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Authors: EMMANOUIL MAVROZACHARAKIS[1]

Affiliations: Social Sciences, Political Science , university of Crete[1]

Orcid ids: 0000-0002-8922-9383[1]

Contact e-mail: mavrozaharakis@gmail.com

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Public Policy Public Goods and the Impact of the pandemic crisis with special respect to the case of Greece

Mavrozacharakis, Emmanouil

Dr. of Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of Crete,
Researcher of the Centre for Human Rights (KEADIK)

Abstract

People expect the state to provide them with a social security net. Whatever its defects, whatever the virtues of the private sector, no structure other than the state can today provide citizens with the basic public goods. Under right-wing governments, a very active role of the state is not expected. Also, is nor expected the introduction of a serious program of public investment and demand-boosting to stimulate the national economy and enter into a virtuous circle of recovery. Today many countries like Greece, which passed the economic crisis with drastic cuts in its traditionally deficient welfare state and its chronic underinvestment in public goods in key areas such as health, have to respond directly to the pandemic crisis. This fact leads in the short term to a revival of the debate on strengthening state powers and especially in strengthening public health systems. Political polarization is expected in the period after the end of the pandemic crisis focusing on welfare state issues. This, most likely, will leave plenty of space for social democratic and Keynesian approaches. It is very likely that in several countries like Greece the right-wing governance will come under pressure leading even to rifts in his hegemony.

Right-wing governance and public goods

The prevalence of the ideas of enlightenment and the rational spirit undoubtedly complies with the perception that economic, social, and political crises are not created by nature or god but by collective human choices and decisions (Shruti:2017,1-2). The same goes for overtaking them. We can therefore only regard the current right-wing governance in Greece as a result of a collective choice. At first sight, this choice was indeed rational in the sense that the electorate invests in the hope of an orderly state through the balancing of social development, the promotion of an intact economy. In this sense, the people felt that the right-wing could relieve the business of unnecessary state interference or bureaucracy, without the state abandoning its guaranty and regulatory role. From the above to a certain extent, the new right-wing government in Greece has taken up recently his legitimation of power. In the past, this legitimation has been broken because the right-wing rule was not accompanied by the constitution of an orderly state, as the right-wing party had been evangelized.

Claus Offe (1997,81): underlines that «all societies, to reproduce themselves in a manner compatible with the notion of "social order", must solve two reciprocal core problems in institutionalized ways. First, they must allocate (adult) human labor power to valued ("productive") functions, thereby situating "people" into "places". The set of allocation rules through which this task is performed includes selective exemptions from the expectation to perform economically valued activities that apply, in our society, to the young, the old, the sick, and the independently wealthy. Putting people in places is a process that results in patterns of (however unequal) inclusion, participation, recognition, self-respect, and discipline, as well as an overall pattern of division of labor. It provides people with relatively stable expectations as to where they belong and what conduct is appropriate in work and life. Second, societies must provide people, in equally patterned and routinized ways, with the means of livelihood in return for the valued functions they perform (or have performed at earlier points) and as a precondition of the continued performance of these functions. These means include income (or the claim to means of the consumption of “goods”) and protection (or at least partial, compensation of risks, or the incidence of “bads”). These two problems — the problem of production and the problem of distribution — can be institutionally solved in a myriad of ways». In other words, the mission of the

state governed by the rule of law “is not limited only to the care and planning of adequate infrastructure in the road and transport network, but also to the education of all young people, to the health of citizens, to the employment of all those who seek work, the quality of the environment and culture (Johnston:2002, 1). Moreover, this is in line with the idea of citizenship established after World War II by TH Marshall and J M Keynes and linked to the welfare state and the pursuit of political, economic, and social equality and cultural autonomy (van Sternbergen:1994, 1-10).

As Dahrendorf (1994, 13) states «Marshall defines citizenship as the body of rights and duties - the status - which goes with full membership of a society. This status is by definition removed from the vagaries of the market. Citizenship is a non-economic concept. It defines people's standing Independent of the relative value attached to their contribution to the economic process. The elements of citizenship are thus unconditional. This is as true for obligations as it is for rights. The right to vote, for example, is not dependent on paying taxes, although paying taxes is an obligation associated with the status of citizenship». The idea of democracy was therefore linked to the demand for more social justice and the creation of public services related to education, health, housing, urban regeneration, public transport, subsidized culture, and the arts.

