In late 1976, he went to Najaf for religious studies; however, he came back in 1978. Upon his return, he became Amal's district leader of the Beqa valley in 1979, and a member of the political council in Amal. He left Amal in 1982 to join the new movement that became known later by Hizballah. For further information see Nicholas Blanford's introduction (pp. 1-13) to Noe, ed., *Voice of Hezbollah*.
70. Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah on *Civil War and Resistance*, interview conducted by the Emirate newspaper *al-Khaleej*, March 11, 1986. Cited in Noe, ed., *Voice of Hezbollah*, p. 30.
71. As'ad Abu-Khalil, *Shiite and Palestinians: Underlying Causes of the Amal-Palestinian Conflict*, p. 12. Cited in Elaine C. Hagopian, ed., "Amal and the Palestinians: Understanding the Battle of the Camps," Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., Arab World Issues. Occasional Papers: Number 9, 1985. See also *al-Nahar* newspaper, May 13, 1985.
72. Sayigh, *Too Many Enemies*, p. 225.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
74. Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, pp. 188-189.
75. Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, paperback), p. 584.
76. Stork, "The War of the Camps, The War of the Hostages."

77. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, p. 584.
78. "Al-Awdah al-Sohiya wa al-Ijtimaiyah fi Mukhayamat Lubnan al-Mohasara," *Balsam* magazine, Issue 134-141, March 1987, pp. 58-65.
79. Ibid.
80. Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, p. 189.
81. Ghassan Bayram, "Min Itifaq al-Kaheira Ela Itifaq Dimashq: Nehayat Houdna Am Bedayat Houdna," *al-Mustaqbal*, Issue 436, June 29, 1985, pp. 24-25.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, p. 190.
85. Sayigh, *Too Many Enemies*, p. 268.
86. Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival*, p. 190.
87. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, p. 593.
88. Ibid., p. 593.
89. Ibid., p. 594.
90. Ibid., p. 595.
91. Ibid., p. 596.
92. Elizabeth Picard, "The Lebanese Shi'a and Political Violence," UNRISD, DP 42, April 1993, p. 36
93. Timor Goksil, Interview conducted by the author in English at AUB. Beirut, January 4, 2007.
94. Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, *The Arab Shi'a: The Forgotten Muslims* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 217.
95. Ahmed Kamel, "Lubnan: al-Wifaq al-Americi al-Souri, Yofajir Harb 'Amal' wa 'Hizballah,'" *al-Yaowm al-Sab'ih*, April 18, 1988, p. 20.
96. Fuller and Francke, *The Arab Shi'a*, p. 217.
97. Picard, *The Lebanese Shi'a and Political Violence*, p. 37.
98. Ibid., p. 37.
99. "Lubnan: Al-Harb Bayna 'Amal' wa 'Hizballah', Niyran al-Dahiy'ya Toshi'il Iqlim al-Toufah," *al-Yaowm al-Sab'ih*, January 16, 1989, p. 13.
100. Ibid.
101. Abbas al-Sabbagh, *al-Nahar* newspaper, August 25, 2005.
102. Picard, *The Lebanese Shi'a and Political Violence*, p. 37.
103. Yitzhak Nakash, *Reaching for Power: The Shi'a in the Modern Arab World* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 122.