Habermas (1994, 25) notes that « today, however, the expression 'Staatsburgerschaft' or 'citizenship' is not only used to denote membership of a state, but also for a status defined by civil rights The status of citizen is constituted above all by those democratic rights which the individual can reflexively lay claim to alter his or her material legal status». The rights therefore in a modern democracy far outweigh the sphere of the free economy or political participation and include social participation and distributive justice (Lamont:2017).

Together with the individual rights of freedom and the rights to freedom of expression and ideas, social rights form a framework that aims to live the life of a civilized being as opposed to state patronage and discrimination (Beetham:1998, 21-29). In other words, only through the revival of the democratic ideal and the establishment of the rule of law of modern times, public social space was established which guaranteed wider production of public goods and services, the mediation and harmonization of interests, the regulation and exercise of individual and social rights (Dewey: 1937, 457-67). Through democracy, in the end, the individual becomes a citizen and a person. However, investment in the citizen, namely in quality public

goods and social services such as education, health - care, social cohesion is what is needed to sustain a society the pressures of international competition and to respond to international challenges.

The welfare state and its functions are not only concessions to the citizens, but necessary conditions for the survival of a capitalist society. " (Midgley: 1997, 105-106). The issue of Democracy is therefore directly linked to the issue of social cohesion (Cuellar:2009), which many governments, being a victim of the syndrome of international competitiveness and neoliberal ideology, often overlook (Fougner: 2006). As Krugman (2004, 44) among others points out, governments should not fall victim to an Obsession with "competitiveness" because it is dangerous and can lead to mistaken choices. The idea that a country's economic progress is solely dependent on its success in the global market is an unreliable case based on empirical analysis. Krugman (2004,42) notes that «Most of those who have preached the doctrine of competitiveness has not been old-fashioned protectionists. They want their countries to win the global trade game, not drop out. But what if, despite its best efforts, a country does not seem to be winning, or lacks confidence that it can? Then the competitive diagnosis inevitably suggests that to close the borders is better than to risk having foreigners take away high-wage jobs and high-value sectors. At the very least, the focus on the supposedly competitive nature of international economic relations greases the rails for those who want confrontational if not frankly protectionist policies».

Moreover, the legitimacy of the state does not depend on whether it can manage globalization, but on how effective it is to deliver public goods to its citizens, at least with other entities, in a context naturally shaped by globalization. In a further sense «The promotion of a higher quality of life and the protection of human dignity should be regarded as a crucial element in any effort to globalize. Accordingly, globalization cannot mean the abandonment of all things to market forces. In other words, "the economic sphere cannot be separated from the more complex fabric of social and political life and sent shooting off on its trajectory. To survive and thrive, a global economy must have a more solid foundation in shared values and institutional practice. It must advance broader and more inclusive social purposes. Basic needs must be satisfied as an end in itself, but also as a means to allow people to be able to cease to a greater extent the benefits of globalization..... Public sector capacity-building in terms of institutions, human resources, mobilization, and management of

resources, as well as innovation and information technology, is crucial in ensuring that countries can seize the opportunities of globalization. There is a growing need to strengthen national capacity to design and implement people-centered programs and policies; to strengthen national capacity to ensure that countries benefit from globalization, while minimizing its costs; to enhance citizen participation at all levels of governance, and to foster partnerships between the State, civil society and the private sector for development» (Bertucci-Alberti:2001, 25-26).

People expect the state to create jobs and provide them with a social security net. Whatever its defects, whatever the virtues of the private sector, no structure other than the state can today provide citizens with the basic public goods. Sen notes that: "what people can positively achieve is influenced by economic opportunities, political liberties, social powers, and the enabling conditions of good health, basic education, and the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives» (Sen: 1999, 5). The State has a very important role to play in this respect. Under the present right-wing government of Nea Dimokratia in Greece, which is not particularly at odds with neoliberalism, a very active role of the state is not expected. Also is not expected the introduction of a serious program of public investment and demand-boosting to stimulate the national economy and enter into a virtuous circle of recovery. It is clear that the right-wing in Greece remains locked up in the anachronistic undertaking of neoliberalism and does not follow the example of a modern European center-right like German CDU that turned to the values of social justice, putting forward policies that combined economic growth, social cohesion, orderliness. As a result, there was a clear political stigma, the widening of social alliances, and finally systematic sweeping victories of the European center-right. This explains why in countries like Germany, the first socio-economic effects of the crisis (redundancies, unemployment eruptions, falling purchasing power) are not particularly acute and did not lead to a more radical electoral behavior and instead created the paradox that the neoliberal right-wing factions which launched with their antisocial policies the attack on social acquisitions were strengthened as well as the far-right regimes that played elaborately with the issue of security and immigration. While one would expect, due to the crisis, the strengthening of anti-capitalist tendencies and ideas, it was at least the opposite.

The modern center-right, in many cases, adopted the Keynesian logic of strengthening demand through public spending and government interventions. However, for a public spending strategy to be successful, it must be designed based

on the social entity (social benefit) and the costs involved (social costs). Public goods resulting from the corresponding public expenditure are usually produced by public bodies (e.g. national defense, internal security). Similarly, in Greece, most of the public goods, for which there is a need for intervention by public bodies for their provision, are produced by their public bodies and are provided free of charge to the people of the community. Their cost is covered by income taxation. According to economic theory, Public goods, have the special feature that the user who enjoys them can not prevent other users from enjoying them at the same time, according to the principles of indivisibility and publicness (Rawls:2003,235). Clean air is a public good that is not guaranteed only for half the inhabitants of a region (taxpayers or those who do not pollute). Air quality is common to all. Public order and the protection of the life and property of citizens were predominantly public goods (Janda, Berry, Goldman: 2009, 9). It is common ground that this is an area in which private initiative alone is not enough. We would say that security, more than education and health, is the main reason why people have, and still tolerate, states (Gros:2016, 10-12).

Balanced policy in a modern state

A relatively balanced policy within a modern state aims primarily to ensure:

1. The optimal distribution of available productive factors (labor, capital, buildings, land, and so on) between different users to ensure sufficient production of goods and services that will meet the needs of the population over time.
2. Excellent distribution of national income (total country production in one year, measurable in value, i.e. in euros) according to the prevailing perceptions of social justice to prevent social unrest. With Marxist terminology, one would say that the mitigation of class contradictions through the closing of the income gap is a precondition for social peace. The distribution is through tax deduction of income from them with and through pensions or benefits that add income to non-residents. A critical dimension is the ability to pursue a social policy that in some cases serves (the social democratic model) to lift inequality, but in other cases (liberal model) the maximum requirement is to provide a safety net to alleviate extreme poverty. In the

countries of mainland Europe where social protection is almost identical to social security (as in Greece), the main objective is to promote social cohesion — a goal incompatible with a rapid deterioration of inequality, but not necessarily with keeping it at a stable and perhaps relatively high level.

3. Steady, balanced, and long—term growth combined with pursuing full employment and the achievement of price stability. Combined policies attempt to achieve the economic well-being of the people and their dignified survival, but at least to meet their basic needs above the poverty line. It is obvious and understandable that, depending on the political and ideological nature of each government, its priorities, its capabilities, and the culture of every people, the center of gravity will be placed in one of the three basic objectives of every modern state.

A state with strong feelings of law and social equality will mainly seek to ensure excellent distribution of national income and stabilization of prices. A state that holds liberal views (in the good sense ...) will seek to make the most of the factors of production and promote growth, without generating major failures in social cohesion. A neoliberal government, on the other hand, will turn its interest in a democracy that is synonymous with the free market, while issues of equality, social justice will be of secondary importance and used to reduce those who are subjected to social exclusion and punishment by the system itself (e.g. charities).

Despite the logical consistency of these differences, some analysts point to the objection that "Governments across the globe, from liberal to social-democratic, are pushing policies that transfer wealth from many too few and shape the conditions for the birth of ruined societies are squeezed out of poverty, unemployment, social hardship and dissatisfaction, crime and the brutality of the police. For many years, reports of super-governmental institutions such as Social Watch, UNICEF, and the United Nations Development Program have attempted to draw attention to the worsening socio-economic conditions around the world. Internationally recognized personalities from the economy, such as Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, denounce the anti-democratic and immoral agenda of the neoliberal elite. “ With the economic crisis of 2007, however, the dividing lines between right and left again became distinct. Modernizing social democracy, following the Third Way model, has in many cases implemented extreme neoliberalist prescriptions, and has abandoned the social

state as its basic ideological prowess, instead of stifling social inequalities. It then lost the traditional social strata that historically supported it, eventually falling into a deep identity crisis. It followed in many cases the election shrinking. Furthermore, it is obvious that due to the international economic crisis, the post-industrial social-democrat recipes have recurred their timeliness and charm.

The fundamental distinction between right and left

The fundamental distinction between right and left is, therefore, re-emerging as a dilemma between the market and society. However, economic growth can only go hand in hand with social equality if there is a democratic control and if the state is active as regulative Institution. This is a qualitative differentiation concerning the political philosophy of modernizing social democracy which has been of prime importance in development. Of course, we must look at solutions that are both visionary and workable. "At the level of implementation, the most effective answer was the Keynesian Revolution in the 1950s and 1960s, which confirmed the full compatibility between a market economy and social cohesion, provided that the state faces the massive flaw of the former: the structural trend towards insufficient demand. The undisputable substantial success of Keynesian macroeconomic policies supporting public demand depended, however, on two fundamental conditions: the economic sovereignty of the nation-state within its boundaries, and the explicit or silent agreement between entrepreneurs and workers to redistribute the profits resulting from the increase in productive income (so-called income policy) '. Of course, the state today has greater difficulty in defining economic policy autonomously than in 20 or 30 years ago. The proliferation of financial instruments has created what some call "shadow worlds" — shadowy in the sense that they escape the control of the bodies assigned to them to manage economic policy. There is, therefore, a very level issue of democracy.

The new government of Nea Dimokratia which is now an irreversible event should carefully and cautiously manage the actors of the traditional form of interest mediation (strong interests, economic and political oligarchies, guilds, unions, clerks, etc.) who often offer specialized integration of their interests into the system, to gain access to the core of the political system. Greece, which has undergone the economic crisis with drastic cuts in its traditionally deficient social state, has to respond directly

to the marked underinvestment in public goods (in key areas such as education, health, natural disasters, dealing with decent living conditions). The most important tool for inputting resources for the policy is the tax system. But in times of crisis, the tax system can be tyrannical since the lack of income to economic actors. Nevertheless, during the pandemic, taxes remained stable in Greece, proving once again that the tax relief policy that usually characterizes the right is applied piecemeal and arbitrarily.

The social and political impact of the pandemic crisis

Under the influence of the pandemic crisis (COVID-19), social differences are confirmed and intensified in all of Europe and Greece. Especially the social strata with lower levels of education and income are particularly affected by the negative economic consequences. The percentage of people who lose their job or work for a short period is higher than the lower the level of education is. The coronavirus pandemic threatens to worsen social inequality in many countries. This is the result of a survey by the aid organization Oxfam, which, among other things, asked almost 300 economists from 79 countries. The Oxfam (2021) report notes that the 1,000 richest people in the world have returned to the record level of their pre-pandemic fortunes in just nine months, while the poorest will need more than ten years to recover financially. According to Oxfam worldwide, billionaires saw their fortunes increase by 3.9 trillion. Dollars from March 18 to December 31, 2020. According to the research, income inequality will increase even more as a result of COVID-19. People living in poverty are more exposed to the coronavirus, the report said. Especially those who work in the informal work sector (e.g. undeclared work), can not work from home and are therefore multiply exposed at risk of infection. The research also notes that inequality will be particularly evident in the global supply of vaccines. It is also clear that many countries like Greece are pursuing a pandemic distribution policy that favors the strong over the weak. Certainly, inequality is not produced by the pandemic but by conditions in society, in economic structures, and existing distribution mechanisms that lead to inequalities. Against the coronavirus, all people are equal. However, for those with poor working or housing conditions, inequality is on the rise. In this sense, we should not blame the virus, but those who are politically responsible and make decisions in the course of the pandemic regarding distribution

policy that makes the position of the weak difficult and strengthen the strong. In Greece, the intensifying social disproportions during the pandemic are illustrated with a simple example. Families suffering from a loss of income from the pandemic usually shop at discounted Lidl-type supermarkets, making the richest German and owner of Lidl, Dieter Schwarz, even richer. These structures create more inequality. In any case, the way people are affected is very unequal, especially in terms of their social status. In any case, the steps were taken towards relaxation, trends to intensify the social selectivity of the measures rather than mitigate it. In his socio-scientific analysis of viral pandemics, Mike Davis (2020) makes a striking reference to the obvious link between illness, living conditions, social status, and malnutrition. They are the already marginalized and precarious groups in society that are most exposed to the dangers of the pandemic. This is true for Greece, but even more so from a global perspective. Indicatively in Brazil, the middle and upper classes brought the virus to the country, but the pandemic was transmitted to the slums especially through domestic helpers. In New York, the black neighborhoods of Queens and the Bronx are the places where the virus is most prevalent, and across the country, the death rate among black populations is well above average. In countries like Ecuador, which is characterized by high social inequality and weak health systems, the pandemic is raging almost uncontrollably. Such a development should be feared in Europe, especially in the refugee camps on the Greek islands or on the Balkan route, where there is a fundamental lack of adequate protection and care. It is obvious, after all, that in mass housing installations the principles of "stay home" and keep our distance can not be easily applied. Staying at home is the prerogative of the upper classes and knowledge workers.

The New York Times (Gramio, 2020) published data according to which 61.5% of the upper-income strata of the population can work from home, while the same applies to only 9.2% of the lower strata. Therefore, the risk of infection is distributed in a socially selective way. The highest risk is borne by the nursing staff and especially the nurses and the employees in the field of education, the security authorities, the workers in the field of logistics.

However, it is not only the risk of infection that is socially unequally distributed but also the burden of banning contacts and closing schools. Anyone living with five children in a two-room apartment without a balcony and garden, which is not uncommon in major cities due to the housing crisis, can not stay home

permanently. Learning and working are impossible, and it is not uncommon for there to be a lack of digital infrastructure to use the school's online offerings. For children from less privileged families, in particular, long-term success in school, transition to high school, or professional life is at stake. Reasonably, therefore, Paul Spicker (2020) wonders what can happen to people who are unable to follow the prescription of isolation. In particular, Spicker states that two-thirds of the population of Great Britain cannot be isolated in their home, to keep a distance, and not to have contact with others. Some do not have a home. Some share their bedrooms with others. Besides, Spicker points out that recipients of benefits are subject to severe penalties for non-compliance with benefits regulations, including the requirement to look for work, attend meetings and appointments, and be on an ongoing basis. Beneficiaries have limited maneuvering limits — there are limits to periods of illness and how long a person can be justified. At the same time, according to Spicker, one has to wonder where people's incomes will come from in a lock-down society. But there is a more serious underlying problem: our capitalist economy and labor market do not provide regular, stable incomes for many people. In many countries, successive governments have undermined the principle of social protection that is needed today more than ever. The inertia of the economy contributes to the deepening of inequality. Mostly fake self-employed, contract workers, and undocumented construction workers are now out of work. Hardline people who have painstakingly set up small businesses and are now threatened with bankruptcy are also burdened.

According to Offe (2020), the pandemic in itself leads to a new kind of stratification: retirees receive health care benefits compared to employees, children and young people with strong immune systems have an advantage over the elderly, those who work with options, home office compared to employees with a living presence at work and direct contact with the client, the rural population has the advantage over the urban population, etc. The hypothesis that the socio-economically vulnerable part of the population (from supermarket cashiers, nursing staff, parcel transporters to refugees) is increasingly exposed to both income disadvantages and exposure to the risk of health. Both the individual loss of well-being caused by the lock-down and the risks of infection and disease is extremely unequally distributed. In particular, the risks are focused on the clients of clinics and nursing homes as well as their staff (“hospital” risks), Older people, people with pre-existing aggravating diseases, people with contacts with local risk groups. Under these circumstances, a

differentiation of the income and risk balancing arrangements for specific groups is justified in light of the violations of their fundamental rights associated with the increased risk. Including the differentiated compensation for the violations and disadvantages that exist. The predominant conflict of interest, which may be temporarily disguised by the generalization of interventions, is that between generations. The unprecedented high material and social costs of pandemic mitigation strategies are not evenly distributed. It is borne by the younger and middle generations, who are severely affected by unemployment and other losses of prosperity. This disproportionate distribution of costs and benefits fuels a potential for conflict that is likely to escalate in the long run in terms of explosiveness, at least in terms of fundamental rights guarantees (a “right to life”) and will be difficult to resolve.

The public perception of solidarity as it relates to shaping the relationship between very high-risk and very low-risk populations is likely to change in the long run and is no longer defined by the idea of a common problem situation to which the solidarity requirement applies («all on a boat»). A collective perception could well become dominant and politically indisputable, based on which a large majority would stand safely on the shore watching a boat sink too far and wondering why it should stand in solidarity with the passengers of the sunken ship and accept the serious disadvantages associated with it.

It follows from the above considerations that preventive health policy should focus entirely on vulnerable groups, whose members, both in their capacity as potential sources, such as v. one as the victims of the infection should be isolated, while the majority of the younger population could be largely relieved of the cost through passive and active protection measures.

In addition to inequality, post-democratic (Crouch 2008) and biopolitical (Foucault 1977, 1978, 2006) trends intensify through the mass pandemic. These trends preceded the pandemic, but now I have experienced tremendous acceleration and expansion. Post-democratic trends and the restriction and erosion of participatory and democratic decision-making processes, as well as biopolitical trends and the increasing isolation of people based on health policy and the restriction of their fundamental rights, are closely linked. These trends may be exacerbated by digital technologies (Boehme-Neßler 2018; Frieters-Reermann, Söder 2018; Martinsen 2018) and lead to further risks and side effects associated with population control and the

restriction of its fundamental rights. Thus, what Colin Crouch described a few years ago as a central aspect of a post-democratic order is being intensified: the shift of politics to the almost apolitical realm of expert opinion. Democracy is undermined by the tendency to make social conflicts impossible. The problem is not that experts are being heard, but that disagreements in the field of science are being ignored and marginalized in the political arena. There are differences among virologists that are even clearer, for example, regarding the continued existence of the debt brake. The real political decision, that is, the question of which experts are ultimately selected, is neither transparently transparent nor democratically negotiated.

Furthermore, the pandemic has indeed consolidated forms of control of individuals associated with the dominant neoliberalism. The control of individuals as conscious political actors is not carried out through a dystopian Orwellian universe ("Big Brother"), is not based on total devotion to the Party (Stalinism) nor, of course, is subjected to a test of compliance with the dominant ideology (Nazism, fascism) (Gros, 2016). Security now penetrates so indirectly into the daily lives of the auditees that it looks like their own conscious choice. The flows are fully controlled by the state at the same time that there is a widespread impression that they are self-regulating. Consultative democracy is depoliticized. Therefore, the pandemic strengthened the neoliberal form of security as synonymous with biosecurity, i.e the preventive control of all necessary parameters, to enable the normal operation of activity, the normal conduct of a process. What is being observed at the moment, according to Stefan Lessenich, is a post-democratic policy that "does not tolerate conflicts of interest" and invokes the "unity of the nation". It is therefore not surprising that the measures have a nationalist aspect. De facto throughout Europe — and beyond — barriers to the movement and free movement of people have returned, in contrast to the movement of goods, it has stopped. However, this is not the result of a European decision, but the result of national decisions. It is no coincidence that this direction has often been led by politicians who, since the summer of 2015, have called for tighter border controls and the prevention of immigration. Understandably, free movement is restricted. However, given that the pandemic is very uneven in countries, it is not clear why freedom of movement is restricted along national borders. Internally, there is an excessive suspension of basic rights, the expansion of police powers, and an authoritarian mindset of control. State regulations and regulations are formulated in an unnecessarily inaccurate and vague way, leaving

police authorities with a high degree of freedom of interpretation, which they sometimes use. In many states, there are lists of fines for imposing sanctions for violations of the restrictions with relatively high fines. In extreme cases, there is still a risk of police detention. Overall, as research shows, the measures adopted have found great consent. However, the citizens themselves often denounce violations that have to do with a latent "authoritarianism that has been firmly entrenched for several years. In the period of pandemic management the "escape to the authoritarian" is more evident than in the past in all political settings (Heitmeyer,2020).

Under the above conditions, the management of public goods by the state obeys the rules of emergency while for countries like Greece many years of austerity have preceded associated with reduced spending in critical areas such as health and especially investment in beds and intensive care equipment. This gap today is highlighted by the onset of the pandemic, making the right-wing sermons on fiscal restraint not only inappropriate but also impractically. The result is that right-wing governments are forced by de facto and practical needs to pursue social democratic policies for the management of public goods and many times more irrationally than previous center-left governments. It is true that the pandemic crisis «has stalled the recovery momentum built up over previous years (Greek GDP was expected to rise by more than 2 pct before the coronavirus struck), halted the job creation that was reducing unemployment – albeit with many part-time positions – and brought back the destabilising sense of uncertainty that was prevalent during the crisis Greece went through from 2010 onwards. The budget also sets out the 62 fiscal interventions totalling more than 31 billion euros to mitigate the economic consequences of the pandemic. As a result, after years of running primary surpluses as part of its radical fiscal adjustment during the EU-IMF bailouts, Greece is on course to produce a primary deficit of 11.14 billion euros, or 6.8 pct of (Malkoutzis, Mouzakis , Bensasson:2021, 1)».

The greatest victory of social democracy in our time is the implementation of its policy by the right. This political victory, of course, should concern the Social Democrats because while their policy is partially implemented, they do not govern themselves.

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